1965
Vietnam War Timeline
1965 |
Vietnam War Timeline |
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US Army Video Showing American Operations in Vietnam
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Sir Paul Hasluck, Australian Minister for External Affairs
"What is happening in South East Asia today is not a local, temporary or
isolated situation. It is part of the rivalry of power and the ideological contest which
is taking place throughout the world. It is part of the stream of events continuing into
the future. In both of those contests the most significant factor in Asia is China".
US State Department; "In Vietnam, a Communist government has set out
deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state..[by a] carefully
planned program of concealed aggression ... as real as that of an invading army. The war
in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established
government".
Richard M. Nixon
"It will take two or three more years of intensive activity to win military victory
over the Viet Cong".
Project OMEGA was started by Gen. Westmoreland as an intelligence, behind the
lines, unit in 1965. As it was designed, it: gathered intelligence on enemy
positions, called in air strikes, evaluated bombing damage and conducted special
raids against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. Initially, it was comprised
of 900 Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Troops and 125 American (mostly
Special Forces) personnel. It was renamed in 1967 as the Mobile Guerrilla Force
and then joined the Studies and Observation Group (SOG).
January - 1965
Memorandum by William P. Bundy, "Notes on the South Vietnamese Situation and Alternatives, 6 January 1965
Cable from U.S. Embassy (Saigon), [U.S. Security Measures in Vietnam] (January 6, 1965).
8 January - Two thousand South Korean troops arrive in South Vietnam. In total, between 1965 and 1973, 312,853 South Korean soldiers fought in Vietnam; Vietnam's Ministry of Culture and Communications estimated they killed 41,400 North Vietnamese Army soldiers and 5,000 civilians
The Australian Army Training Team(AATTV) is increased to 100 Officers and Warrant Officers.
11 - 27 January. Buddhists demonstrate against the government of Tran Van
Huong. The demonstrations continue and intensify until the Armed Forces Council ousts
Huong.
"America Policy in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia," William P. Bundy, Remarks Made Before the Washington (Mo.) Chamber of Commerce on January 23, 1965
27 January. South Vietnamese Generals instigate another coup and
declare Tran Van
Huong incapable of maintaining order and call upon General Nguyen Khanh to form a new
Government.
Escalation of the Vietnam War officially started on the morning of January 31, 1965 when orders were cut and issued to mobilize the 18th TAC Fighter Squadron from Okinawa to Danang AFB. A red alert alarm to "scramble" was sounded at Kadena AFB at 3:00 a.m. F-105's, pilots and support were deployed from Okinawa and landed in Vietnam that afternoon to join with up with other smaller units who had already arrived weeks earlier. Preparations were under way for the first step of Operation Flaming Dart .
Draft Memorandum by J.T. McNaughton, "Observations About South Vietnam After Khanh's 'Re-Coup'," 27 January 1965
Australian Unit War Diaries
February - 1965
1 - 6 February - The Viet Cong call a "Tet Truce" to mark the Vietnamese New
Year.
3 February - US National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy with a team of experts
arrive in Saigon and quickly conclude that "the situation was as bad as had been
feared".
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7 February - American Advisor's compound at Pleiku is attacked, killing 8 US soldiers
and wounding 128 others, damaging or destroying 122 aircraft. This was branded as, "
a provocation that altered the entire course of the war". In retaliation , 49 US
carrier aircraft from the US Seventh Fleet conduct large scale air strikes against targets
in North Vietnam. US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and McGeorge Bundy urge President Johnson for a
policy of "sustained reprisal".That same day Coral Sea's Air Wing 15 and Hancock's
Air Wing 21 conducted Flaming Dart I, a multi plane attack on Dong Hoi. |
McGeorge Bundy, "A Policy of Sustained Reprisal," 7 February 1965
William Bundy Discusses Vietnam Situation, February 7, 1965
Letter from Mike Mansfield to Lyndon Johnson, [Views on Vietnam] (February 8, 1965).
10 February - The Viet Cong(VC) destroy a hotel used by US servicemen in
Qui Nhon. Twenty three die. President Johnson immediately approves "a second series
of reprisals". On the 1Oth, carrier forces were ordered to respond to yet another
Communist attack, this time the sabotage of the American quarters in Qui Nhon, which
resulted in 54 casualties. The following day, as the U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Forces
hit Vu Con, 95 aircraft from Ranger, Hancock, and Coral Sea , in Flaming Dart lI, bombed and strafed enemy barracks at Chanh Hoa. But even as the Flaming Dart operations were underway, U.S. leaders decided that continued Communist resistance
demanded resort to the last stage in the program of military persuasion, a sustained and
increasingly intensive bombing effort in North Vietnam.
Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from William P. Bundy, "Additional Military and Diplomatic Possibilities," 10 February 1965
16 February 1965.- Discovery of a 100-ton North Vietnamese trawler
unloading munitions on a beach in South Vietnam's Vung Ro Bay. The incident spurred further U.S. Navy involvement in the Vietnam War.
17 February - US President Johnson, "We have no ambition there
for ourselves.... We seek no wider war..... the US... would persist in the defence of
freedom".
US asks for Military Staff talks with Australia as a matter of urgency.
Draft Memorandum from William P. Bundy, "Where are We Heading?" 18 February 1965
Minutes, "National Security Council Meeting, Thursday, February 18, 1965, Cabinet Room, 5:20 p.m."
19 February. President Johnson decides on "Operation Rolling
Thunder.... a program of "measured and limited air action" against military
targets in North Vietnam, south of the 19th Parallel".
February 19, U.S. Air Force B-57s conducted the first jet strikes flown by Americans in support of South Vietnamese ground units.
February 19, 1965, several dissident South Vietnamese Generals moved their battalions into Saigon with the intention of ousting General Nguyen Khanh. General Khanh escaped to Da Lat with the aid of Air Marshall Nguyễn Cao Kỳ, which enabled him to crush any coups that were launched against the new regime. He threatened to bomb Saigon and Tan Son Nhut Airport unless the rebel troops were withdrawn, but was dissuaded from this by General William Westmoreland, Commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
23 February - Australian Government cables Washington, agreeing to
military staff talks.
24 February - The Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment,(1 RAR) is warned that his unit would be deployed to "somewhere in South
East Asia".
The first official admission that US airmen are flying combat missions against the VC in
South Viet Nam(SVN).
Secretary Rusk's Defense of the Legal Basis for the American Bombing of North Vietnam, News Conference, 25 February 1965
26 February -President Johnson authorized the deployment to Danang of two
Marine battalion landing teams, a medium helicopter squadron, and headquarters elements of
the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
27 February - Statement Submitted by Adlai Stevenson to U.N. Summarizing a Significant Report Entitled, "Aggression from the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign to Conquer South Vietnam," Released 27 February 1965
"Aggression from the North," State Department White Paper on Vietnam, February 27, 1965
28 February, A1-E Skyraiders and Skyhawks from Coral Sea carried out
the first such attack with a concentrated strike on Mu Gia Pass near the North Vietnamese -Laotian border. After an Air Force attack on critical Nape Pass, early in
March, Hancock planes again struck Mu Gia. In both operations the logistic routes
were cut at critical points and delayed- action bombs made the areas difficult for the
enemy to traverse. Still, the North Vietnamese soon managed to repair the roads, construct
bypasses, and maintain the logistic flow. By 23 March 1965, Seventh Fleet aircraft had
carried out half of the 43 Barrel Roll missions with 134 strike, 28 flak suppression, 56
combat air patrol, 32 aerial photographic, and 25 escort sorties. Nonetheless, American
military and civilian leaders concluded that the overriding political objective of the
campaign, to deter North Vietnamese subversion of South Vietnam and Laos, had not been
achieved.
29 February - Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Shane
Paltridge whilst visiting Saigon announces more civil aid for Vietnam and the addition of
seventeen advisers.
Australian Unit War Diaries
March - 1965
By March 1965, the government and armed forces of South Vietnam were on the verge of
collapse under the weight of the enemy's political-military offensive. Since the year-long
American punitive campaign failed to deter the North Vietnamese, the Johnson administration decided that a massive effort was required to strengthen the South's stand
against its Communist foe. The regular and paramilitary units were especially in need of
increased American assistance. But in a departure from previous assumptions, U.S. leaders
concluded that a rebuilding program would succeed only behind a shield of American
military power. At the same time, they intended to make the cost of continued military
action increasingly prohibitive for the Communists. In practical terms, this meant the use
of the American Armed Forces to 1) interdict the infiltration of enemy supplies and
reinforcements into the South and 2) to destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units
in-country so that a renewed nation- building effort could proceed and, it was hoped,
prosper.
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2 March. Operation "Rolling Thunder " commences. First Shots The operation became the most intense air/ground battle waged during the Cold War period, indeed, it was the most difficult such campaign fought by the U.S. Air Force since the aerial bombardment of Nazi Germany during World War II. Thanks to the efforts of its allies, North Vietnam fielded a potent mixture of sophisticated air-to-air and ground-to-air weapons that created one of the most effective air defense environments ever faced by American military aviators. After one of the longest aerial campaigns ever conducted by any nation, Rolling Thunder was terminated as a strategic failure in late 1968 having achieved none of its objectives.Video - Duration: 8: 40 min's |
The targets, timing of the attack, and other details of the operation were all decided in Washington, D.C. There were only two targets. Both were relatively minor, located just north of the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam. The enemy’s real strength around Hanoi and Haiphong was not touched, not even threatened. It was a strange way to begin a war.Air Force F-105s, F-100s, and B-57s struck an ammunition depot at Xom Bang, 10 miles north of the DMZ. Meanwhile, Navy and South Vietnamese aircraft bombed a naval base at Quang Khe, 65 miles from the DMZ. It would be almost two weeks before the next Rolling Thunder missions took place, again against minor targets not far above the DMZ. Maxwell Taylor, the ambassador to South Vietnam (and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), doubted that the enemy was impressed. “I fear that to date Rolling Thunder in their eyes has merely been a few isolated thunderclaps,” Maxwell Taylor said. “The North Vietnamese probably didn’t even know the planes were there,” said Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief of US Pacific Command.
The North Vietnamese respond by building up a comprehensive air defence
system. Throughout the Rolling
Thunder campaign, the Navy maintained units in the Gulf of Tonkin to retrieve downed fliers from the sea and from North Vietnam and Laos. Normally,
two destroyers were deployed to the forward, North SAR Station (20N 107E) and another two
to the South SAR Station (19N 106E). To carry out rescues in North Vietnam's lethal
environment, one UH-2 Sea Sprite helicopter equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks, machine
guns, and armor was nested on board a ship at each station. Another four similarly armed
and armored Sikorsky SH-3A Sea Kings (the primary rescue helicopter) were based in one of
the Yankee Station carriers. During major air operations, one or two SH-3As orbited over
the destroyers. Each of the other aircraft carriers carried a detachment of three
unreconfigured UH-2 Sea Sprite helicopters devoted to sea rescues. Air Force Sikorsky HH-3E
helicopters, Grumman HU-16 amphibian aircraft, and A-l Skyraider escorts also operated in
the gulf. To provide the SAR helicopters with enemy ground fire suppression,
communications, and other support during operations, the fleet kept four A-l Skyraiders, A4, or A-7 attack aircraft airborne and ready for action. Under the overall control of Commander Task
Force 77, the SAR Coordinator directed the Navy's effort from a North SAR Station
destroyer. This officer guided the actions of the airborne on-scene commander and arranged
for additional support when it was needed.
3 to 10 March - Representatives from MACV, the U.S. Navy, and the South
Vietnamese Navy hammered out details of the establishment of a combined coastal patrol.
The operation, named Market Time, was intended to complete the cordon being drawn around
the South Vietnamese battleground. The decision for American forces to join in combat with
the enemy in South Vietnam was also reached during this period. At first, ground troops
were considered only as protection for the vital American air and naval installations at
Danang against Viet Cong and regular North Vietnamese attack.
5 March - A new direction in American strategy jelled during a meeting
in Washington on 15 March 1965 of the U.S. foreign policy and military establishment. The
President authorized the Pacific Command to carry out a systematic bombing campaign
against North Vietnamese lines of communication, military installations, and logistic
facilities south of the 20th parallel. Thereafter, the Rolling
Thunder program focused
less on influencing the enemy's will than on hurting his actual physical capability to
support the military venture in the South. Much the same occurred with the Yankee Team and Barrel Roll operations in Laos. The Seventh Fleet's naval air forces were given somewhat
greater latitude in target, ordnance, and aircraft selection, in operational control, and
in other tactical considerations.
Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Lyndon Johnson, [Discussion on Vietnam] (March 6, 1965).
Draft Memorandum from McNaughton to Robert McNamara, "Proposed Course of Action re: Vietnam," (draft) 24 March 1965
March 8, 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam to defend Danang AFB.
30 March - Military staff talks between US, Australia and New Zealand in
Honolulu. US wants ground forces. Australian Delegate Air Marshall Scherger
returns to Australia and recommends to the Government that an Australian Battalion should
be offered as part of the US Forces.
A bomb explodes outside the US Embassy, killing two Americans and wounding the US Deputy
Ambassador.
General Westmoreland asks the US President for one Division of troops to combat the
communist threat in the central highlands and two battalions for air base protection. The
President approves the increase of two battalions but not the division. US Ambassador
convinces the President to adopt the 'enclave strategy'. This involved creating
defensive enclaves around air bases and ports.
The Rolling
Thunder bombing campaign and the 34A operation in North Vietnam, the Yankee
Team and Barrel Roll programs in Laos, the 34A operations, and the fleet's presence in the
South China Sea would continue for years. By mid-March of 1965, however, American leaders
concluded that these actions would not compel the North Vietnamese and the subordinate Viet Cong and Pathet Lao to forego their drive for control of Southeast Asia. Indeed, the
enemy attacks on the Desoto Patrol, stepped up Communist activity in South Vietnam and
Laos, and infiltration of regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units southward revealed
Hanoi's intention to turn up the heat. Having exhausted most of the options in the
campaign of coercion initiated in early 1964 without achieving the desired result, the Johnson administration sought a new strategy in Southeast Asia.
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March. 3,500 United States Marines land at Danang. President Johnson describes this as onyly being temporary. The Marines' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 was increased to nearly 200,000 by December Video1 - Duration: 6: 18 min's: Video 2 Duration: 2:24 min's |
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Reading Material Like Rolling Thunder - The Air War Over Vietnam |
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April - 1965
The passive defense mission was shelved on 1 April 1965 when President Johnson authorized the Marines at Danang to move out and engage Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in combat.
3 - 5 April. The first series of raids against bridges on the road to Hanoi begins. In
the course of this raid, North Vietnamese MIGS (Russian-built fighter aircraft) attack US
planes.
Reflecting the desire to concentrate greater resources against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, on 3
April the southern Laotian Panhandle was separated from the Barrel Roll operational area
in northeastern Laos and designated Steel Tiger. Two B-57 light bombers, supported by a C-130 dropping flares for illumination, flew the first Steel Tiger mission against the trail. Combat aircraft of all kinds would soon join in the attack.
1st Australian Logistics Support Company Diary - AWM95, 1/5/1 - 3-9 April 1965, Narrative, Annexes (2.11Mb PDF file)
6 April - National
Security Action memorandum signed by Bundy to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense
and the Director Central Intelligence Agency
7 April - Australian Cabinet agrees to provide a Battalion( 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment) if and
when requested by the US. The decision is welcomed by the US as, "the
sooner the better"..
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDA, NSAM 329: Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development, 9 April 1965
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDA, NSAM 330: Re 3/16/65 Rowan Report (Vietnamese Conflict), 9 April 1965
15 April - Coupled with this decision was approval during March for U.S.
carrier aircraft to strike enemy forces in South Vietnam. On 15 April planes from Midway,
Coral Sea, and Yorktown (CVS 10) conducted the first such attack against
Viet Cong positions northwest of Saigon. The ships sailed in a new carrier operating area
southeast of Cam Ranh Bay, at 11N 110E, known as Dixie Station. An aircraft carrier was
constantly stationed at Dixie Station between June 1965 and August 1966. Beginning in
April 1965 the fleet created a radar picket station between the Communist mainland and
Task Force 77 sailing in Tonkin Gulf. Normally, two destroyers stayed on alert at this
forward station. In July of the following year, this deployment was formalized with
establishment of PIRAZ (positive identification radar advisory zone), which entailed
locating and tracking all planes over the eastern regions of North Vietnam and the gulf by
a positioned surface ship equipped with advanced radar and communications. The unit also
vectored naval aircraft to and from their targets and warned them of approaching MiG's
Cable from Ambassador Taylor to Dean Rusk on the Step-Up in Ground Forces, 17 April 1965
By mid-April, 1965, (he Australian government's senior ministers had decided, but not yet announced, that an Australian battalion would be made available for service in South Vietnam. Meanwhile, a group of Anglican bishops had engaged the Liberal prime minister. Sir Robert Menzies, in a public exchange of letters over Australia's policy toward Vietnam. As this debate continued, the government's principal official adviser on foreign policy, the newly appointed secretary of the Department of External Aflairs, Sir James Plimsoll, urged Menzies to make his next contribution short and "unbelligerent" because "there are some aspects of the Vietnam situation which are so hazy that anything written, no matter how carefully, can be open to rebuttal."2 It was sound advice that bears repealing even today as the Vietnam War passes from politics into history.
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. 20 April - Under tight security Operation Plan
"Trimdon", codename for the dispatch of the Australian battalion is sent to top
levels in the Army. It includes a cover story explaining 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment as simply being
"exercised". 1 RAR were exercising in a joint Army/RAAF exercise in the "Colo - Putty area of NSW named Ex "Sky High 2" from 4 - 14 April. "Sky High 2" Documents General Instructions - Op Instructions - Road Movement Instructions - Air Loading Table - 1 RAR TAC Equipment Scale Warning(12.91 Mb pdf) |
A conference is held in Honolulu between US Ambassador Maxwell Taylor and senior US government and
military officials where they agree that an increase of US combat troops(9 battalions) to
Vietnam is needed and that they should solicit help from other countries, notably
Australia, New Zealand and South Korea.
21 April. Dr Phan Huy Quat, leader of the RVN government, is
reluctant to see the introduction of foreign combat troops. It is only after some
persuasion by the US that Dr Quat agrees and the Quat government further agrees to state
publicly that the battalion had been committed "at its request". The
announcement of the commitment by the Australia is delayed awaiting the
"appropriately worded" request from the Saigon government. The Australian
government did not want to announce the commitment until it could say that is was acting
"at the request of the RVN Government".
Dean Rusk, "American Foreign
Policy and International Law:South Vietnam's Right of Self Defense, April 23, 1965
McNamara Report of Meeting in Honolulu with William Bundy, McNaughton, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp, and Westmoreland, 21 April 1965
The American Ambassador in Saigon, Maxwell Taylor
The South Vietnamese government has "no enthusiasm" for foreign forces and was
"highly sensitive to criticism that the country was "taken over;
"anti-American sentiments lie just under the surface".
Australia's Ambassador Anderson Reinforces Taylor's Comments
"Foreign forces would only heighten Vietnamese xenophobia and encourage them
to leave the fight to the Americans".
Statement by President Johnson at a News Conference at the White House on April 27, 1965 and Transcript of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's News Conference of April 26, 1965 on the Situation in Viet-Nam
28 April - Australian Ambassador in Saigon David Anderson obtains
the formal agreement from the Republic of South Vietnam(RVN) Government .
29 April, 8 pm - Prime Minister Menzies Announces,
"that the government had received from South Vietnam a request for further military assistance" . “We have decided…in close consultation with the Government of the United States – to provide an infantry battalion for service in Vietnam.” He argued that a communist victory in South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia. “It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans” he added.
A decision that had been decided "weeks and weeks" before.
President Johnson warmly welcomed Australia's Commitment
"This action proves again the deep ties between our countries in the cause of
world peace".
Part of the Chief of Staff Directive to the Commander, Australian Force Vietnam
"As a result of a request of the Republic of Vietnam the Australian Government
had "agreed" to provide it military assistance to defeat
"Communist-inspired insurgency and aggression".
1965 Editorials - After the Announcement that Australia would commit troops to Vietnam
April 30 - The Australian Age - New Tasks in Vietnam
"The decision by the Australian government to send a battalion to South
Vietnam is a grave one and commits Australia to a more direct role in this cockpit of war
where the conflict for power between Communist China and the West in South East Asia has
been joined... These are inescapable obligations which fall on us because of our
geographical position, our treaty commitments and our friendships... There is clearly a
United States call to share, even in a small way, more of the burdens. There was no
alternative but to respond as we have".
April 30 - The Australian - The War That Can't be Won
"The Menzies Government has made a reckless decision on Vietnam which this nation
may live to regret. It has decided to send Australian soldiers into a savage,
revolutionary war in which the Americans are grievously involved - so that America may
share a tiny part of her embarrassment. Their decision is wrong, at this time, whichever
way we look at it. It is wrong because Australia's contingent can have only insignificant
military value, because it will be purely a political pawn in a situation for which
Australia has no responsibility whatsoever.
It is wrong because it deliberately and coldly runs counter to the mounting wave
international anxiety about the of the Vietnam war and the justification and perils of
America's military escalation ...Neither of the Pacific Defence treaties to which Australia
subscribes can honestly be invoked to justify the Menzies Government decision".
"ANZUS cannot apply, because the United States is not under attack. SEATO, more
worthless than ever, certainly doesn't apply...
But Australia has lined up her generations against the hatred and contempt of resurgent
Asian peoples - without adding one iota of confidence or strength to the tragically
embroiled American nation. It could be that our historians will recall this day with
tears".
30 April. The Canberra Times conducts a survey of late night
shoppers and finds that out of 44 people, 26 had no idea of what was happening in Vietnam,
including fifteen who had not heard of the decision to send troops to Vietnam.
For details of 1 RAR movement see 1 RAR Commander's Diaries - Period 30 April - 30 June 1965 (2.53 Mb)
Australian Unit War Diaries
1 RAR 
Slouch Hat
May - 1965
May 1 - The West Australian - Australia Faces Up To Reality
"The Federal government has made a grave decision in committing "900" Australian troops
to fight in South Vietnam. Yet, however much Australians might abhor the prospect of
becoming physically embroiled in the conflict in Vietnam, the government could not shirk
its responsibilities there. The decision gives expression to the fundamentals of our
policy in South East Asia. For the United States, the task of halting Communism aggression
involves mainly the principles of freedom and peace. For Australians, in Borneo and
Vietnam, our own security also is at stake, both now and in the future. The United States
wants to negotiated settlement in Vietnam. Its stepped-up campaign is designed only to
convince the Communists that they cannot take what they want by force. If the Americans
lose militarily or diplomatically, so do we".
May 1 - The Courier Mail - We Are At War
"This is a grim week-end for every Australian. we are now at war, a war which
will touch every one of us far more than most people, even today, will realize. Australia
is to fight on the Asian mainland to aid the United States in stopping the advance of
Communism, which threatens us directly. We are going with a token, but nonetheless
committed and lethal force to support the South Vietnamese Government against the
aggression of North Vietnam, backed by communist China".
Our Government has made the decision in our name, and that is its duty. The nation now has
to support that... For us, the cost will not be light. Brave men will die in jungles
without even seeing the other side's soldiers; many others will be wounded. At home we
will have to commit a great deal of our manpower and our economy to the fight. The easy
days ended with the Prime Minister's announcement on Thursday.
2 May - Australian Military Planning Team arrive in Saigon.
3 May - The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment has "Operation Plan Trimdon" upgraded to condition "yellow" (21 days to move) and issues a briefing document titled "Background to Vietnam".
3 May - US Army 173rd Airborne arrives in South Vietnam. The Australian
battalion is to be integrated into this unit.
5 May - The Daily Mirror - Troops for Vietnam
The decision of the Menzies Government to dispatch troops to South Vietnam is opposed
by many Australians.
- To send troops at this time is wrong because it flies deliberately in the face of
increasing international pressure for negotiation.
- It is wrong because it is not justified under either of our two Pacific pacts. SEATO and
ANZUS.
- It is wrong because our future is in South East Asia, and further commitment in Vietnam
could irreparably poison our relations with our neighbors.
Early May. A Morgan Gallup Poll seeks reaction to the decision to send
troops and finds 52% support, 37% oppose and 11% are undecided. 53% support and 29% oppose
the bombing military targets in North Vietnam. 64% favoured and 20% opposed American
forces staying in Vietnam. 64% to 16% believed Thailand and Malaysia would be taken over
by other countries if the United States left Vietnam. 72% to 16% believed that Australia
would eventually be in danger from China if the US pulled out of Vietnam.
11 May . The VC launched their wet season offensive by attacking the town
of Song Be, north of Bien Hoa.
13 May - Save Our Sons (SOS) founded in Sydney and oppose conscription.
13 May - 18 May :The US suspends air raids on North Vietnam for one week, hoping for a peaceful overture from the North Vietnamese. At the same time, the US launches a diplomatic offensive. Both actions prove to be fruitless.
Address by William P. Bundy Before Dallas Council on World Affairs on May 13, 1965, "Reality and Myth Concerning South Vietnam" .
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Bien Hoa Air Base Vietnam May 16 1965 Conflagration / Fire |
Letter from Clark Clifford to Lyndon Johnson, [The Vietnam "Quagmire"] (May 17, 1965).
19 May .When the North Vietnamese fail to respond to the US peace
initiative and suspension of bombing, President Johnson orders that the raids be resumed.
Raids are conducted against North Vietnamese oil storage tanks.
Address by William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Before the Faculty Forum of the University of California at Berkeley on May 27, 1965, "A Perspective on U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam"
20 May - The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment has "Operation Plan Trimdon" upgraded to condition "green". Departure date for main body on HMAS Sydney set
for 27 May. Advance party to depart by QANTAS
Australian airlines - QANTAS is called upon to provide aircraft to ferry
troops to Vietnam. QANTAS baulks at providing aircraft even though they were aware that
they had obligations in such a defence role.The airline cites "disruption to normal
commercial operations" as the excuse. The Government is unsympathetic and QANTAS
provides charter services to Vietnam, followed by a regular weekly service from
March 1968 until operations ceased on 26 February 1972. charter flight..
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25 May - 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment recce group (3 pax), 1st Australian Logistics Group recce group (4 pax) and 709 Sig Tp (3 pax) departs Kingsford Smith Airport on QANTAS commercial flight for Saigon via Singapore. The groups arrive Saigon 26 May 1500 hrs. HQ 145 Signal Squadron 709 Signal Troop 25 May 65 - 20 Nov 67. Richmond RAAF Base, NSW. May 1965. Troops of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR), carry their weapons up the front steps of a Qantas Boeing 707 at Richmond RAAF Base, NSW, during the loading of men and equipment bound for Vietnam. |
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Military Police patrol Danang streets - US operations in the Danang area May 1965 |
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27 May: "Op Plan Trimdon". HMAS Sydney escorted by HMAS 'Duchess' departs Australia at 1am with 347 officers and men from the B Coy 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment. Included is 1 Tp A Sqn 4/19 PWLH, stores and equipment. . The troop sailed to Vietnam aboard HMAS Sydney and arrived in Vung Tau on 11 June 1965. The troop included eight M113 APC, which had only recently been issued (the troop had been training with Ferret, Saracen and Saladin prior to departure) and two Landrovers. The troop formed the APC Troop of the 1st Australian Logistic Support Company, which was supporting the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment (1 RAR). In March 1966, the troop became officially known as the 1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop. Garden Island, NSW. 27 May 1965. Troops of 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR), wait on Fitting Out wharf to board HMAS Sydney as it comes alongside. The troopship was loaded and ready to sail to South Vietnam during the night. |
The enemy also was preparing. In Hanoi, the secretary general of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Le Duan, was responsible for the direction of the insurgency. Even as the 1st Battalion, RAR, was on the water and in the air, he wrote prophetically to his followers in the south: "If the Americans switch over to 'local war' in the South with from 250,000 to 300,000 troops, they will be confronted with our protracted war of resistance. To have to fight a long-drawn-out war is the US Achilles' heel."
28 May : Advance party 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment departs for Saigon via Manilla and arrives Saigon 29 May.
For details of 1 RAR movement see 1 RAR Commander's Diaries - Period 30 April - 30 June 1965 1.2 Mb
Australian Unit War Diaries
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| Canvas Gaiters | Old Style Cotton Ammunition Pouch | Bush Hat | Entrenching Tool | Machette |
June - 1965 - The Australian Involvement
The 'enclave strategy' is abandoned and the US President authorizes General Westmoreland to engage in 'counter insurgency combat operations'. ARVN losses are high and General
Westmoreland asks for a further 34 US battalions and 10 battalions from other countries.
He believes without substantial numbers of US combat troops South Vietnam will fall.
Westmoreland is given approval by the US President to use American forces in any situation
in which he deems necessary. Plans are drawn up to conduct a raid into War Zone D, a
communist sanctuary near the Bien Hoa airbase. The 173rd Airborne Brigade of which 1 RAR
will form part of, is chosen to lead the assault.
Nguyen Cao Ky becomes head of the Saigon Government.
1st - The Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment and a party of troops(27 pax) depart Richmond
Air Force base in Sydney, bound for Saigon. They arrive Saigon 0615 hrs 2 Jun.
3 Jun : 2nd charter flight consisting of 110 men from 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment departs Richmond on QANTAS charter flight at 1950 hrs and arrives Saigon 0610 hrs 4 June.
5 June - 3rd charter flight consisting of 110 men from 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment(1RAR) departs Richmond on QANTAS charter flight at 1950 hrs and arrives Saigon 0610 hrs 6 June.
6 June - US General Westmoreland visits 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment(1RAR).
6 & 7 June : Nine NCO's and soldiers from A Coy 1 RAR conduct a night ambush with the US 2/503 Bn. NTR
7 June: fourth charter flight consisting of 110 men from 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment departs Richmond on QANTAS flight at 1950 hrs and arrives Saigon 0610 hrs 8 June.
7 June - US General Westmoreland reports that North Vietnamese troops are
infiltrating South Vietnam (SVN) and ARVN forces are reluctant to assume the offensive and
in some cases their steadfastness under fire is coming into doubt. He asks for another
41,000 combat troops now and another 52,000 later. He also states; "Studies must
continue and plans developed to deploy even greater forces, if and when required".
Operation Name 17-65 CTZ TAO Phuoc Thanh Province
Start Date End Date 7/6/1965 7/9/1965 Units Involved 173d Airborne Brigade (USA)
8 & 9 June - Nine NCO's and soldiers from C Coy 1 RAR conduct a night ambush with the US 2/503 Bn . NTR
| 8 June - 5.30 am - HMAS Sydney with B Company,
the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment(1 RAR) and 1 Tp A Sqn 4/19 PWLH arrive at Vung Tau and are met by US General Westmoreland and other VIPs. The last flight ferrying troops from Australia arrives at
Saigon 1 RAR are now complete in situ. . The 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment is paraded at Bien Hoa and officially welcomed by General Nguyen Van
Thieu , Minister of Defence, Republic of Vietnam (RVN). . 9 & 10 June - The last ferry flights depart Australia. . For details of 1 RAR movement see 1 RAR Commander's Diaries - Period 30 April - 30 June 1965 (pdf) 1.2 Mb |
10 & 11 June - 12 officers and soldiers from B Coy 1 RAR conduct a night ambush with the US 2/503 Bn . NTR
Cable from Westmoreland to CINCPAC on concept of operations, force requirements and deployments, 13 June 1965
A five day battle in Phuoc Long province, 60 klms north of Bien Hoa between ARVN and
VC main force units causes heavy casualties to both sides including 13 US advisers killed
and ten wounded.
18 June. The first B-52 raids are launched against Viet Cong targets in
South Vietnam. Flying out of Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, twenty-seven aircraft used 750 and 1,000 pound bombs to attack a Viet Cong stronghold. During this mission two B-52Fs were lost in a mid-air collision; another was unable to conduct air refueling. Missions were commonly flown in three-plane formations known as "cells" and were also employed when ground units in heavy combat requested fire support.
June 19, 1965, the National Leadership Committee headed by General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu appointed Kỳ to the office of premier, the highest political office in South Vietnam
20 June - 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment takes responsibility for a Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR), an area extending 4000 metres to the Dong Nai River
as was approximately 3500 metres from east to west.
The
1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment is directed to:
1. (a) secure 1 RAR battalion defensive position - (b) secure assgned sectors and
airfield defence - (c) secure and defend the intermediate extended zone, and (d) patrol
the TAOR.
2. Conduct patrols and offensive operations to secure the Bien Hoa airbase and prevent
enemy massing for a surprise attack on Bien Hoa.
3. Conduct search and destroy operations.
| 1 RAR Op Order 1/65 Operational Dates: 25 - 26 June 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with in direct support 3/319th Arty (US) less one battery, in support E/17th Cav (US). Description: The battalion shake-down operation on joining 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (173d Bde) at Bien Hoa air base, in the form of a battalion search-and-destroy operation in an AO between the convergence of Routes 1 and 15 on Bien Hoa. The AO, of 24 square kilometres, lay astride a likely VC line of approach to attack the air base. Undulating terrain covered mainly in jungle. The operation was designed to clear a base area for the incoming 2d Bde Ist Inf Div(US). Deployment by helicopter. Location: West central Bien Hoa province, eleven kilometres SE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Two platoon-size VC camps located, VC documents and books captured. Remarks: The accidental detonation of a grenade on return from the operation killed three Australians and one US soldier, with a further soldier dying of wounds; eleven soldiers were injured including two US soldiers. A Court of Enquiry is appointed. 1 RAR Opord 1/65 pages 18 to 29 ( 2.53mb pdf file) Non Battle Casualties(NBCAS): Those killed: Bourke M.A. Pte 37867 1RAR C/7 19 RAIN F F /NBCAS Shrapnel wounds from Carroll's grenade. Carroll W.T. Pte 37010 1RAR C/7 21 RAINF F /NBCAS Grenade caught in webbing on side of truck. 29-6-65 Van Valen A. Pte 54320 1RAR C/7 21RAINF DOW/NBCAS At 3FDHOSP T.S.N. from Carroll's grenade on 26.06.65 . Those wounded: 214425 Pte B. Ornowske, 214897 L/Cpl G.E. Piper, 2411980 Pte A.E Miranda, 214386 Pte A.W Mc Donald, 54320 Pte A. Van Valen, 213507 Pte R.J.Goulden, 214428 L/Cpl W.G, Fry, 215927 Pte M. Jagers. US Casualties 1 killed 2 wounded. A solemn ceremony held after the accidental deaths |
| 1 RAR Op Order 2/65 Operational Dates: 29 - 30 June - The Assault into War Zone D 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with in direct support one battery 3/319th Arty (US). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being the security element for the 173d Bde FSPB in a brigade AO north of Tan Uyen, in the western area of War Zone D. The battalion AO covered 37 square kilometres. Undulating terrain covered mainly in jungle and brushwood. The operation was intended to prevent a build-up of the VC threat to Bien Hoa air base. Insertion by helicopter, extraction by APC. Location: Northern Bien Hoa province, nineteen kilometres north of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: WIA 4. Remarks: The first combined US-RVN combat operation of the war and the then largest heliborne troop-lift including the ARVN Abn Bde. 173d Bde reported VC: KIA 25 and the destruction or capture of more than 200 tonnes of rice and food, as well as three trucks. U.S. Department of State FRUS, Vol. II, 1964-68, Vietnam, January-June 1965 Office of the Historian , WIA's: 335092 Major J.B. Healy, 15546 Cpl J Kennedy, 42975 Pte K Gray, 2Lt C,E Leggett. |
Manning Details - Australian Army Forces Vietnam (AAFV)
1. Headquarters Australian Army Forces Vietnam (HQ AAFV) - Stationed at
Saigon. 12 officers and 22 other ranks. Total 34.
2. 1 RAR (including reinforcements) 37 officers and 766 other ranks.
Total 803.
3. 1st Australian Logistics Support Company(1ALSC) - 9 officers and 124
other ranks. Total 133.
4. 709 Signal Troop - 2 officers and 48 other ranks. Total 50.
5. Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) - already in situ. 15
Officers and 85 other ranks. Total 100
Initial Strength of Australian Armed Forces Vietnam (AAFV) - 1965 - 75 Officers and 1045 other ranks. Total strength = 1120
RPG - 7
July - 1965
General Westmoreland attempts to bring the role of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment into line with the US
operations by including 1 RAR as part of a general reserve required to carry out tasks
anywhere in Vietnam. Fearing heavy casualties, Australia's response is, "
1 RAR can best be employed, and make its most effective and valuable contribution to the
operations in South Vietnam by continuing on its present role and tasks in the
area".
Memo from George Ball to Rusk, McNamara, both Bundy's, McNaughton, and Unger, Part II Only, 29 June 1965
Memo from W. Bundy, "Holding On in South Vietnam," 30 June 1965
Memorandum for the President from George Ball, "A Compromise Solution in South Vietnam," 1 July 1965
11 July. US and Australian officials meet in Saigon where the US is
advised that Australia wishes are that 1st Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment continue in its present role of security at
Bien Hoa. Later, the 30-35 klm restriction put on 1 RAR operations was lifted and extended
to include the whole of III CTZ.
| 1 RAR OP 3/65- Operational Dates: 6-9 July 1965. Formations/units: 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with in direct support one battery 3/319th Arty (US). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being a manoeuvre element of 173d Bde, in a brigade AO east and NE of Tan Uyen, part of the SW area of War Zone D. The battalion AO was generally rectangular, extending north from the Song Dong Nai some six kilometres, and approximately three to four kilometres wide. Hilly terrain mainly covered in jungle. Enemy forces anticipated by the brigade were from squad to regimental size. Deployment by helicopter. Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, twelve kilometres NNE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: DOW 1, WIA 3; VC: KIA 2, wounded/escaped 7. Six camps and one old ambush position for 200-300 personnel located, also one tonne of rice. Remarks: 48th Inf Regt (RVN) blocked VC escape routes to the west of the brigade AO. 173d Bde reported own: KIA 10, WIA 46, with VC: KIA 51, possible KIA 350, PW 28, and more than 300 VC buildings destroyed, with 100 tons of rice destroyed or recovered, also one tonne of documents, 30 weapons and five radios captured. KIA: 8-7-65 Nalder W.L. Pte 2412151 1RAR D/12 19RAINF DOW At 173rd CCS from sniper GSW to chest that day. |
| 1 RAR Op 4/65 - Operational Dates: 17 July 1965 Formations/units: 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (less C and D Coy's on base patrol and support tasks) with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH). Description: A battalion search operation to destroy VC using portion of the 173d Bde TAOR for movement, conducted as a sweep from NW to SE into a stop position. The AO was approximately two square kilometres. Terrain-a generally gently sloping ridge line, rising from NW to SE, covered mainly in jungle. Deployment on foot, by APC. Location: Central Bien Hoa province, six kilometres NE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Nil. XT 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here when it arrived in VN. "Single Gun Ready" 15Jul65. 18Aug65, it was 6 km N of Bien Hoa at XT 99-21, on 27 Aug65 it was 2.5 km N of Bien Hoa. Bien Hoa Prov, III Corps. |
161 Bty, RNZA, comprised 140 men and was located at Bien Hoa as part of the United States 173rd Airborne Brigade. 161 Battery, RNZA, was based at Bien Hoa for one year, providing close fire support for the Brigade's three infantry battalions and for the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, which had joined the Brigade in June 1965.
20 July - Notes for Memorandum from McNamara to Lyndon Johnson, "Recommendations of Additional Deployments to Vietnam," 20 July 1965
24 July. Ground to air missiles fire at four US Phantoms over Vietnam, shooting down
one and damaging three. This marks the first time that US planes are attacked by surface
to air missiles (SAM).
26 July - President Johnson writes to Prime Minister seeking a further Australian
contribution .
28 July - Lyndon Johnson. In response to Westmoreland 's request for more troops.
"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Airmobile Division and certain other forces
which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately.
Additional forces will be sent as requested...... We do not want an expanding struggle
with consequences that no one can foresee, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our
power. But we will not surrender and we will not retreat".
Operation Name 19-65 (Opord 19-65) CTZ III
TAO Phuoc Tuy Province Search and Destroy
Objective of Operation to disrupt suspected VC supply route from Rung Sat into III CTZ
Start Date 28 Jul 1965 - 2 August 1965
173d Airborne Brigade (USA);
29 July - The Australian Defence Committee recommends additional
Australian forces.
| 1 RAR OP 5/65- Operational Dates: 29 July-3 Aug 1965. Formations/units: Under operational control of HQ 2d Inf Bde (US): 1 RAR, with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), in direct support 161 Bty, RNZA. Description: A battalion patrolling operation in both 1 RAR and 2/503d Inf (US) TAOR of 173d Bde TAOR, to provide warning for and defence of Bien Hoa air base during the brigade operation in Phuoc Tuy province. The AO, comprising the combined battalions' TAOR, was roughly rectangular, of 30 square kilometres. Undulating to flat terrain with rice, rubber plantations, vegetable farms and jungle. Deployment on foot, by APC for particular tasks. Location: Central Bien Hoa province, six kilometres NE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Two old VC camps located. Remarks: The first operation recorded as involving 161 Fd Bty(NZ) supporting 1 RAR. |
Australian Unit War Diaries
US strength at 81,400. US KIA 509.
M72 - LAW - Used Against Bunkers
August - 1965
1 - 3 August. A senior Australian Army Officer goes to Vietnam for
reconnaissance and discussions on a further Australian commitment.
Statement by President Johnson at White House News Conference on July 28, 1965, "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, August 16, 1965, p. 262.
| 1 RAR OP 6/65- Operational Dates: 7-11 August 1965 . Formations/units: 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with under command D/16th Armor (US), 1 APC Tp (PWLH), in direct support Bty B 3/319th Arty(US). Description: A battalion search-and-destroy operation in the SW area of War Zone D in an AO generally square in shape of 30 square kilometres. Hilly terrain, mainly covered in jungle. The enemy force was All Main Force Regt, with a local force screen. Insertion by trucks and APC, extraction by helicopter. Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, thirteen kilometres north of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: WIA 3; VC: KIA 3,wounded/escaped 5. Ten camps and two tonne of rice located. |
| 1 RAR OP 7/65- Operational Dates: 12 August-8 September 1965 Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command D/16th Armor (US), 1 APC Tp (PWLH), in direct support 161 Bty, RNZA, in support Bty B 3/319th Arty (US). Description: A battalion patrolling operation in both 1 RAR and 2/503d Inf (US) TAOR of 173d Bde TAOR, to provide warning for and defence of Bien Hoa air base, during the brigade operation in the area of Pleiku in II CTZ.The AO, comprising the combined battalions' TAOR, was roughly rectangular, of 30 square kilometres. Undulating to flat terrain, with rice, rubber plantations, vegetable farms and jungle. Deployment on foot. Location: Central Bien Hoa province, six kilometres NE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Nil |
17 August - The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the
Australian Cabinet approve the additional increment of 350 men. The Increment of the
Australian forces will consist of a field artillery battery(105 Fd Bty), a troops of
engineers, a reconnaissance flight (Sioux Helicopters), a signals troop and additions to
the existing headquarters and logistics support company.
17 August. Operation Starlite, the first major action fought by only US
forces, takes place. US marines numbering 5,500 destroy a Viet Cong base area near Van
Tuong. The attack is preceded by a massive artillery and air assault. US forces
successfully capture the Vietcong positions and rout the Communist forces. The US marines
lose 45 and claim to kill 668 Viet Cong.
| 1 RAR Op 8/65 - Operational Date: 18 August 1965 Formations/units: Task Force 'Lander' comprising, under command, C Coy 1 RAR, D/16th Armor (US), 1 APC Tp (PWLH), with in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ), in support Bty B 1/7th Arty (US). Description: An 'artillery raid', in which the guns of 161 Fd Bty (NZ) were established in a temporary gun position,forward in the TAOR on the southern side of the Song Dong Nai. From this advanced position they surprised the VC by firing on a target in depth-a suspected VC regimental sized assembly area NW of Tan Uyen. The AO was the immediate vicinity of the gun position, to provide for its close-in protection, and northwards one kilometre to the banks of the Song Dong Nai. Flat terrain with rice, grassland and cultivation. Deployment by APC. Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, eight kilometres north of Bien Hoa air base. Results: No indications of casualties to VC forces. Remarks: For the first time the L5 howitzers of 161 Fd Bty (NZ) were deployed inside the APC's for concealment to achieve surprise. |
24 August. The Bien Hoa airbase is bombarded by 300 enemy shells which includes mountain guns , mortars and 75mm RCL's. Eleven US aircraft are damaged with 29 personnel wounded.
| 1 RAR Op 9/65 - Operational Date: 27 August 1965 Formations/units: Task Force'Tattam' comprising, under command C Coy 1 RAR: 1 APC Tp (PWLH), element D/16th Armor (US) with in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ), in support Bty B 1/7th Arty (US). Description: An 'artillery raid' in which the guns of 161 Fd Bty (NZ) were established in a temporary gun position, forward in the TAOR on the southern bank of the Song Dong Nai. This advanced position allowed them to surprise the VC by firing on targets in depth-VC activity in an area of War Zone D immediately north of the TAOR. The AO was the immediate vicinity of the gun position, to provide for its close-in protection. Undulating terrain mainly rubber plantation and jungle. Deployment on foot and by APC (161 Fd Bty (NZ)). Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, five kilometres NE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: No indication of casualties to VC forces. XT 161 Bty RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) . On 27 Aug65 it was 2.5 km N of Bien Hoa. Bien Hoa Prov, III Corps. |
September
| 1 RAR Op 10/65 Date 3 September 1965 Formation/Units: 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment less C Coy, with under command 1APC Tp (PWLH), element D/16th Armor (US), in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ) and Bty A 1/7th Arty (US), in support 1/7th Arty (US) less Bty A. Description: An 'artillery raid' in which the guns of 161 Fd Bty (NZ) and Bty C 1/7th Arty (US) were established in a temporary gun position, forward of the TAOR on the eastern flank. This advanced position allowed them to engage elements of All Main Force Regt. The AO protecting the gun-position was 46 square kilometres. Undulating terrain, covered mainly in jungle, rice, and clear forest. Deployment by truck, APC and helicopter. Location: North-central Bien Hoa province, 14 kilometres east of Bien Hoa air base. Results: No indications of casualties to VC forces; one VC suspect captured. Remarks: Bty C 1/7th Arty (US) was under command 161 Fd Bty (NZ) for the operation. FSB Bien Cat - XT 78-32 161 Bty RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 4-16Sep65 and 19-23Feb66. Was also 2 km NW of city 16- 18Sep65, 10 km N of city 18-23Sep65 and 6 km S of city 8- 14Oct65. Binh Duong Prov, III Corps. |
10 September: Sgt(T/WO2) Scott R.A. AATTV KIA by Sniper in Quang Tri Prov.
14September; White R. Bdr KIA when Land Rover towing trailer with ammo' hit cmd det mine.
 Australian Army Aviation |
14 September - |
 Royal Australian Artillery |
| 1 RAR Op 11/65 'Ben CAT 1' - Operational Dates: 14-27 September 1965. Formations/units: 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment ,with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), in direct support 161 Fd Bty (NZ). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being a manoeuvre element of 173d Bde and the brigade AO being north and NW of Bien Cat. A pro-VC area, it lay between the VC routes east-west between War Zone C and War Zone D and the Iron Triangle SW of Bien Cat; Summary of operations, 1965-1966 441 was a potential concentration area for more than one VC main force division. The brigade AO was roughly oval-shaped on an east-west line, of approximately 275 square km; the battalion was assigned A0s successively in a line from SW to NE within the brigade AO. Generally undulating terrain, mainly jungle in the SW, mainly clear forest in the centre, and a mixture of vegetation in the NE. Deployment by APC and helicopter. Location: NW Binh Duong province, 40 kilometres NW of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: KIA 1,WIA 5; VC: KIA 12, wounded/escaped 5, PW 4, 20 camps or defensive positions located-some destroyed, one homemade plant for making ammunition destroyed, three weapons captured. Remarks: 173d Bde results were: VC. KIA 46, PW 80, 9000 documents and half a tonne of medical supplies recovered, 23 camps destroyed or marked for later airstrikes. FSB Ap Bau Bang - XT Appx 26 km NNE of Ben Cat. 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 23-27Sep65. Binh Duong Prov, III Corps. FSB Lai Khe - XT 77-38 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 27-28Sep65. Binh Duong Prov, III Corps 21September: Smith F.J. Cpl 1RAR A/3 KIA by GSW to chest by sniper at Ben Cat. |
Operation Name 24 - 65 (OPORD 24 - 65) CTZ III TAO Binh Duong Province
 |
28 September - The additional Australian force - land at Vung Tau and
proceed to Bien Hoa where the engineers(3 Fd Tp) and 161 Recce Flight come under command 1 RAR. 105 Fd
Bty comes under operational control of the US 3rd Artillery Battalion, 319 Artillery. Sioux helicopters flown off HMAS Sydney to Vung Tau and fly to Ben Hoa the following day. Map showing 1 RAR 105 Fd Bty and US positions at Bien Hoa. |
Morgan Gallop Poll in Australia indicates: 56% of Australians are in favor of involvement
in Vietnam, 28% in favor of withdrawal, 10% were undecided.
1 RAR and supporting units have established a strong defensive position at Bien Hoa with
effective logistics and administrative support and have achieved dominance of their TAOR.
Australian Unit War Diaries
CIA coup of Indonesia 1965 Video Duration 3:59 min's
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9mm Owen Sub Machine Gun Used by 1 RAR in Vietnam in 1965 - Ineffective for Vietnam conditions and replaced by the 9mm F1. |
9mm F1. Used by Australian Troops - Replaced 9mm Owen Gun - Limited use - Used mostly by crews in Armoured Vehicles |
October - 1965
A South Korean combat division lands in South Vietnam.
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| 1 RAR Op 12/65 'IRON TRIANGLE'. Operational Dates: 8-14 October 1965 Formations/units: 1 RAR,with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), D/16th Armor (US), in direct support 161 Fd Bty(NZ). Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being a manoeuvre element of 173d Bde. The brigade AO was immediately south and west of Ben Cat, covering the 'Iron Triangle', a VC headquarters, transit camp and supply installations area.The first 1 RAR AO was some fourteen sq km of the NE section of the brigade AO immediately SW of Ben Cat; the second, of ten sq km, was to the east of the brigade AO between the Song Thi Tinh and Route 13. Flat to undulating terrain, traversed by the Song Thi Tinh, with jungle,rubber, grassland, and rice areas adjoining the river. Insertion by APC and truck, extraction by the same means and by helicopter. Location: West-central Binh Duong province, 29 km WNW of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: KIA 2 including one US attached,WIA 37; VC: KIA 8, wounded/escaped 1, PW 2. Four small defensive positions and three camps/VC villages were located, including one of 5000 sq m., comprising tunnels, weapon pits, trench lines and huts. Remarks: 1 RAR search area was significant for booby traps (five detonations accounting for most of the WIA) and several adapted and VC-initiated mines.173d Bde reported VC KIA 106, possible KIA 4, PW 115; recovered or destroyed a small number of weapons and munitions, more than one tonne of rice, six camps, 212 huts, seven sampans. 9 October: Field R.E. Pte 1RAR A/2 KIA When Shot in throat by sniper near Ben Cat. 12 October: Ross T. LCpl 1RAR A/1 KIA By a booby trap in Iron Triangle. |
10 - 14 October. The US 1st Cavalry Division joins the South Vietnamese
in an attack in the Central Highlands
19 October - Battle of Plei Me
22 October - Anti war demonstration in Pitt St, Sydney.
161 Recce Flight commence operational flight sorties
| 1 RAR OP 13/65- Operational Dates: 23-26 October 1965. Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH) and 3 Fd Tp, in direct support 105 Fd Bty and 161 Fd Bty (NZ), in support E/17th Cav (US). 161 (Indep) Recce Fit. Description: A battalion search-and-destroy operation to extend the 173d Bde area of influence beyond and to the NE of its TAOR based on the Bien Hoa air base. The AO was 38 sq km, most of which was within the VC base area War Zone D. Generally hilly terrain, covered mainly in jungle. Deployment by APC and truck. Location: NE Bien Hoa province, eighteen km NE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: KIA 1; VC: KIA 2, wounded/escaped 5. A number of civilians were detained for questioning and later released. 25 October: Hansen A.R. Pte 1RAR C/8 KIA At Tan Dien. Bien Hoa Prov. |
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In 1963 air mobile operations and the attack helicopter were in their infancy. Weapons, doctrine and specific tactics had to be developed to make the helicopter an effective lethal weapon on the battlefield. This job fell to the US Army Combat Development Command. |
November - 1965
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SAIGON, VIETNAM. 1965-11-01. ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS OF THE BIEN HOA-BASED DETACHMENT OF 1 APC TROOP, A SQN, 4/19TH PRINCE OF WALES LIGHT HORSE FILE PAST THE FLAG-FLANKED OFFICIAL DAIS DURING A PARADE IN SAIGON TO MARK THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE NOVEMBER 1 REVOLUTION. |
Guy Fawkes Night - A New Zealand celebration first held 5Nov65 (and each
5Nov), when 161 Bty, RNZA fired 240 rounds of illum, smoke and HE into the air above War
Zone D. The puzzled US command ignorant of the significance of the event urgently queried
to the nature of the contact, then told the higher US HQ that "the Kiwis are
celebrating some Guy named Fox."
| 1 RAR Op 14/65 " Operation Hump".Operational Dates: 5-9 November 1965 Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command 3 Fd Tp, in direct support 105 Fd Bty, 161 Bty, RNZA, in support 161 (Indep)Recce Fit. Description: A brigade search-and-destroy operation, 1 RAR being one of two manoeuvre elements of 173d Bde. The brigade AO was in the VC base area War Zone D,astride the Song Dong Nai to the NE of Bien Hoa; the AO of 1/503d Inf (US) was to the NW, and that of 1 RAR, 32 sq km to the SE of the river. Undulating to hilly terrain covered mainly in jungle. VC forces object of the operation were Q762 Main Force Regt and D"900" Main Force Bn. Deployment by helicopter. Location: NE Bien Hoa province, twenty km NE of Bien Hoa air base. The Battle of Gang Toi was fought on November 8, 1965, as one of the first engagements between Australian and Viet Cong troops during the Vietnam War. The battle occurred when the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, struck a Viet Cong bunker system in the Gang Toi Hills while in support of Operation Hump. Results: Casualties own: MIA believed KIA 2, WIA 6; VC: KIA 6, wounded/escaped 1, PW 1 and 4 children from a VC hamlet. Five VC hamlets,one camp and one heavily-defended company position located. Remarks: 173d Bde reported losing KIA 40, WIA 51 from 1/503d Inf(US) and claimed 403 VC KIA inflicted by that battalion in one major action. 2 MIA....Both presumed killed in action ( KIA) during the Battle of the Hump in Bien Hoa Province on November 8, 1965. MIA's were: Parker R.H.J. LCpl 1RAR A/1 KIA/BNR Multiple GSW to body on Hill 82 at the Hump and Gillson P.R. Pte 1RAR A/3 KIA/BNR Multiple GSW to body on Hill 82 at the Hump. Attempts were made to recover their bodies but due to intense enemy resistance and further loss of life in the attempts, their bodies were never recovered from the battle field. 1 RAR requested a special operation to attempt a recovery but this was denied by the US Commander. The remains of both soldiers were recovered in 2007 and returned to Australia for burial. |
Operation Aussies Home was established by former infantry Lt Col Jim Bourke to fully account for the six servicemen listed as Killed in Action Body Not Recovered. Bourke served in D Coy 1RAR on their tour in 1965. L/Cpl Richard 'Tiny' Parker and Pte Peter Gillson were killed during Operation Hump and their bodies not recovered. In April 2007, after several years research and on the ground searching in the area of the battle, Operation Aussies Home uncovered the remains of the two soldiers. Parker and Gilson had been buried together the day after the battle by Vietnamese forces in a weapon pit.
13 November: Swanton R.J. Sgt(T/WO2) AATTV KIA GSW. In contact at Tra Bong. Body recovered 14.11.65.
WO2 Kevin Wheatley awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions at Tra Bong Valley, Quang Ngai province, South Vietnam
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The Battle of Ia Drang was one of the first major battles between the United States Army and the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) during the Vietnam War. The two-part battle took place between November 14 and November 18, 1965, at two landing zones (LZ's) northwest of Plei Me in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The battle derives its name from the Drang River which runs through the valley northwest of Plei Me, in which the engagement took place. "Ia" means "river" in the local Montagnard language. Representing the American forces were elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry of the United States Army. The Vietnamese forces included the 33rd, 66th, and 320th Regiments of the PAVN, as well National Liberation Front (NLF) of the H15 Battalion. The battle is the subject of the critically acclaimed movie "We Were Soldiers Once " Video Duration 5:02 min's |
1 RAR OP 15/65 "Full Strike" - Cancelled.
| 1 RAR Op 16/65 'NEW LIFE'. Operational Dates: 21 November - 17 December Formations/units: 1 RAR, with under command 1 APC Tp (PWLH), 3 Fd Tp, and in direct support 161 Bty, RNZA. Description: An operation, as a manoeuvre element of 173d Bde, to clear, develop and maintain a key section of road within the brigade AO, together with the conduct of associated search, control and destroy operations; four AO's, of successively 82, 42, 44 and 43 sq km, were assigned to 1 RAR. This was within the the overall strategy of denial of VC access to the rice harvest, and restoring to government control an area generally under VC domination since late 1964. The brigade AO was centred on the rice growing areas of the La Nga Valley, in the vicinity of Vo Dat and Vo Xu. Generally flat terrain, with mainly swamp and rice, and some jungle. Deployment by helicopter. Location: NW Binh Tuy province,80 km ENE of Bien Hoa air base. Results: Casualties: own: DOW 1, WIA 1; VC: KIA 8,wounded/escaped 8, PW 86. 134 tonne of rice removed or destroyed where removal impracticable. Remarks: 173d Bde was augmented by two infantry battalions, with supporting artillery, from lst Inf Div (US) 29 November: Hillier R.H. Cpl 1RAR B/4 KIA GSW to chest. 1 RAR - The Attack on Chin Duch/Duc Hanh . FSB Vo Dat - YT 60-33 80 km ENE of Bien Hoa and 35 km NE of Xuan Loc. 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 21- 25Nov65, and
25-29Nov65, they were 6 km NW of Vo Dat at Chinh Duc. III Corps. FSB Chinh Duc - XT? Appx 6 km NW of Vo Dat. 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s
Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66) firebase set here 25-29Nov65. III Corps FSB Vo Xu - 81-38 161 Bty, RNZA (Kenning’s Bty 13Jun65-13Jun66)
firebase set here 29Nov65-13Dec66. III Corps. |
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Australia. 25 November 1965. Popular Television entertainer Ian Turpie is among four top line entertainers to make up the first official entertainment troup for South Vietnam. He didn't seem to mind when Sister P. Foote of the RAAF administers the first in a series of injections in readiness for his forthoming tour. Standing behind Ian is Pat Carroll also one of the entertainers who will be visiting South Vietnam. On hand to give |
