

ANNEX A TO

1 ATF OP INSTR 1/67

DATED 041200H JAN 67

EN FORCES - OF WOLLONGONG

1. Main Force.

a. Locs and Strs.

(1) It is believed at least two bns plus HQ 274 Regt are op in the Northern HAT DICH area - general area YS 3084. The presence of ptls from 173d AB Bde (Sep) regular artillery and air strikes plus the opportunities offered by the Christmas and New Year truce periods may have enticed these elements to move EAST. Track activity, agent reports and lights at night suggest either:

- (a) The mov has occurred, or
- (b) The bns have been resupplied.

(2) A bn of 274 Regt is probably loc in the vic of TAM BO, YS 5080.

b. Activities.

(1) TAM BO Bn.

(a) Reported to have the PW from the attack on the VAN KIEP range so is likely to be 265 Bn.

(b) Reported to have recently killed one of their soldiers who wished to become a CHIEU HOI.

(c) An HF Radio transmitter is reported by the people at BINH GIA at YS 486804.

(d) Recently 12 villagers from BINH GIA were detained for one day and questioned about Australian activities, the defences at BINH GIA and how much rice is in the village.

(e) It is suspected the raid on VINH TRUNG, YS 5077, was made by this bn.

(2) 274 Regt (-)

(a) At present elements of this group have been in contact with patrols of 173d AB Bde (Sep). To date they have elected not to become engaged in a major battle and the nature of the country in which they are operating (YS 3086) makes it difficult for US forces to trap them.

(b) Some or all of this group may have taken advantage of the truce periods to move EAST to Interprovincial Route 2.

c. Intentions.

(1) According to NAM HUNG's notebook, 274 Regt intends to attack somewhere along Highway 15 or NORTH of NUI DAT as part of its winter offensive.

(2) Whichever plan they decide on, the Regiment is

in a position to implement both attacks quickly as it is only a few hours march from both objectives - on Highway 15 possibly PHU MY (YS 2574) and on Inter-provincial route 2 probably BINH GIA, the rice stored there being a tangible prize as well as the blow to allied prestige such an attack would cause.

2. Provincial Forces.

a. Locs and Strs.

(1) D445 Bn is currently unlocated but possible areas of operation are SOUTH of Route 23 between the LONG HAI mountains and AP THU AN BIEN (YS 6758), or NORTH of Route 23 in the TAN RU Area (YS 5770).

(2) The strength of D445 Bn is approx 350.

b. Activities.

Throughout December, D445 Bn activity increased markedly and included attacks and harrassing fire on PHUOC HAI (YS 5153), HOI MY (YS 5057), DAT DO (YS 5860) and TAM PHUOC (YS 5558).

(2) In conjunction with the above offensive operations and utilising local labour, the battalion also transported rice and supplies to the TAN RU area in an effort to replace the 70 tons of rice lost during Op INGHAM.

c. Intentions. D445 Bn will continue sporadic raids and mortaring against ARVN outposts in the same general area to weaken the ARVN will to resist and to impress their presence on the local population.

3. Local Forces.

a. Locs and Strs.

(1) CHAU DUC Distric Forces (C20 and C21) are probably operating in the area from HAT DICH, NORTH and NE to NGAI GIAO (YS 4479). Strength is estimated at about 70.

(2) LONG DAT District Coy (C25) is still operating in the LONG HAI peninsular with a strength of 50.

(3) XUYEN MOC District Pl (C23) is believed to be located SOUTH of XUYEN MOC at YS 6365 and has a strength of approx 30.

b. Activities.

(1) C20 and C21 combined with 265 Bn 274 Regt in the attack on the firing range 9 Dec and C20 was contacted by a combined ARVN/11 ACR force in the operation conducted around CU BI (YS 4382) and NANG SON (YS 4479) in November 1966.

(2) C25 Coy has been assisting D445 Bn in their attacks on the LONG HAI Peninsular during December.

c. Intentions. All local forces will continue to act as guides, reconnaissance troops and intelligence sources for main force units and D445 Bn. They will also carry out their normal tasks of trail-watching, tax collection and intimidation of the local population.