1970
Vietnam War Timeline
1970 |
Vietnam War Timeline |
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The AC-47 ("Puff the Magic Dragon" ) was a United States Air Force C-47 Skytrain (the military version of the DC-3) that had been modified by mounting three 7.62 mm General Electric miniguns to fire through two rear window openings and the side cargo door, all on the left (pilot's) side of the aircraft. Other armament configurations could also be found on similar C-47 based aircraft around the world. The guns were actuated by a control on the pilot's yoke, where he could control the guns either individually or together, though gunners were also among the crew to assist with gun failures and similar issues. Its primary function was for close air support for ground troops, both U.S. Australian and South Vietnamese. Once called into action, it could loiter, orbiting the designated target, sometimes for hours, providing suppressing fire. Coverage given by a Spooky was over an elliptical area approximately 52 yards in diameter, placing a projectile within every 2.4 yards during a 3 second burst. |
January - 1970
1 January - New Year Truce.
Spiro Agnew, US Vice President
"They have been in a war for years and years and they are quite debilitated and
decimated, and I don't think they are capable with any kind of resistance of continuing
this fight".
Operation ' Bluewater'
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Units Involved: Three Coys 6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) 9 Sqn RAAF, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 1 Fd Sqn.
The New Zealand Soldier |
Operation '
Atherton'
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CTZ: III Corp |
10 January - 8 RAR return to Nui Dat from Op "Atherton" and celebrate Christmas on the 11 January.. 5 RAR continues Ops in AO ROSSLYN.
Operation 'Napier'
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CTZ: III Corp TAO. AO Bayswater Allied Units Involved: 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. In DS 101 Fd Bty, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt. In Sp 1 Tp 1 Fd Sqn,one Tp plus one section B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 1 ATF PsyOps Unit, 131 Div Loc Bty, det 1 Div Int Unit. Enemy Units Involved Objective of Operation: To cordon and search AP NGAI GIAO then conduct reconnaissance and ambush operations Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive: AWM951-1178 |
14 January. 10 Pl D Coy 8RAR spring a half Platoon Ambush in 8 RAR TAOR 1 ATF Base Area, killing 8 VC and wounding 2 VC.
Operation 'Matilda'
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CTZ: III Corp TAO. AO Allied Units Involved: A Sqn 1 Armd Regt,. In DS 101 Fd Bty, two provost Det 1 AFV Provost Unit, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt. In Sp 1 Tp 1 Fd Sqn,one Tp plus two sections and two AMC sects B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, det 104 Sig Sqn, B Coy 6 RAR + two mortar sections,161 (Indep) Recce,4x XM546 TLC II F Force V Arty, 9 Sqn RAAF, 6x 155mm from FSB Dianne YS 710017 Enemy Units Involved Objective of Operation: To conduct conduct reconnaissance and ambush operations along axis of advance. Descriptive Narrative of Operation: Combined Armoured/Infantry/Cavalary Operation conducted with 10 Tanks, 19 APCs, 4x AMCs, 1xH13, one Rifle Coy with Mortars. 1 ATF Base (Nui Dat) to Xuyen Moc to Ham Tan to Route 1 to vicinity of Nui May Tao Mountains and thence to 1 ATF Base (Nui Dat). Sources Used in Archive: AWM951-1178 |
16 January - 8 RAR 1 ATF Base (Nui Dat) supplies Ready-Reaction Coy.
23 - 25 January. 8 RAR with support elements conduct a cordon and search of Xuyen Moc and the hamlet of Nui Nhon. The Battalion returns to Nui Dat.
Operation 'Keperra'
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CTZ: III Corp |
23-1-70 Stevens J.G. Pte 313122 5RAR2 21 RAIN F KBA GSW to head.
24 January - 8 RAR Cordon and Search the village of Xuyen Moc.
26 January - B and D Coys 8 RAR deploy to blocking positions in the Nui Dinh
Hills
27 January - A and C Coys including Section of Mortars and Assault Pioneers
deploy to Nui Dinh Hills.
Operation 'Cutlass III'
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CTZ: III Corp TAO. AO Allied Units Involved: 17 Constr Sqn, one sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, one ACV 1 ATF, FO Party 1 Fd Regt, one mini team 1 Fd Sqn. 1/16 (Mech) Inf for local def. Objective of Operation: Land Clear up to 1000m east of Route 15. Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive: AWM951-1178 |
28 January - Australian Minister of State for the Army - Andrew Peacock
visits elements of 8 RAR at Nui Dat.
30-1-70 Hollis A.E. Spr 2786682 1FDSQN RAE 23 KIA Mine. Att. to 6RAR2.
30-1-70 Engstrom R.J. Cpl 18797 1FDSQN RAE 22 KIA Mine. Att. to 6RAR2.
1 ATF Monthly Report 1 January to 31 January 1970. Friendly KIA 3, Friendly WIA 16, contacts 106, en KIA 79. en PW captured 8. Total VCI killed and captured 1, total SA captured and destroyed 70, total crew served weapons captured and destroyed 3.
Reference Material:
February - 1970
1-2-70 Thompson B.J. Pte 2789920 5RAR2 C 22 RAIN F KBA Detonated a buried grenade while racking leaves at Nui Dat 7 days before RTA.
3 February - D and C Coys 8 RAR return to Nui Dat for Ready Reaction tasks.
106 Fd Bt (ARTY) arrive SVN.
6 February - Lunar New Year (TET) Truce.
7 February - C Coy 8 RAR deploy to east of Hoa Long for local ambush duties.
10 February - C Coy 8 RAR deploy on Op Hammersley to the Long Hai
Hills and is supported by 2 Troop A Sqn Tanks.
Advance Party of 100 men from 7 RAR departs Kingsford Smith Airport, Sydney for
Vietnam. a further 50 depart on the 15th.
Operation '
Hammersley'
CHARLIE VALLEY: After Action Report
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CTZ: III Corp TAO Units Involved: 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, one Tp A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, one Tp plus one AMC sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, elm 17 Constr Sqn with D8 or TD15s, 2 mini teams 1 Fd Sqn, one mortar sect 8 RAR Enemy Units Involved Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance and ambush operation Descriptive Narrative of Operation:Operation Hammersley began on 10th February 1970 when C Company, with tank, APC and mortar support deployed to the western side of the Long Hai Hills to protect quarry operations being undertaken by 17 Construction Squadron. C Company established Fire Support Base lsa near the quarry site and ambushed likely enemy routes leading from the hills. The first major contact occurred at 1855 hours on l5th February, when 9 Platoon, ambushed approx. 100 enemy at YS 458564. The enemy proved to be very aggressive; fighting continued until 2015 hours, when the enemy dispersed after the arrival into the contact area of 8 Platoon and a troop of tanks. Seven enemy bodies were recovered on the night of 15th February. A more detailed search at first light revealed four more enemy dead and numerous drag marks. It was apparent that the enemy had suffered heavy casualties. Unconfirmed reports stated that 34 enemy had been killed in the ambush. Five members of 9 Platoon and one member of the attached splinter team from 1 Field Squadron were slightly wounded. During the night D Company, which at the time was 1 ATF Ready Reaction Company, was deployed by APCs to Fire Support Base lsa, but was not used in the 9 Platoon contact. At first light on 16th February Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill flew to the scene of the contact and from there directed operations by C Company and D Company. Meanwhile while Battalion Headquarters and B Company prepared to deploy from Nui Dat. Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill's concept of operations was for B Company to ambush likely enemy routes in the vicinity of a fire trail from YS455544 to YS 463553 while C Company and D Company with APC and tank support, conducted reconnaissance in force to the north west and south east of the established ambush positions, with the aim of either destroying the enemy or forcing enemy groups to move into the ambush killing grounds. Due to the threat of anti-personnel M16 mines, whenever practicable, infantry moved in closed down APCs with tanks in front of the APCs to clear the way. This tactic was successful and there were no casualties from M16 mines when troops moved in this manner. Likely enemy withdrawal routes which could not be ambushed were fired upon by mortars, artillery and aircraft. Implementation of the concept soon produced results. On 18th February C Company discovered a major enemy troop concentration of D445 Battalion located in a valley of an area called Minh Dam Secret Zone by the Vietcong. Valley of the Minh Dam Secret Zone. Initial contact was with three enemy only, one of whom was captured. The prisoner, a sixteen year old youth, identified himself as a member of Cl-D445 Battalion and accompanied Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill in the command and control helicopter from which he identified enemy positions at which, he claimed, thirty to forty of his comrades were located. It was later established that the whole of D445 Battalion was in the area. C Company with support from 2 Troop A Squadron 1 Armoured Regiment and 3 Troop B Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment moved forward to assault the suspected bunker position. Contact was made with the enemy when the leading APC was hit by an RPG round and caught fire. A heavy firefight followed initial attempts to recover the APC failed; however, five of the seven occupants were rescued under fire, from the vehicle. For their part in this action Corporal Coe of C Company, and Corporal Macey of B Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment were each awarded the Military Medal. Following the rescue of the APC occupants C Company withdrew and regrouped to attack again. Meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill had ordered the redeployment of B Company and D Company to ambush positions from which they could block enemy egress out of the valley to the north and east. Artillery and air strikes were directed onto the steep cliffs to the southwest and along both sides of the valley. It appeared that the elusive D445 Battalion would be forced to fight or to accept heavy casualties during any attempt to escape. There is no doubt that the enemy appreciated the significance of B and D Companies' moves, as during their deployment B Company was involved in four contacts, which resulted in four members of the supporting APC Troop and five B Company soldiers being wounded. Four APCs were slightly damaged by RPG fire; however, B Company was not prevented from completing its mission. Six enemy bodies were later found in the areas of the contacts. The above contacts did delay B Company's movement. As a result D Company reached its ambush location first and B Company was forced to pass through the D Company positions. During one of the B Company contacts friendly APC machine gun fire hit 11 Platoon, wounding ten soldiers, two of whom remained on duty. Meanwhile the C Company Group had again assaulted into the valley, inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and recovered the burnt out APC. Six C Company soldiers were wounded during this assault. By last light on 18th February the Battalion was favorably deployed for a coordinated first light attack. However this concept was changed when it was directed that the enemy positions be the target of a B52 strike. The battalion withdrew to enable the strike to occur. D445 Battalion took advantage of this withdrawal and escaped to the east along the routes which had been blocked by B Company prior to their withdrawal. On 21st February, following the B52 strike and intensive artillery fire, three rifle companies, with tanks and cavalry still in support, redeployed to the Long Hai Hills. Two Vietnamese Regional Force (RF)companies began operations in the area. Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill's concept of operations was that the two RF Companies, C Company and D Company would carry out bomb damage assessment and reconnaissance in force, while B Company ambushed likely enemy routes. A Company later joined the remainder of the Battalion, following operations in the east of Phuoc Tuy Province, and began reconnaissance and ambush tasks. During the following ten days numerous caches were discovered and more than 200 enemy bunkers destroyed. 4 Platoon B Company achieved notable results when ten of an enemy party of eleven were killed by our fire, or by their own mines while attempting to escape. Many enemy dead, killed during earlier fighting, were found unburied. Casualties suffered by the Battalion during this period were very light, except on 28th February when a platoon was involved in two mine incidents. Prior to these incidents the platoon had been moving at a rate of 100 metres per hour clearing a route to an ambush position. At 1100 hours an M26 grenade booby trap with an anti-lifting device, was located. An engineer party moving to neutralize the booby trap initiated an M16 mine causing seven soldiers to be killed and thirteen to be wounded. While guiding a Dustoff helicopter into an area cleared of mines a member of the platoon stepped out of the cleared area detonating a further M16 mine which killed one and wounded three soldiers. One of the wounded later died During Operation Hammersley the enemy suffered 42 killed in action. This number was confirmed by body count; however unconfirmed reports have indicated that the number of enemy dead may have exceeded one hundred. Other significant enemy losses were: 70 personal weapons, 5 crew served weapons, approximately 1 1,000 small arms rounds,250 grenades, mortar bombs and mines, 2000 lbs of food, large quantities of medical supplies and equipment. Friendly losses were 11 killed and 59 wounded. Of this number 2 of the dead and 19 of the wounded were from supporting arms. Ten of the 40 wounded from 8 RAR were a result of friendly fire. 18-2-70 Carlyle H. Tpr 43941 B3CAV RAAC 21 KIA APC c/s 83A, ARN134421, hit by RPG's and satchel charge. 18-2-70 Whiston B.J. L/Cpl 1202024 B3CAV RAAC 23 KIA APC c/s 83A, ARN134421, hit by RPG's and satchel charge. 28-2-70 MacLennan L.J..Pte. 3795935 8RAR RAINF 21 KIA Mines/booby traps in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Richter P.M..Pte. 3796110 8RAR RAINF 21 KIA Mines/booby traps in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Hubble R.N..Spr. 55566 1FDSQN RAE 19 KIA Mines/booby traps in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Munday.B.J. Pte. 3795712 8RAR RAINF 22 KIA Mines/booby traps in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Pesonen T.E.A. Pte. 7154 8RAR RAINF 25 KIA Mines/booby traps in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Barrett.J.J T/Cpl. 1200097 8RAR RAINF 24 KIA Triggered mine while marshalling Dustoff in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Jackson. R.J. Cpl 2783512 8RAR RAINF 25 KIA Mines/booby traps in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 Hoban W.J. SGT 15400 8RAR RAINF 39 KIA Mines in Long Hai's. 28-2-70 West G.M. Pte 61912 8RAR A/1 19 RAINF DOW At 1FDHOSP V.T. from mines/booby traps in Long Hai's The effectiveness of the Battalion's operations cannot be assessed only from a comparison of these figures; the effect which Operation Hammersley had on the enemy's future capacity to operate from a sanctuary close to major centres of population must also be taken into account. General Ewell, Commander 11 FFV, no doubt had this in mind when, on 26th February 1970, he signalled "Your excellent selection of the target box plus the vigour and thoroughness of the followup bomb damage assessment have delivered a severe blow to D445 and the Communist structure in Phuoc Tuy". the Long Hai Hills, for many years, had been a stronghold from which enemy provincial forces had operated with relative impunity against major centres of civilian population. From this stronghold, the enemy, defended by mines and booby traps, had inflicted heavy casualties on friendly forces which had attempted to dislodge them. The Battalion's operations had proved that it was possible to force large enemy groups out of their mountain hides. This had the secondary, but probably more important result, of encouraging Vietnamese Regional Force Companies to operate in the area. From the enemy’s view point two significant results followed Operation Hammersley. Firstly he was shown that his previously safe haven was vulnerable. Secondly the local population was given substantial proof that guerilla control of populated areas near the Long Hai Hills was not inviolate. The Battalion obtained valuable experience in mobile operations involving the use of A PCs and tanks, and, once again, the value of close liaison with neighbouring headquarters was demonstrated. 28 - Dustoff . 11 Australian soldiers are killed and 16 wounded by an M16 mine. The Chief of General Staff (Australia) signals the Commander Australian Forces Vietnam (COMAFV), "Most distressed and concerned at casualties being suffered by 8 RAR in Long Hai area. In view of our experience I am at loss to understand 1 ATF undertaking operations in an area in which they have always been costly and of doubtful value. Please let me have a report urgently including the aims of the operation and the responsibility for its initiation". FSB Pat - YS 61-82 32 km NE of Nui Dat, 17 km ENE of Duc Tanh and Rte-2, 14 km N of FSB Discovery. Described as an old, mosquito infested FSB. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s Bty 18Sep69-6Sep70) firebase set here 16Feb-11Mar70. 106 Bty RAA also here 13Feb70. Prov, III Corps. FSB Isa - FSB Isa's real role was to provide a base from which a team of engineers from 17 Construction Squadron could work an old quarry in the mine laden hills. Isa had been gunned up with a section of 81mm mortars, a trio of Centurion tanks and a troop of M113A1 armoured personnel carriers. Charlie Company Eight was to provide the on-the-ground security. Long Hai Mountains Generally 20 km NE of Vung Tau and 15 km due S of Nui Dat. A rugged mountain chain rising from the plain S of Ba Ria and Long Dien, and bordering the coast of Phuoc Tuy Prov. Long Hai Airfield was on the coast at the SW edge of this hill mass. |
Operation 'Uhlan'
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CTZ: III Corp |
14 February - A and B Coys 8 RAR including Assault Pioneers return to Nui Dat to
prepare for Op Epsom.
15 February - D Coy 8 RAR with the remainder of A Sqn tanks deploys to Op
Hammersley to assist C Coy
16 February - 7 RAR main body departs Sydney, Australia, on board HMAS Sydney.
B Coy 8 RAR deploys to Op
Hammersley.
5 RAR returns to Nui Dat on completion of Op Bondi.
Operation '
Epsom'
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CTZ: III Corp TAO Units Involved: 8th RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion. In DS 161 Fd Bty, one H13 161(Indep) Recce Flt, HQ one Tp 1 Fd Sqn plus 4 splinter teams. Enemy Units Involved Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA Enemy WIA Objective of Operation: To destroy en and en installations in AO Rosslyn. Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive: AWM95-1-4-181 |
17-2-70 Maza R.N. LCpl 15142 32SSSQN 40 RAE At Glenorie. NSW
18 February - 3 Sqn SAS depart Vietnam and are replaced by 2 Sqn SAS. During their
tour 3 Sqn had mounted 230 operations with 78 contacts resulting in 144 enemy KIA plus 32
possibles.
21 February - B52 strike on the Long Hai Hills in support of 8 RAR. B52 Damage
24 February - Rear Party 7 RAR depart for Vietnam by air.
27 February - 7 RAR arrive at Vung Tau on their second tour. 5 RAR depart for Australia.
Operation '
Gisborne'
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CTZ: III Corp
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Operation '
Semaphore'
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CTZ: III Corp TAO Allied Units Involved: D Coy/8 RAR, two mini teams 1 Fd Sqn, in Spt Nui Dat Arty, one Tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and seven TCV Enemy Units Involved Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA Enemy WIA Objective of Operation: To destro en and en installations in AO Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive: AWM95-1-4183 |
March - 1970
1-3-70 Watt G.S. Sgt. NZ80166 NZMEDSVCS RNZAF KIA booby trap
2- A and B Coys 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
3 - A and B Coy including Bn HQ 8 RAR deploy on Op Ascot.
Operation '
Hamilton' After Action Report
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CTZ: III Corp
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4 - D Coy 8 RAR deploy to Op Ascot.
5 - 5 RAR arrive in Australia completing their second and last tour of Vietnam.
7 - 8 RAR cordon the area believed to be the location of HQ D445.
10 March. 6 RAR(NZ) return to Nui Dat.
Operation '
Finschhafen'
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CTZ: III Corp |
12 - C Coy 8 RAR redeploy to FSPB Isa.
16 - HMAS Hobart departs Australia for Vietnam on its third deployment.
Sect 161Fd Bty(NZ) move from FSB
Discovery to FSB Wells YS6569.
19-3-70 Paenga T.W. Pte NZ43651 6RAR RAINF 21 KIA Ambush in bunker system on Nui Dinh. GSW/ shrap to head.
19-3-70 Wright D.N. PteNZ43223 6RAR2 W3 RNZIR DOW In Aust. from wds on 30.01.70
18 - General Lon Nol ousts Prince Norodom Sihanouk an seizes power in Cambodia.
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20 - A Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
21 March. Situation Report. 7 RAR continues Ops in AO KURRAJONG. 8 RAR vacates FSB DISCOVERY and returns from AO ASCOT to Nui Dat on the 24 March. One Coy 6 RAR conducts ops with RF/PF at LONG SON Island during period 23 - 28 Mar.
21 - FSB Toby - YS 71-79 Along Rte-329, 5 km SW of FSB Lynx, 13 km SSW of
Hill 2310, 30 km NE of Nui Dat and 161 Bty, RNZA (Master’s Bty 6Sep70- 8May71)
firebase set here 21-29 Mar 70 (left section). Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps
. 23-3-70 Anton R.D.T/Bdr 218193 4 F DREGT 19 RAA KBA Went to sleep in unit lines with M26 Grenade in pocket.
24 - B and C Coys 8 RAR with Bn HQ return to Nui Dat. C Coy deploy to to
area north east of Xuyen Moc.
Operation 'Raven' |
Units Involved: W Coy/6 RAR, A To B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 101 Fd Bty, Tp A Sqn 1 Armd Regt. For deployment 9 Sqn RAAF, elm No 35 Sqn, CH47 (US) Reference: Enemy Units: No change Friendly Forces: No change Mission: Conduct recce and ambush ops within AO Rose to AO Tulip, Sources Used in Archive: 1 ATF War Diaries AWM95-1-4- 135 |
Operation 'Townsville'
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Units Involved: 6 RAR(-), A To B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 101 Fd Bty, Tp A Sqn 1 Armd Regt. For deployment 9 Sqn RAAF, elm No 35 Sqn, CH47 (US) Reference: Enemy Units: No change Friendly Forces: No change Mission: Conduct recce and ambush ops within AO AUCKLAND Est FSPB PAT YS613814 Sources Used in Archive: 1 ATF War Diaries AWM95-1-4- 135 |
D Coy 8 RAR reacted to an area north east of Xuyen Moc.
28 - HMAS Hobart relieves HMAS Vendetta at Subic Bay.
29 - D Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
That Son. Aerial view of the burned out remains of RAAF De Havilland Caribou transport aircraft A4-193. On 1970-03-29 the 35 Squadron RAAF aircraft had just landed with its load of drums of helicopter fuel when it came under very accurate enemy mortar fire. The starboard wing suffered a direct hit and the rear fuselage was riddled with shrapnel. Fortunately none of the crew of four were seriously injured and managed to escape to the safety of a nearby bunker. In the early hours of the next morning the enemy attacked the airfield again and further mortar rounds set the aircraft on fire completing its destruction. The fuselage has been almost completely consumed and only part of the wing and engines remain surrounded by incinerated fuel drums
The Cambodian Campaign (also known as the Cambodian Incursion) was a series of military operations conducted in eastern Cambodia during the late spring and summer of 1970 by the armed forces of the United States (U.S.) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) during the Vietnam War. A total of 13 major operations were conducted by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) between 29 April and 22 July and by U.S. forces between 1 May and 30 June. .
30 March. 1 ATF Summary. A Sqn 1 Armd Regt(-) remains at Nui Dat elms continue to spt ops, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt(-) remains Nui Dat elms continue to spt ops. 1 Fd Sqn elms continue to spt ops. 17 Constr Sqn - road and bridge construction Route 23 - emls at quarry. 6 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) remains in AO AUCKLAND, 7 RAR(-) remain in AO KURRAJONG - Bn HQ at FSB ANNE YS5477. 8 RAR(-) remain at Nui Dat. 1 SA Sqn has 5 LRRPs deployed.
Fire Support Patrol Bases. FSPB TASMAN at YS6386 - FSPB TIGER YS6491 - FSB PAT YS6181 FSPB ANNE YS5577 - FSPB ISA YS4353 - FSPB ANDREA YS2657.
April - 1970
1 April - A Coy 8 RAR react to an intelligence report of enemy concentration east of Dat Do.
They return same day. Nil result.
2 April - A Coy 8 RAR react again to the area east of Dat Do.
3 April - A Coy 8 RAR react to an area north of Ap Nui Nhon.
3-4-70 Poulson D.. Pte 3795605 8RAR RAINF 20 KIA GSW in contact with bunker system. Body not recovered until next day
4-4-70 Pettit J.G.WO2 13824 AATTV RAINF 33 KIA At A-245 Dak Seang in Kontum Prov..
Operation' Phoi Hop'
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Units Involved:.8 RAR The hamlets of Hoa Long (particularly Ap Tay and Ap Bac), Suoi Nghe, Duc My, Binh Ba and Duc Trung were in 1970 continually being infiltrated by VC. For example in March 1970 the number of known incursions into Hoa Long by groups of up to thirty in number was ten. Infiltration by the VC was aimed at demonstrating their presence by propaganda meetings, by terrorism and by showing the ineffectiveness of GVN security measures; and it was also aimed at obtaining food. There were therefore, profitable ambush targets to be had. Since Hoa Long was the most frequently entered,Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill invited the District Chief of Long Le to suggest how the Battalion could help.Major Tri said that previous attempts to prevent infiltration by ambushing outside Hoa Long had failed.Major Tri suggested ambushes be placed inside the village. The idea was accepted and two companies (C and D) were committed to this task. Furthermore a Phoi Hop (ie joint) Headquarters was to be set up in Hoa Long District Compound with the Battalion Command Post and Fire Control Centre collocated with Major Tri's Headquarters. On the 7th April B Company deployed on foot to ambush approaches to Duc My and Binh Ba and on the following day A Company deployed by APCs to the Ap Suoi Nghe area. Both these companies deployed half platoon ambushes. B Company west of Duc My had first contact when 5 Platoon moving into its ambush position on 8th April contacted three enemy in a small camp one of whom was killed. Again on the llth 4 Platoon contacted two enemy both of whom were killed. On the night 8-9 April C and D Companies had laid their ambushes in Hoa Long itself. This tactic unsettled the Vietcong and they began to ask local ox cart drivers what was happening. On the night of the l lth all ambushes were moved outside the village perimeter, first ensuring that the information would be passed to the Vietcong. This tactic brought immediate results at about 2300 hours that night, 9 Platoon C Company located just outside the village on the western side of Route 2, contacted approximately sixteen enemy. The ambush was sprung and mmediately the Vietcong force split into two groups and probed hard on three sides of the ambush. Contact continued forforty minutes and was only broken after a troop of APCs arrived on the scene from Nui Dat. Immediately following the contact the APCs swept the area for bodies with no results and a more comprehensive search the next morning was also negative. It was apparent that although the enemy had been well caught in the ambush they had managed to drag the dead and wounded clear and that the three sided probe had been mounted to cover the clearance of the bodies. It was evident that the concept was working and that the ambushes were proving highly profitable in terms of enemy contact. The following day B Company killed one more enemy in ambush. If further proof was needed the night of 13th- 14th supplied it, with an interesting series of contacts to the southwest and west of Hoa Long involving both C and D Companies. At approximately 0005 hours six enemy were seen by a half platoon ambush of 9 Platoon C Company. The enemy were running and crossed Route 2 about two thousand metres south west of Hoa Long. As they were moving across the front of the ambush at about 100 metres, the ambush was sprung. On contact the enemy turned north still running and moved out of sight of the ambush. Ten minutes later a group of approximately four enemy still running, moved across the front of a half platoon ambush of 10 Platoon D Company which was situated north west of the 9 Platoon C Company ambush. The ambush party opened fire, some enemy fell and the remainder again moved to the north. Forty five minutes later a half platoon ambush of 12 Platoon D Company contacted one enemy moving from the south east, who fell. Sweeps next morning produced two dead Vietcong from the C Company ambush, three dead from the first D Company ambush and one possible dead from the second. A perfect billiard ball effect had been produced as the enemy patrol had bounced from one ambush to the other and had been gradually whittled down. Subsequent information from a Hoi Chanh who was a member of the enemy patrol, disclosed that it had originally consisted of fourteen Vietcong of whom five had been killed. Further contact was made the same night when two enemy moved from the east into a half platoon ambush of 7 Platoon C Company who were situated outside the north eastern sector of Hoa Long. A further body was located the following morning in the area of this contact. The following night the Assault Pioneers in ambush south of the village observed enemy moving across their front at 100 metres and opened fire. Although the enemy returned fire, the results were negative on both sides. There had been a strong suspicion for some time that as well as Vietcong moving into Hoa Long, there were some located on a semi permanent basis in the village itself. Because of this, on the advice of Major Tri, it was decided to cordon and search Ap Bac, the north west hamlet of Hoa Long village, in conjunction with the local RF Company. The cordon was executed on the night of 18th-19th by the simple expedient of the companies in ambush in the village moving from their ambush positions to cordon positions round Ap Bac. Before the cordon was inserted at 0130 hours, C Company had a contact in the village complex killing one Vietcong. This was significant, as it was the first time a kill had been obtained within a village by the Battalion, proving that ambushes of this type were a feasible alternative to the outer barrier. The following day five hundred and seventy six people were screened and eighteen people detained. Operation Phoi Hop was an interesting and effective experiment. A Battalion had been deliberately placed in position to provide a barrier between three villages and the Vietcong. The material results in terms of enemy eliminated were good, but the subsidiary results were of equal importance. Subsequent intelligence reports specifically stated that the presence of A and B Companies round Duc My and Ap Suoi Nghe had effectively prevented movement into those villages during the period of Phoi Hop and that the Vietcong were worried and confused by the tactic. Around Hoa Long the same confusion was apparent with reports of Vietcong stopping villagers in the fields by day and attempting to extract information from them concerning the Battalion's activities. In addition, villagers began to volunteer information to the soldiers, a marked change of attitude in a short and around the Hoa Long area rose dramatically with six rallying as a direct or indirect result of the Operation. Phoi Hop proved that ambushing routes into villages achieves tangible and intangible results out of all proportion to the effort involved in mounting such operation, while retaining own casualties at a low level. Results of Operation Phoi Hop were: Enemy Casualties11 KIA, 8 WIA, 6 Hoi Chahn directly or indirectly attributed to the Operation.18 suspects detained in the cordon of Ap Bac. Ammunition Captured: Grenades, 264 assorted rounds, Food Captured: 20 lbs. of rice. Own Casualties:3 WIA. |
4 April- FSB Andrea - YS 26-58? On Long Son Island, 20 km SW of Nui
Dat, 13 km N of Vung Tau, 3 km from the ocean and 5 km SW of QL-15. The base located on
the solid rock summit of Hill 84, and was first built when a single, 161 Bty RNZA L-5
cannon and eight gunners deployed here 4 Apr 70. The position was manned by the one
gun and 17 PF Viet soldiers firing in support of HQ ATF D and E Plts while they searched
the island for rocket sites that endangered Vung Tau. One night, one of the PF’s
threw a cigarette into a pit containing all the unused powder charges, causing an intense
blaze that lasted several hours, exposing all to sniper fire. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s
Bty 18Sep-6Sep70) firebase set here 4-17Apr70. Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps.
6 April - B Coy 8 RAR react to an area north east of Binh Ba and return same day. USS Orleck on station and fires on 11 targets.
7 April - B Coy 8 RAR deploy to an area west of Duc My on Op Phoi
Hop.
8 April- A Coy 8 RAR deploy to an area west of Ap Suoi Nghe. C and D Coys deploy to
ambush positions in Hoa Long Village on Op Phoi Hop.
First Australian moratorium demonstration. 120,000 people march in cities across
Australia.
 |
Protest
|
11 April- C and D Coys 8 RAR deploy to ambush positions south and west of Hoa Long
Village.
14 April - Cambodian President Lon Nol appeals for military assistance in Cambodia
17-4-70 Kidd S.J. Lt. NZ838605 6RAR RNZIR KIA In contact. GSW to body.
17-4-70 Fitzgerald J. WO2 27974 AATTV RAINF 41 KIA .Mortar fire in Thua Thien Prov.
18-19 April. 8 RAR conduct cordon and search of Ap Bac Hamlet.
19 -April 7 RAR deploy on Op Concrete 1 in the
Xuyen Moc District.
Operation '
Concrete I'
|
CTZ: III Corp |
20 April- All Companies 8 RAR and Bn HQ deploy on 1 ATF Op
"Concrete".106 Fd Bty moves Nui Dat to FSB Discovery.161 Fd Bty move to FSB Bond. C Bty 2/35 Arty(US) move to FSB Discovery 21 April.
Operation '
Nudgee'
|
CTZ: III Corp |
22 April - Prime Minister Gorton Announces a Reduction in Australia's Commitment,
"...the process of Vietnamisation made this force reduction 'desirable and
feasible'".
22 - 25 April USS Turner on station off coast and engaes targets in the Long Hais and east of TOAR
25 April - C and D Coys 8 RAR move to Hoa Long and lay ambushes.
26 April - A and B Coys 8 RAR move to Hoa Long and lay ambushes.
26 April - FSB "Bond " vacated by 161 Fd Bty and return to Nui Dat then move to Duc Thanh (FSB Le Loi area 27 Apr.
26 April - 4 May.
USS Brinkly Bass on station off coast and engages targets in AO and Long Hia's.
28 April - B, C and D Coys 8 RAR deploy on Op Nudgee. A Coy continues to
ambush approaches to Hoa Long Village.
29 April - US forces announce participation in the offensive into Cambodia by South
Vietnam.
30 April - 4 Fd Regt (RAA) 105mm Ammo Usage Month April. HE - 13,048, WP - 189, Illum - 927, Splintex - 39
May - 1970
1-5-70 Goody P.R. L/Cpl 1734847 8RAR RAINF 22 .KIAFFF Mistaken for VC and shot with M60 during ambush by Pte D.P. Brennan.
1-5-70 McQuat J.L. Pte. 5716533 8RAR RAINF 21 .KIAFFF GSW. Stood up during ambush
1-5-70 Earle P. Pte. 45104 8RAR RAINF 21 .KIAFFF Mistaken for VC and shot with M60 during ambush by Pte D.P. Brennan.
2 - 9 May - Anti war demonstrations break out on US college campuses. 4 Students are
killed.
5 May . USS Orleck on station and engages targets in AO and Long Hai's.
8 May- 120,000 Australians demonstate for an end to the war.
7 May - Bn HQ 8 RAR deploy to FSPB "Le Loi. B and C Coys deploy to AO
Quartermile in continuation of Op Nudgee. 7 RAR OP "Concrete 1" concludes with
redeployment for Op "Concrete 11".
7 May. 101 Fd Bty departs SVN having finished thier tour. 107 Fd Bty arrive to replace them.
Operation '
Concrete II' |
CTZ: III Corp TAO Start Date End Date 8/5/1970 11/6/1970 Allied Units Involved: 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance and ambush operation Descriptive Narrative of Operation 21-5-70 Crouch N.V. Pte. 5716239 7RAR RAINF 22 .KIA GSW/RPG at bunker system North of Dat Do 6-6-70 Dickson S.W. Pte. 2792089 7RAR RAINF 21 .KIA M16 mine during clearing of ambush site. Between Phuoc Hai and Lonh Hai. 6-6-70 LARRSON S.G.. Pte. 4720583 7RAR RAINF 23 .KIA M16 mine during clearing of ambush site. Between Phuoc Hai and Lonh Hai. 6-6-70 Navarre P.J. Pte 2792729 7RAR2 C/9 21 RAINF DOW At 1FDHOSP from mine wds earlier that day. |
9 May - B Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat. Luscombe Field at Nui Dat.
9 May, 10 days after ground troops crossed the border, a combined
Vietnamese-American naval task force steamed up the Mekong River to wrest control of that
key waterway from North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. The flotilla, led by a Vietnamese
naval officer, was composed of American PCFs, ASPBs, PBRs, HAL-3 and VAL-4 aircraft, Benewah, Askari, Hunterdon County, YRBM 16, YRBM 21 and 10 strike
assault boats (STAB) of Strike Assault Boat Squadron 20, a fast-reaction unit created by
Admiral Zumwalt in 1969. The Vietnamese contingent included riverine assault craft of many
types, PCFs, PBRs, and marine battalions. Naval Advisory Group personnel sailed with each
Vietnamese vessel. By the end of the first day, Vietnamese naval units reached the
Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh, while to the south the combined force stormed enemy-held
Neak Luong, a strategic ferry crossing point on the river. For political reasons, no U.S.
personnel were allowed past Neak Luong, midway to Phnom Penh. Although the American
component pulled out of Cambodia by 29 June, the Vietnamese continued to guard the Mekong
and evacuate to South Vietnam over 82,000 ethnic Vietnamese jeopardized by the conflict.
11 May - 15 May . USS St Paul on station of coast and provides fire support to AO.
12 May- D Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat One Platoon of D Coy occupy FSPB
"Isa".
13 May - D Coy 8 RAR conduct a cordon and search of Ap Bac Hamlet. B Coy
ambushed around Long Dien.
14-5-70 Ahearn A.W. Sgt 214287 8RAR D 25 RAINF DOW Booby trap on 11.05.70 .
15 May - C Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat. D Coy redeploy in AO Quartermile
north west of Ap Suoi Nghe.
15 May - 22 May. HMAS Hobart (RAN ) on station off coast to provide fire spt to AO.
Operation '
Ashfield' |
CTZ: III Corp TAO Allied Units Involved: 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. In DS 107 Fd Bty. In Spy 2/35 Arty(US). Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance and ambush operation in AO MAGIC, centre of mass YS3165 Descriptive Narrative of Operation. Conducted from Nui Dat. Take-over from 6 RAR. |
18 May- C Coy 8 RAR deploy to ambush positions in the south east sector of
Hoa Long. All radars at Horseshoe Hill closed down in preparation for return to Australia..
18-5-70 Bartholomew G.T. Spr. 2782555 1FDSQN RAE 22 .KIA
20 May- D Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
21 May - C Coy 8 RAR deploy to ambush positions south of Long Dien.
23 May- D Coy 8 RAR ambushed south and south east of Hoa Long.
25 May - B Coy 8 RAR move to north of Le Loi. Coy HQ to Nui Nhan.
26 May- D Coy 8 RAR ambushed south of Hoa Long and replace C Coy south of
Long Dien. C Coy deploy to block south west of Le Loi in conjunction with 2 RAR's initial
operation.
26 - 31 May. USS Rupertuss on station and engages targets in AO..
Operation Name |
CTZ: III Corp TAO Start Date - End Date 26/5/1970 - 11/6/1970 Allied Units Involved: 2d RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion, 107 Fd Bty, 4 Tp A Sqn 1 Armrd Regt, 3Tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 2/35 Arty(US), elms 9 Sqn RAAF, CH-47 US Army Aviation. Objective of Operation: Battalion reconnaissance and ambush operation in AO WICKHAM Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive:AWM95-7-2-56 FSB Noela YS 347710 Casualties: 29-5-70 Neal D.W. Pte. 1735386 2RAR RAINF 22 .KIA Section member tripped claymore/booby trap. KIA with Pte D.J.Tully. 29-5-70 Tully D.J. Pte. 2792375 2RAR RAINF 21 .KIA Section member tripped claymore/booby trap. KIA with Pte.D.W. Neal 29-5-70 Gurnick J.L. Pte NZ483256 2RAR2 W3 RNZIR DOW Grenade booby trap. |
28 May - 6 RAR complete their second and last tour of Vietnam. A Coy 8 RAR deeply to Le
Loi in attempt to locate an enemy hospital.
30 May - A and C Coys 8 RAR deploy to the north of AO Kipper.
FSB Kylie - YS 45-84 On the W side of Rte-2, 3 km NNE of FSB Peggy, 7 km
N of Duc Tanh and 17 km N of Nui Dat. Built initially on a small scale since it housed
only a section of 161 Bty RNZA 30May70, it was later expanded significantly to accommodate
the M2A2 howitzers added to cover the Binh Ba Rubber Plantation. 161 Bty, RNZA
(Andrew’s Bty 18Sep69-6Sep 70) firebase set here 30May-6Jun70 and 1- 12Jul70 (right
section); 29-30Jun70 (left section). Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps.
31 May - 4 Fd Regt (RAA) 105mm Ammo Usage Month May. HE - 14,123, Smoke WBT - 26 WP - 641, Illum - 995, Splintex - 2, Smoke - 1
June - 1970
1 June- B Coy 8 RAR returns to Nui Dat.
1-6-70 Morgan J.L. Pte 3795756 2AOD 21 RAAOC KBA Hit by truck at 1ALSG V.T. .
5 June - A Coy 8 RAR redeploy from AO Kipper to the north west of Binh Ba.
5 - 8 June. USS Rupertus on station off coast and engages targets within AO and Long Hai's. The relieved by USS Higbee which moves off-station on the 10th for special mission. Back on station 12th.
6 June - C Coy 8 RAR redeploy from AO Kipper to Le Loi and conduct local patrols.
7 - B Coy 8 RAR deploys to night ambush tasks around Hoa Long.
TPS 25 Ground Radar Surveillance arrives at Nui Dat.
10 June - A Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
11 June - Operation "Nudgee" and 'Capricorn' conclude.
12 - 29 June. 7 RAR conduct Operation Cung Chung
. A Coy 8 RAR deploys to the west and south west of Binh Ba .
Operation Name
|
CTZ: III Corp III TAO Phuoc Tuy Province Start Date End Date 12/6/1970 29/6/1970 Allied Units Involved: 1st Australian Task Force (HQ); 2d RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion; 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment; 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, C Bty 2/35 Arty(US), 1 Fd Sqn, 9 Sqn RAAF. Objective of Operation: 1st Australian Task Force reconnaissance and ambush operation Descriptive Narrative of Operation:By the 1l th June the bulk of 1 ATF was concentrated in the south of Phuoc Tuy Province with great emphasis being given to interdiction of the access routes to the villages. In the west 2 RAR was concentrating mainly on the Nui Dinhs, 8 RAR in the centre generally on Route 2, Hoa Long and Long Dien, with 7 RAR being responsible for the eastern edge of the Long Hais and Dat Do. Operation Cung Chung was conceived to give each Battalion a set sphere of influence and specifically to continue to apply as much pressure as possible to the Vietcong attempting propaganda and liaison tasks in the populated areas. Areas of operations laid down, provided for 2 RAR to control Route 15, as far north as the 78 northing and the area bounded by the Nui Dinhs in the east to the Rungsat in the west. 7 RAR was given from Dat Do and the Horseshoe in the north, to the coast in the south, taking in most of the Long Hais to the west. 8 RAR in the centre was to concentrate on Hoa Long and Long Dien in the south, taking in the northern tip of the Long Hais and extending north along Route 2 from Hoa Long to the Province Boundary. Emphasis was to be placed on the two large centres of Hoa Long and Long Dien and the four smaller villages of Ap Suoi Nghe, Duc My, Binh Ba and Duc Trung, with the intention of reducing infiltration to the population to a minimum. The most significant feature of the Operation was that all AO's were for the first time jointly owned by the Battalion and the local district headquarters. In order to determine deployments of companies in relation to local Regional and Popular Forces, conferences were required to be held daily between the company commanders concerned and the District Chief. In addition road check points were to be set up at locations agreed between Task Force and Sector. They were to be jointly staffed by Vietnamese Police and Australian soldiers, although the police were responsible for the physical halting and searching of vehicles. Initial areas of responsibility were allocated by the Commanding Officer. D Company were given Long Dien and the northern tip of the Long Hais. B Company was to be responsible for Hoa Long and A Company for the northern tri-village complex adjacent to Fire Support Base Le Loi. At this stage C Company were engaged in searching for and ambushing an area where a concentration of D 440 was reported. This they continued to do. A fifth company was formed based on the Anti Tank and Assault Pioneer platoons. These two platoons deployed to Night Defensive Position Kylie, an engineer base established on Route 2 to support road building operations, with the task of protecting the base and operating in the north of AO Mullett. Le Loi was retained as the location for the Battalion Headquarters and the guns of 161 Battery. The Battalion was now spread from the Long Hais in the south to the Provincial boundary in the north, while protecting two static bases outside Nui Dat, Le Loi and Kylie. At 0730 hours on 14 June as C Company was moving two platoons, to a PZ for extraction west of Le Loi, 8 Platoon moving south west from its night ambush location contacted enemy in a bunker system and during a sharp fire fight received four casualties. The casualties were evacuated, but a resupply helicopter bringing in ammunition was fired at from the bunkers receiving twenty five hits and only just reaching Nui Dat. About forty minutes later a second contact occurred with 8 Platoon killing one enemy. At this time it was decided to move A Company to block the exits to the south and west of the bunkers and to move 9 Platoon C Company closer to the system to block the north west. By 1200 hours all blocks had been inserted by air or on foot. At 1 245 hours a force consisting of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, the remainder of C Company and the D and E Platoon had left Le Loi for the bunkers, but on arrival the system was empty. The next day C Company did a thorough reconnaissance of the bunkers which produced identification of D 440. A subsequent intelligence report indicated that five enemy had been killed in the two initial contacts of 8 Platoon. The following day A Company completed a thorough reconnaissance of the entire area and discovered three more bunker systems due west of theoriginal system, with the southern most, occupied the previous day. A Company then continued to follow up enemy sign while 2 Platoon remained in the bunkers as a stay behind ambush, catching one enemy identified as D 440, nine days later. A Company then returned to its task of ambushing the routes to the tri-village complex. A few days later the Anti Tank Platoon moving to an ambush position in the vicinity of the Viet Cong rubber sited two enemy, close to a small hamlet. One was killed and tentatively identified as a member of the Cau Sou organization. No contact was made over the next few days as the Battalion continued its village protection role in co-operation with the local district authorities. On the night of the 27th 8 Platoon broke the dry period by contacting five enemy south of Long Dien and killing four. Two of the dead were identified as members of the Dat Do Finance and Economy Section and thus valuable members of the Vietcong Infrastructure. The main feature of Operation Cung Chung was the attempt to produce close working relationships at the district level between the Battalion and the district authorities. The introduction of a joint area of operations demanded close co-operation and daily conferences. Generally the system worked satisfactorily although obvious security problems were apparent. The major achievement of the operation was the confidence given to the District Chief and his forces to deploy outside the confines of the villages. Results were: Enemy Casualties:KIA 10, WIA 2, Weapons Captured:Small arms 3, Ammunition Captured:Small Arms, rounds 100, Grenades 1, Mortar Bombs1, Explosives lbs, 3, Mines 4, Food Captured:Rice lbs 10,Salt lbs 4, Miscellaneous Ibs 5. Own Casualties:WIA 4(Does not include intelligence estimatesof enemy killed.) FSB TESS YS283643 FSB Noela 14-6-70 Scott I.N. Spr. 17354241FDSQN RAE 21 .KIA APC c/s 21A hit mine at Phuoc Hai 16-6-70 Cashion G.O. Pte 62036 7RAR D 19 RAIN F F /BCAS Lightning hit APC c/s 22B antenna's. 18-6-70 Jones L.C. Pte. NZ629544 2RAR RNZIR .KIA Cmd detonated mine. 18-6-70 Fisk C.R. LCpl NZ41301 2RAR2 V5 RNZIR DOW From wds of Cmd detonated mine earlier that morning. |
14 June. USS Higbee off station, relieved by USS Edson until 19th then relieved by USS Berkley.
15 June - C Coy 8 RAR returns to Nui Dat.
19 - 23 June. 7 RAR conduct Operation "Elanora" as part of Op
"Cung Chung".
24 June. USS Berkley off station. USS James C Owens on station till 28th. Engages target in AO, Long Hai's.
Operation Name
|
CTZ: III Corp TAO Start Date End Date 19/6/1970 23/6/1970 Allied Units Involved: 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment(-),B coy(-), C Coy, D Coy and Spt Coy(organised as 2 Rifle Coys), section 81mm Mortars. B Sqn 3 Cav Regt in sp. Enemy Units Involved. D445 Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA Enemy WIA Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance in force operation Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive Preliminary Checklist Of United States Military Operations In Southeast Asia |
20 June - C Coy 8 RAR take over from D Coy in Long Dien District. B Coy
conduct searches for bunkers in Ap Bac Hamlet
A No 9 Squadron, RAAF, Bushranger helicopter gunship, hit by enemy ground fire was forced to make an emergency landing on the beach about seven miles north east of Vung Tau. The helicopter was hit late on Saturday afternoon on 20 June 1970, but due to fading light and rapidly deteriorating weather conditions, it was impossible to attempt recovery until the following morning. By that time the heavy surf and unusually high tides had swamped the machine, breaking of the tail boom and causing severe structural damage. A Chinook heavy lift helicopter later lifted the Bushranger helicopter to Vung Tau airbase for repairs.
FSB Bridget - YS 51-53 On
the coast at the end of Rte-44, appx 1 km from the water’s edge, 29 km NE of Vung
Tau, 17 km SSE of Nui Dat and 9 km SSE of FSB Horseshoe. Described as a very unpleasant
location built on gray, metallic sand that was very hot underfoot and gave off an intense
blinding glare. 161 Bty, RNZA, Andrew’s Bty firebase set here 20-21Jun70 (right
section); 21-31Aug70 (one tube?). Master's Bty here 22-30Sep70 for
"Housekeeping"? Prov, III Corps.
22-6-70 Wojcik B.K. ABCD R62713 CDT3 23 RAN F /NBCAS Motorcycle accident.
25 June - D Coy 8 RAR deploy to Le Loi.
Operation Name
|
CTZ: III Corp III TAO Phuoc Tuy Province Start Date End Date 29/6/1970 23/7/1970 Allied Units Involved: 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment(-),106 Fd Bty, 3 Tp 1 Armd Regt, A Bty 7/8 US Artillery,2 Tp 1 fd Sqn, 161 Recce Sqn, 9 Sqn RAAF. Enemy Units Involved Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA Enemy WIA Objective of Operation: To interdict movement to and from the Long Hai Mountains Descriptive Narrative of Operation: A continuation of operation CUNG CHUNG in AO SHEPHERDBN.At beginng HQ and Spt Coy locate at Horseshoe Hill, D Coy at NDP ISA, B Coy deployed on Ops in vic Phuoc Hung. FSB Kylie - YS 45-84 On the W side of Rte-2, 3 km NNE of FSB Peggy, 7 km N of Duc Tanh and 17 km N of Nui Dat. Built initially on a small scale since it housed only a section of 161 Bty RNZA 30May70, it was later expanded significantly to accommodate the M2A2 howitzers added to cover the Binh Ba Rubber Plantation. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s Bty 18Sep69-6Sep 70) firebase set here 30May-6Jun70 and 1- 12Jul70 (right section); 29-30Jun70 (left section). Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps. |
29-6-70 Van Valen A. Pte 54320 1RAR 21 RAINF DOW/NBCAS At 3FDHOSP T.S.N. from Carroll's grenade on 26.06.65
29 June - A Coy 8 RAR deploy by APC to blocking positions in the north of AO Mullet. B
and C Coys deploy by air to blocking positions in AO Mullet. D Coy deployed from Le
Loi to AO Mullet.
USS St Paul on station and engages targets east and south of Xuyen Moc..
Operation 'Petrie'
|
Units Involved: 8 RAR From approximately the 24th June, reports had been received that the Headquarters and other elements of D440 were located west of Night Defence Position Kylie in an area known to the Vietcong as the Tre (Bamboo) Base. This area had been a traditional location for the Vietcong for years and recently was known to have been used by D440 on many occasions. The area which had been searched by 8 RAR before, consisted of a number of well constructed bunker systems surrounded by very thick bamboo clumps. It was well hidden from the air and was protected by the bamboo, making going for infantry and tanks particularly difficult. The reported location was from a reliable source and the presence of the enemy headquarters made the target extremely valuable, even though the total number of enemy would probably not number more than forty. Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill's concept was based on deploying the maximum number of troops roundthe enemy location in as wide a cordon as practicable. Blocks in the cordon were to be provided by half platoon ambushes, with sections of APCs and tanks in depth to the infantry. Once the blocks were positioned on the best available egress routes, a massive bombardment with both guns and air would be brought down on the enemy location, covering a wide area and all suspected positions. Following the bomb ardment two companies would carry out a reconnais sance in force, one company with tanks to the main bunker systems and one on foot against a nearby location to the west. To continue the pressure on the tri-village complex W Company, 2 RAR-NZ and the Defence and Employment Platoon of Headquarters Company 1 ATF were placed under operational control of 8 RAR. The Mortar Platoon of 2 RAR was also placed under operational control, as were a squadron minus of tanks and a troop of APCS. On 29th of June B Company and C Company deployed by air from Nui Dat to their blocking positions. C Company was to block in the vicinity of the Ap Cu Bi rubber on the south east side of the area with B Company blocking to the west and north west. A Company deployed by APC from Nui Dat direct to their blocks to the north and north east and D Company by air from Le Loi to the southern block position. Between each company was a sector designated for blocking fire which provided a buffer on the flank and ensured that half platoon ambushes on the extremities did not clash. The deployment went according to plan and on the 30th the companies moved their platoon and half platoon ambushes to cover the most likely withdrawal routes. By last light the blocks were positioned with the tanks and APCs in depth to the infantry. The Mortars of 2 RAR were deployed to Le Loi and the 8 RAR Mortars were split and moved to the south west and north west of the blocks to cover the B and D Company locations. On the same day a battery of US 155 MM self propelled guns and a battery of 8 inch guns moved to Le Loi to prepare for the bombardment on the following day. On the lst July with all companies in their platoon and half platoon blocks the bombardment of the suspected enemy locations began. The guns were followed by an air strike, which was in turn followed again by guns. In all, over 2000 105, 155 and 8in. rounds were used plus 48 5001b. bombs. The bombardment had the desired effect as at 1020 hours D Company in the southern block', sited about ten enemy at a distance, moving south, who appeared to be reconnoitering a route out of the blocks. Tank and artillery fire were directed on them and they changed direction and moved back to the north. Results of the incident were unknown. Immediately following the intensive artillery preparation and air strikes, platoons of A and B Companies with tank support conducted reconnaissance in force south towards the suspected enemy position. Large numbers of bunkers were located by A Company and on the following day these were destroyed as the reconnaissance continued. One group of 20 bunkers located on the 3rd July by A Company had been occupied the previous day and on the fourth after more bunker destruction the company began to follow up tracks to the south east. That same day 1 Troop B Squadron of 3 Cavalry Regiment in one of the most northern blocks contacted eight enemy of whom three were killed by APC fire. On the 6th July B Company after little contact of any significance, captured one enemy soldier. The soldier claimed to be a Hoi Chanh and on interrogation provided information that he was a member of the medical platoon of headquarters 274 Regiment. He also gave details of an area to the north west on the border of Phuoc Tuy and Long khan where he stated there was a large hospital complex with a number of wounded. Acting on this information the CO redeployed A and C Companies on the 7th and 8th to surround the area on three sides with the 1-5 Mechanised Battalion (US) newly arrived from Cambodia, providing the northern blocks. On the 6th and again on the 7th 5 Platoon B Company located large caches, the second containing at least 1800 lbs. of rice and 250 lbs. of noodles which were destroyed. Also on the 6th an APC with D Company soldiers on board detonated a 101b. mine wounding four of the company and two cavalrymen. Both B and D Companies were now relocated in the area of the "triangle" and much evidence of movement was apparent. On the 8th, C Company when moving forward with the Hoi Chanh to locate the hospital, contacted an unknown number of enemy in bunkers and were eventually relieved by 1 Troop of the Armoured Squadron who restored the situation after the Support Section had been pinned down by heavy fire. After a number of "dry" days 2 Platoon A Company raised spirits all round by killing three enemy of 274 Regiment and wounding one, out of a party of five contacted in their block to the west. The following day another enemy was killed by 3 Platoon A Company again in its blocks. The Hoi Chanh although he had given valuable information and had led C Company to occupied bunkers, was unable to locate the hospital complex he claimed existed in the area. On the 11 th B Company returned to ambush round Hoa Long and D Company moved back to the tri-village complex. All the remaining companies were withdrawn to Nui Dat on the 11th, ending Operation Petrie. Although Petrie had been mounted on reliable intelligence concerning D440's location and further redeployment had taken place on detailed information from the Hoi Chanh, there was little to show by way of enemy eliminated. This was due as much to the small number involved, as to their proven elusiveness. One very notable result of Petrie and the preceding pressure on D440 was an instruction from Ba Long (VC) Province Headquarters to the Battalion to move out of Phuoc Tuy into Long Khanh. From this fact alone, the operation had achieved at least some significance. Results of the operation were: Enemy: KIA 10, WIA 2, PW-Hoi Chanh 1, Weapons Captured: Small Arms 7, Chicom Mine 1, Food Captured: Rice 2014 lbs., Salt 6 1 bs.Miscellaneous 481 lbs. Own Casualties:WIA 12 |
29 June. US ground troops withdraw from Cambodia.
30 June - 4 Fd Regt (RAA) 105mm Ammo Usage Month June. HE - 12,273 , Smoke WBT - nil, WP - 244, Illum - 836, Splintex - 62, Smoke Col - nil
July - 1970
The Battle of Fire Support Base Ripcord was a 23 day battle between the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division and the North Vietnamese Army from July 1, 1970 until July 23, 1970. It was the last major confrontation between United States ground forces and North Vietnam of the Vietnam War. Little was known about the battle until 1985, when the FSB Ripcord Association was founded. Three Medals of Honor and five Distinguished Service Crosses were earned during the operations.
4 July. USS St Paul off station.
9 July. HMAS Hobart on station and engages targets in AO and Lonh Hai's.
7 July - A Coy 8 RAR deploy to a blocking position north of the Song Ca.
8 July - C Coy 8 RAR redeploy to a blocking position north of the Suoi Soc.
8-7-70 WA Nalder W.L. Pte 2412151 1RAR 19 RAINF DOW At 173rd CCS from sniper GSW to chest that day.
11 July - B Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat for local ambush tasks at Hoa Long.
A No 2 Squadron Canberra bomber aircraft A84-241 sits in the middle of the Phan Rang runway, Vietnam, after its nose wheel failed to lower for landing on 11 July 1970. The aircraft was piloted by O224235 Pilot Officer (PO) Michael Brendon Birks and O117504 Flying Officer (FO) Alan Joseph Curr. The aircraft suffered very little damage except around the nose undersurface, and the crew climbed unharmed out of their aircraft. When the United States Air Force base commander arrived on the scene, he was prepared to bulldoze it away to remove the obstruction it was causing to the normal flying operations, RAAF personnel mounted a hurried effort to rescue the aircraft.
12-7-70 Bain J. T/Sgt 16667 1 F DREGT 26 RAE * At Brisbane . QLD
Operation 'Nathan'
|
CTZ: III Corp |
19 July. USS Ernest G. Small on station. HMAS Hobart expected to be on station 21 July until 26 July then relieved by USS Duncan. USS Ernest G. Small on station 29 Jul.
20-7-70 McNair D.G. LAC A317006 9SQN 27 RAAF DOW At 3FDHOSP TSN. from burns received from aircraft crash on 3-7-70
21-7-70 Bullman J.H Pte 2794031 1ARU 22 RAIN F KBA F F F 161Bty drops-short. ARU patrol on training excercise.
21-7-70 Foster G.L. Pte 1202992 1ARU 22 RAIN F KBA F F F 161Bty drops-short. ARU patrol on training excercise.
2 RAR Routine Order V130 dated 22 July 70. Canteen Timings. Rifle Coys1630-1730 daily. Spt Coy and Admin 1800 - 1900 hrs daily. The rationfor each man remains 2 cans per day.(perhaps)
SWIMMING COMPETITION
An AFV Swimming Competition is to be run on a continuous basis at the Harold Holt Memorial Swimming Pool Vung Tau. There is a team competition and an individual competition with appropriate trophies for the best performance in each. Competition is "against the clock" so that all sub-units can compete as operational requirements permit, The Coy Sports Officer is to read the instruction at least 10 days prior to stand down at the Badcoe Club, so that arrangements can be made for entry and timekeepers etc.
23 July - D Coy 8 RAR deploy to FSB Brigid. Spt Coy deploy to FSB Isa.
A, B and C Coy begin operations around Long Dien and Hoa Long.Op
Decade commences.
Operation Name
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CTZ: III Corp III TAO Phouc Tuy Province Start Date - End Date 23/71970 - 2/8/1970 Allied Units Involved: 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Enemy Units Involved Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA Enemy WIA Objective of Operation: To deny enemy entry into villages Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive Preliminary Checklist Of United States Military Operations In Southeast Asia |
In July the Vietnamese Navy assumed sole responsibility f or the Ready Deck operation,
which was given a Tran Hung Dao designator like the other former SEALORDS areas. Also in
July, the U.S. Navy ceased its combat activity on I Corp's Cua Viet and Hue Rivers. The
Americans then transferred the last combatant vessels of Task Force Clearwater to the
Vietnamese. A final turnover of river craft at the end of 1970 enabled the Vietnamese Navy
to take charge of the Search Turn, Barrier Reef, and Breezy Cove efforts deep in the
Mekong Delta. Except for continued support by HAL-3 and VAL-4 aircraft and SEAL
detachments, the U.S. Navy's role in the SEALORDS campaign ended in April 1971 when Solid
Anchor (previously Sea Float and now based ashore at Nam Can) became a Vietnamese
responsibility.
31-7-70 Doyle D.G. Tpr 219663 B3CAV 19 RAAC KBA Decapitated when APC reversed under chopper rotor blades.
31 July - 4 Fd Regt (RAA) 105mm Ammo Usage Month July. HE - 8,503 , Smoke WBT - 58, WP - 387, Illum - 899, Splintex - nil, Smoke Col - 65
August - 1970
2 August - B Coy 8 RAR deploy to Le Loi and begin operations. D Coy vacate NDP Brigid and begin
operations in the Long Dien area. A Coy deploy to the west of AP Suoi Nghe.
2-8-70 Thompson D.L. Pte. 1202729 2RAR RAINF 20 .KIA Mine
2-8-70 Penneystone P.L. Spr. 6709611 1FDSQN RAE 22 .KIA Mine
3 August - 10 Sep. 7 RAR deploy for Op Cung Chung 2(3 Aug - 10 Sep) and 3
.
Operation Name
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CTZ: III Corp III TAO Phuoc Tuy Province Start Date - End Date 3/8/1970 - 25/10/1970 Allied Units Involved: 2nd, 7th & 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. DS 106 fd Bty, 161 (Indep) Recce Flt, one Tp A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, 2 Tp B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 2 Tp 1 Fd Sqn. Operation Decade's end and Cung Chung ll's beginning merged into each other on the 2nd and 3rd August. D Company handed back Brigid on the 2nd to 7 RAR, returned to Nui Dat and took over the Long Dien sector from B Company. C Company maintained its stance round Hoa Long, while A and B Companies were redeployed to the area west of the tri-village complex. A Company moved by air and APC on the 2nd,with the three platoons locating themselves on tracks to the west and north west of Ap Suoi Nghe. B Company moved on the 3rd setting up Company Headquarters in Le Loi and ambushing in the area of Binh Ba, Duc Trung and Duc My. At the same time all companies re-deployed the road check points, that had been a feature of Cung Chung 1, in co-operation with the district police. Although reports had been received over the previous week of Vietcong penetration into Binh Ba, there was no great confidence that there would be much contact, at least until movement patterns had been established. This pessimism was soon dispelled by 6 Platoon B Company,' who on moving to their ambush position on the 3rd through the rubber, sited three enemy dressed in green, who broke and ran on the platoons approach. Shortly after 3 Platoon, A Company also moving to their ambush, north west of Nui Nghe heard movement from the north, set up an immediate ambush and killed the three enemy moving towards them, demonstrating the value of consistent alertness. The area in which A Company was now located was obviously very promising with much sign of movement. It appeared likely that C41 or the Chau Duc Company which intelligence reports had located in the Chau Pha Valley, were the enemy force involved. On the 6th two separate small bunker systems were discovered which had apparently been vacated after the 3 Platoon contact on the 3rd and there was evidence of movement out of the a(ea to the north east. On the 7th A and B Companies were moved back to Nui Dat for the Battalion Birthday celebrations on the 8th, the intention being to relocate A Company in the same area to follow up on the 9th.' This did not take place because the area of operations was handed back to 2 RAR, and when A Company redeployed they were given part of the Long Dien sector. No contact was made for the next few days, but on the night of the 11-1 2 a dramatic change of fortune occurred. On this night the normal Hoa Long series of ambushes took place with 8 Platoon occupying the area adjacent to the French Fort, south west of Hoa Long, a continuously good ambush site. The platoon had an elaborate cover plan for the insertion of the ambush, involving movement by trucks at dusk through the ambush site to Baria, then turning round and coming back with the troops detrucking from moving vehicles on the return journey. The ambush was set and at about 2100 hours reported seeing about fifty enemy moving into Hoa Long about one hundred metres from their location. No action was taken to disclose the ambush, but the ambush commander, Sergeant Sherrin decided to relocate his platoon to cover the track used by the enemy into Hoa Long. At about 0315 hours the enemy were again seen moving out of Hoa Long, using the same track that had been used for the movement in. The ambush was sprung and was so effective that there was little fire returned. Seventeen enemy were killed immediately and later two more enemy were killed and five prisoners taken by APCs that the Commanding Officer reacted from Nui Dat to exploit the success of the ambush. Early the following morning RF platoons combed Hoa Long for additional wounded and a further prisoner was captured cycling out of the village. That afternoon another member of the group rallied as a Hoi Chanh. It was apparent that the original group of about fifty had split into two and moved out of the village using the same route, the 8 Platoon ambush accounting for the first group in its entirety and some of the second group. The prisoners were identified as members of C41 and the Chau Duc Company and it was obvious that the result of the ambush would be felt by them for some time to come. On the 12th A Company did a thorough sweep and search of the area to the south of the village while the RF continued to search the village interior. It was considered probable that a large proportion of the second group were still hiding in the village in the unlocated bunkers that had been a target for search teams from the Battalion on two previous occasions. The amount of food captured after the contact, including 550 lbs. of rice, proved that the party was on a major resupply mission and was probably heading back to the Chau Pha Valley. Subsequent intelligence suggested that the remainder of the party had moved back into Hoa Long on contact, lain up undetected and moved out of the village two nights later. For the next ten days no further contact was made, but on the night of the 23rd August a report was received that a party of about 100 men had entered Hoa Long from the northwest. This report was confirmed by the District Chief of Long Le District Major Tri. If a party of this size was prepared to move into Hoa Long once, it was obvious that the same might happen again, as it was very necessary for the enemy to re-establish his political influence in the village, after the reverse he had suffered on the 12th. The Commanding Officer as a result, decided to concentrate three companies on the western side of Hoa Long in an area ambush and to deploy the fourth to cover the neck of the Chau Pha Valley well to the north west, the valley being established as the enemy route into Hoa Long. On the night of the 26th A, C and D Companies established an L shaped ambush to the west of the village with A and C Companies on the eastern side of the L and D Company plus the Assault Pioneers in the southern portion. On the 27th B Company deployed to its location in the Chau Pha Valley and the trap was set. On the 25th the Assault Pioneers vacated lsa, which was handed back to 7 RAR. By the lst September no further contact had been made and no entries into Hoa Long had been reported. B Company moved back to Nui Dat by air and relieved C Company of its role on the north west side of Hoa Long. A few days prior to this D Company had been redeployed from its south westerly stance and had moved into ambush positions due south of Hoa Long. Hoa Long was now very tightly covered on two sides by the Battalion with the RF and PF occupying the eastern edge of the village. On 3rd September C Company deployed to the north east and north of the village leaving only the east not covered by Battalion ambushes. If any doubts were felt of the enemy's intentions, they were dispelled on the morning of 5th September when it was learned that a party of 25-30 Vietcong had entered the village the night before from the west and left some hours later by the same route. The information was confirmed that same day by a Hoi Chanh who remained in the village when his party left and rallied to the District Post the next morning. He showed the route that had been used in detail and the point where Route 2 had been crossed and the perimeter wire cut. The Vietcong group had actually moved between the left flank of B Company and the right flank of A Company and aided by the rain and the lack of moon had managed to move in and out, without contact. It was apparent from the Hoi Chanh's statement that the location of the ambushes was not known and that luck had played a major part in the entry. The following day another Hoi Chanh, a girl, rallied. She had been a member of the same party and on the way out had dropped off in the foothills of the Dinhs, hidden and moved back to Hoa Long with the villagers the following evening. Early on the night of the 6th - 7th a half platoon ambush of 7 Platoon C Company fired at ten enemy who appeared to be moving north out of Hoa Long. The opening range was 150 metres and although the party dispersed there were no known casualties. As the enemy was heavily laden with food it was obvious they had come out of one of the villages although whether Hoa Long or Long Dien was not known. In the ambushes various early warning devices and heavy weapons were now deployed nightly. All companies had liberal supplies of Starlight Scopes which were proving particularly useful in the open paddies. B Company in addition had a large NOD (Night Observation Device) that gave excellent vision for over 1000 metres down Route 2 west of the village, and was sited in conjunction with a 106MM RCL firing splintex. A further refinement, beginning on the night of the 9th was the deployment of a team of four snipers with an ambush party, to the hills just east of the Nui Dinhs known as The Three Sisters. This party had been trained by the 25th Infantry Division (US) Sniper School at Cu Chi and had been loaned American M14 sniper rifles for the operation. The area of deployment east of the hills, gave a commanding view of the paddi to the north, south and east. With the capacity to hit a man at 500 metres at night, the sniper team were a valuable addition to the Battalions potential effectiveness. On the 10th radar equipment working from the top of Nui Dat hill was placed under operational control of the Battalion and swept the areas of the Chau Pha Valley, the eastern edge of the Dinhs and the south and south east of Hoa Long, nightly. Its effectiveness was proved on the night of the 13th-14th when a group of from 20 - 30 enemy was located in the foothills of the Nui Dinhs. Although this group appeared to be setting itself for a move into Hoa Long from the west, nothing eventuated. On the 10th September Operation Cung Chung Ill had officially begun. This did not affect the Battalions deployment, but had increased the area of operations, by taking over 2 RAR's former territory including most of Route 15 east to Route 2. W Company 2 RAR-NZ came under operational control of the Battalion and continued to operate to the north of the Nui Thi Vais against the D65 sappers. By the 15th September nothing further had been heard from the Chau Duc, so the Commanding Officer decided to vary his tactics. In order to give the impression that the Battalion had lost interest in the village, the mortars and the Battalion Liaison Officer were brought back to Nui Dat and the Commanding Officer discontinued his daily visits to Major Tri, the District Chief. Two Companies D and C, were given new tasks, D Company to redeploy to the neck of the Chau Pha Valley to establish blocking ambushes and C Company to north of the Three Sisters, again ambushing the most likely route to the village from the Dinhs. The other two companies were given redefined areas of responsibility on the west, B Company spreading itself south and A Company moving south and east and covering the southern sector of Hoa Long. In addition B Company sent out a number of observation parties to lie up and cover the Song Dinh and the Song Cau while the remainder of the company was available to concentrate quickly, if movement was detected. The snipers were split, one team remaining with C Company and the other going to B. On the 20th a platoon of W Company 2 RAR under operational control of the Battalion, contacted four Vietcong south east of Thai Tien village, killing one of them. The dead enemy was identified as a member of C41 and documents captured showed that C41 and the Chau Duc had been using Thai Thien as an alternative supply source to Hoa Long. It was also stated in the document that the ambushes around Hoa Long had prevented the Chau Duc using Hoa Long over the previous two weeks. The obvious course of action now, was to block Thai Thien which was adjacent to the AO which had been passed back to 2 RAR on the 21st. The fact that the Chau Duc and C41 were forced to use Thai Thien contrary to the orders of Ba Long Province, was indicative of the problem they were facing.ThaiThienfrom the Vietcong viewpoint was the supplier of 274 Regiment, and the D65 sappers and could not afford for long to provide for anyone else. On the 22nd the Battalion took over 7 RAR's AO, incorporating Long Dien and Dat Do. This area although dormant for some time, had become a greater focus of interest from the beginning of September. Renewed activity was a direct result of the infiltration back into the province of D445 after a period of retraining and reindoctrination. A kill by 7 RAR, east of Dat Do in mid September proved extremely valuable in revealing the future intentions of this formidable group. These included offensive action against district posts, the pacification programme and more specifically against Vietnamese government and Australian ambushes. Dat Do was the major point of interest with likely entrance routes from the south east to the north east. Pressure was still to be applied to Hoa Long by B and D Companies, but the information concerning D445 was too specific to be ignored and two companies were directed to ambush to the east of Dat Do from the night of 22nd September. No contact occurred for the next few days, but at the end of the month 2 RAR ambushed a large party of Chau Duc guerillas killing five west of Ngai Giao. One prisoner was taken who produced nteresting intelligence, to the effect that the Chau Duc had become disillusioned with Hoa Long and had decided to try elsewhere for food. They were. in fact generally living off jungle gardens and had obtained little from the area of Binh Ba. This, tied in with the contact east of Thai Thien, proved conclusively how much the 8 RAR operations had hurt Chau Duc and C41. No entries had been made since 5th September and the guerillas had been denied access to what was without doubt one of their major power bases in the province. Although no kills had been recorded by the Battalion against them for some time, there was no doubt that the operation in the vicinity of the village had been extremely effective. On the 4th October the Battalion came out of operations and from that date to the 25th provided one company at a time on a rotation basis generally in the Hoa Long area. Again, as so often in the past the unexpected happened. On the night of 6th, 9 Platoon in the well used location south west of the village ambushed six, killing four and wounding one, who was captured. The guerillas were from the Vung Tau City unit and had been into Hoa Long for food. The PW was a hard-core North Vietnamese Political Officer with a history stretching back to 1954. One of the dead was the unit 21C. This ambush on the 6th was the Battalions last operational contact. Operations Cung Chung ii and Cung Chung Ill had continued the work begun in Cung Chung i and Pho Hop and gave further proof if any was necessary, that the interdiction of village communication routes was a sound and profitable basic stance. All reports received, suggested that if the Vietcong hold on the villages was not broken, it was certainly seriously weakened. This, added to the obvious lowering of the local gueriila units morale, showed that considerable progress was being made, giving grounds for optimism if not complete confidence, in the military situation in Phuoc Tuy Province. Tangible results of the two operations were: Enemy casualties:26 KIA, 5 WIA, 7 PW, 2 Hoi Chanh. Weapons captured: 2 AK 47, 2 SMG, 1 BAR, 1 Pistol. Ammunition captured: 490 assorted rounds, 2 M16 mines, 13 grenades, 15 lbs explosive, Food captured: 870 lbs of rice, 10 lbs of salt, 243 lbs miscellaneous foodstuffs. Own casualties:1 WIA FSB Allison - YS 65-68 Along the N side of Rte-329, 24 km due E of Nui Dat, 5 km ENE of FSB Beth, and 7 km WNW FSB Feathers. 5Oct70, 161 Bty’s deployment here met with near disaster when it ran into the tail end of a VC ambush compromised by captured intel. 161 Bty, RNZA (Master’s Bty 6 Sep70-8 May71)firebase set here 6-13 Oct 70. Prov, III Corps. FSB Bruiser - YS 64-65 3 Km S of Xuyen Moc, 18 km ESE of Nui Dat, 5 km SE of FSB Beth and 4 km SSW of FSB Allisoun. Built on firm white sand that caused sandstorms when Chinooks arrived to resupply. 161 Bty, RNZA (Master’s Bty 22Sep70-29Mar71) firebase set here 14- 21Oct70 . Prov, III Corps. FSB Feathers - YS 71-67 8 km N of the ocean, 28 km E of Nui Dat, 14 km S of FSB Toby, 6 km E of Xuyen Moc and 23 km ENE of Dat Do. 161 Bty, RNZA (Master’s Bty 6Sep70-8May71) firebase set here 9-13Dec70 and firing in support of B and Support companies, 7 RAR. Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps. |
7 August - All Companies 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
7-8-70 Raffen F .L. Sgt(T/WO2)4186 AATTV 41 RAIN F DOD At 85EVAC from heart attack.
9 August - All Companies of 8 RAR return to the area operations occupied on the 7th,
except A Coy who deploy to An Nhut sector of Long Dien District.
|
11-12 August . C Coy 8 RAR ambush the village of Hoa Long. 19 NLF soldiers are killed and ten captured. PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, SOUTH VIETNAM. AUGUST 1970. AN AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIER (APC) SITS ASTRIDE ROUTE TWO OUTSIDE THE VILLAGE OF HOA LONG NEAR THE SCENE OF THE AMBUSH OF 12 AUGUST 1970 IN WHICH THE EIGHT PLATOON OF C COMPANY, 8TH BATTALION, THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN REGIMENT (8RAR), KILLED SEVENTEEN ARMED VIET CONG LOADED WITH RICE, FISH, AND OTHER SUPPLIES. AUSTRALIANS IN APCS KILLED ANOTHER ENEMY AND CAPTURED FIVE PRISONERS. A CORDON OF TANKS, APCS AND INFANTRY WAS IMMEDIATELY THROWN AROUND THE VILLAGE, JUST SOUTH OF NUI DAT, TO PREVENT THE ESCAPE OF OTHER ENEMY BELIEVED TO BE HIDING. |
12 August. An Sioux heli from 161 (Indep) Recce Sqn is hit by ground fire and makes a low level speed landing at the nearest FSB.
24 August - B Coy 8 RAR return from Le Loi which is handed over to an element of
C Coy.
25 August- FSB Isa is handed over to 7 RAR.
25-8-70 Moore S.T. Sig 3175954 110SIG 20 RASIG DOD* Neuroblastomma. RTA to RGH Heidelberg 18.09.69.
25 - 26 August. US Army Search-LIght Unit deployed to the Horseshoe Hill.
26 August - 8 RAR less B Coy concentrate around Hoa Long.
USS Buck on station. Off station 31 Aug for re-supply.
27 August - B Coy 8 RAR deploy to the neck of the Chau Pha Valley.
TPC 25 - Radar Personnel movement detecting radar equipment used by the
ANZAC (and presumably the US under other nomenclature). First employed by the 1 ATF Aug70
when set up on the slopes of Nui Dat and FSB Horseshoe guide arty fire missions and alert
RAR ambush sites.
27-8-70 Richardson N.T. L/Cpl. 218697 7RAR RAINF 23 .KIA In Phuoc Tuy Prov.
Operation'Massey Harris' |
CTZ: III Corp III TAO Phouc Tuy Province Start Date - End Date 29/81970 -18/9 /1970 Allied Units Involved: Mor sect and Rifle Pl 2 RAR/NZ, two XM-584's, two M113 Flame APC's, one Tp + one dozer tank + one bridhe layer A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, one CET 1 Fd Sqn, one H12 161 (Indep) Recce Flt, US Naval Gunfire Det, 9 Sqn RAAF + one CH47(US) Objective of Operation: To destroy illegal crops and gardens in AO SUSAN Descriptive Narrative of Operation Sources Used in Archive: AWM95-1-4-197 |
31 August - 4 Fd Regt (RAA) 105mm Ammo Usage Month August. HE - 6,330 , Smoke WBT - nil, WP - 357, Illum - 537, Splintex - nil, Smoke Col - 1
106 Fd Bty has supported 7 RAR for six months, In this time they expended 40,000 rounds HE, white phos and night illum.
September - 1970
1 September - B Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat for ambush tasks around Hoa Long. 7 RAR celeberate their 5th birthday
10 -22 September. Op Cung Chung 2 Phase 1 commences.
10 - 20 September. 2 RAR/NZ less W Company returned to Nui to Dat for a further period of rest and retraining.
W Company remained deployed under operational control of 8 RAR when that battalion assumed temporary responsibility for the area west of Route 2.
Operation Tailwind was a covert incursion into southeastern Laos by a company-sized element of U.S. Army Special Forces and Montagnard commando (Hatchet Force) of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG or SOG), conducted between 11 September and 13 September 1970 during the Vietnam War (also known as the Second Indochina War). The purpose of the operation was to create a diversion for a Royal Lao Army offensive and to exert pressure on the occupation forces of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN).
13 September - FSB Kylie is closed. Assault Pioneers of 8 RAR return to Nui Dat.
14-9-70 Mowbray B.G T/Maj 53057 HQA F V 36 AAPSYCH DOD At 1 F DHosp VT from heart failure following a fight at the Grand Hotel.
14 September - D Coy 8 RAR take up ambush duties around Hoa Long.
14 September - HMAS Perth departs Sydney on its third Vietnam deployment.
16 September - D Coy 8 RAR deploy to the Chau Pha Valley. C Coy deploys to the area
of The Three Sisters.
18 September - Second Australian moratorium. 100,000 march and 300 people arrested.
21 September - C Coy 8 RAR return to Nui Dat and take up ambush tasks to the east
of Dat Do.
21 September: 2 RAR/NZ redeployed on Operation CUNG CHUNG II. Battalion Headquarters remained at NUI DAT to provide better control of operations which now extended both west and east of Route 2. Night Defensive Position (NDP) GARTH was established in the Courtenay Rubber Plantation area to support engineer road reconstruction on Route 2.
24 September - A Coy 8 RAR take up ambush duties east of Dat Do Town.
25 September - C Coy 8 RAR redeploy from Dat Do to Hoa Long.
28 September - HMAS Perth relieves HMAS Hobart at Subic Bay.
30 September: 2 RAR/NZ Battalion headquarters redeployed by air to FSB HIRAN and combined with Headquarters 1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force to conduct Operation PIMLICO in the area astride the PHUO TUY/ BIEN Province boundary.
October - 1970
2 October : Operation PIMLICO ended and 2 RAR/NZ Battalion headquarters returned to Nui Dat.
3 October. OP Cung Chung III - Phase III commences. 7 RAR resumr responsibilty for AO NAOMI. Op Cung Chung( Phases 3 and 4 runs until 1 February 1971).
4 October - 8 RAR ceases Battalion Operations and begins one Company operational
cycle.
5 October. Op Pimlico concludes. Bh HQ 2 RAR returns to Nui Dat.
8-10-70 l. Willoughby G.I. Pte. 3797671 2RAR RAINF 23 .KIA Sniper in Phuoc Tuy Prov.
11-10-70 Cooper T. Pte NZ482859 2RAR2 W3 RNZIR DOWFFF At 24EVACHOSP from wds on 10.10.70.
11-10-70 Cooper T. Pte NZ482859 2RAR2 W3 RNZIR DOWFFF At 24EVACHOSP from wds on 10.10.70.
14 October. C Coy 7 RAR conduct interdiction Op around Xuyen Moc.
15 October - President Nixon announces a further withdrawal of 40,000 US troops
22-10-70 Schuit M.J.M. Spr 4720852 17CONST 23 RAE DOI At 24EVAC after injuries on 04.10.70.
19 October : FSB LE LOI closed.
25 October - 8 RAR on Ops Cung Chung 2&3 concludes.
27 October. Two patrols from 2 and 3 Pl of A Coy 7 RAR clashes. result: 1 KIAFF, 2 WIA.
26 October. FSB GAIL closed and 2 RAR/NZ ceased active operations along Route 15.
27-10-70 Davies R.W. T/Lt. 422514 7RAR RAINF 25 .KIAFFF.Patrols from 2 Pl and 3 Pl clashed. Navigation error.
31-10-70 Sutherland M.L. L/Cpl. NZ41081 2RAR RNZIR .KIA In contact. GSW to back
31 October - 8 RAR Main Body departs Vung Tau for Australia on HMAS Sydney.
November - 1970
1 November. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)(-) and 7 RAR Op Cung Chung 3 .
3 - RAAF Canberra Bomber A84-231("Magpie 91") is lost - missing
in action - . The crew and aircraft are never found.
3-11-70 Carver R.C. POff O119223 2SQN 24 RAA F MIA Posted MIA when a/c A84-231 failed to return from mission.
3-11-70 Herbert M.P.J. F Off O44310 2SQN 24 RAA F MIA Posted MIA when a/c A84-231 failed to return from mission.
5 November - 8 RAR Advance Party depart Tan Son Nhut by air.
9-11-70 Fleming R. Sgt 38129 1ARU 24 RAIN F DOD At 24 Evac after brain haemorrhage.
2 RAR/NZ direct support SIOUX aircraft of 161 (Independent) Reconnaissance Flight flown by Second Lieutenant T. Hayes and carrying the Commanding Officer, was shot down by ground fire in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The aircraft was destroyed but both officers were rescued. The Commanding Officer was evacuated to 1st Australian Field Hospital with a gunshot wound.
10 November - 8 RAR Rear Party depart Tan Son Nhut by air.
12November - 8 RAR arrive in Brisbane, Australia completing their first and final tour of
Vietnam.The Battalion marches through Brisbane.
Operation Ivory Coast was a United States special military operation conducted in North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.On November 21, 1970, U.S. Army Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons and Lieutenant Colonel Elliot "Bud" Sydnor led a team of 56 U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers in a joint Air Force/Army raid on the Son Tay prison camp (located 23 miles west of Hanoi) in North Vietnam. The objective was to recover some 70 American prisoners of war thought to be held at the camp. The mission, though executed successfully, failed to recover any prisoners, because all had been moved to another camp before the raid.
27 November - FSB Cook - YS 29-62 On QL-2, 16 km SW of Nui Dat,
18 km N of Vung Tau, 5 km NNE of FSB Andrea and 8 km SW of Nui Thi. Author of Vietnam
Gunners wrote that it was located in a "flat, sandy covered with grass and
fringed mangrove-like swamps of a tropical river delta." with 161 Bty, RNZA
Master’s Bty 6Sep70-8May71) firebase set here 27Nov-2Dec70. Bty deployed here 27Nov70
to fire in support of a 2 ANZAC operation on the western slopes of the Nui Dinh Mountains.
Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps.
1 ATF MONTHY REPORT: 01 NOVEMBER - 30 NOVEMBER 1970: Friendly KIA nil : Friendly WIA 4 : Contacts 30 : En KIA 9 VC : PW Captured 3 : Total VCI captured and killed nil : Hoi Chanh 3 Total SA captured and destroyed 12.Total crew served weapons captured and destroyd 1.
FAQ :Were all AC-130 Spectre gunships based in Thailand? (United States Air Force Gunships in the Vietnam)
December - 1970
2 December. 1 ATF Location Summary : HQ 1 ATF remain Nui Dat, A Sqn1 Armd Regt(-) remain Nui Da t- Tp Sp 2 RAR to AO Judy and 7 RAR to AO Naomi, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt(-) remain Nui Dat - sp 2 RAR and 7 RAR, 1 Fd Sqn HQ remain Nui Dat -sp ops, 17 Constr Sqn Hq renains Nui Dat remainder Engr Ops, 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC) remain in AO Judy - Bn HQ remain Nui Dat, 7 RAR(-) remain AO Naomi - Bn HQ Horseshoe Hill -Coys conduct Ops Dat Do area, one Coy south of Xuyen Moc - elms defend quarry NDP Isa.
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt tanks replace A Sqn in Vietnam
9 December. 2 RAR/NZ(ANZAC)(-) and 7 RAR Op Cung Chung 3 .
Members of 1 Platoon, A Company, 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) (The ANZAC Battalion comprising 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and a component from the 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment) stopping for water from a stream whilst on patrol in the Nui Dinh mountains, Phuoc Tuy Province.
FSB Raglan - YS 60-80 17 km ENE of FSB Le Loi, 10 km W of FSB Toby, 23 km
NE of Nui Dat and 11 km ENE of Ngai Giao. Located 11 km S of the Long Khanh Prov border,
and 16 km E of Rte 2, the site was covered with luxuriant shoulder-high grass which was
quickly flattened. 161 Bty RNZA fired "Mark Missions" in support of 7 RAR
that was working with US units in that area. Named for a NZ town that was very supportive
of the 161 Bty, sending the Bty gifts every Christmas and throughout its 6 years in SVN.
161 Bty, RNZA (Master’s Bty 6Sep70-8May71) firebase set here 19 Dec70-2Jan71. Phuoc
Tuy Prov, III Corps.
US military strength now at 335,000.
150845Z PRIORITY MESSAGE OPS 1675 - SECURITY CLASS: RESTRICTED
FROM 1 ATF TO: LIST Z:
CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR 1970/71 ALL ADDRESSEES ARE ADVISED THAT 1 ATF IS TO REMAIN ON A FUU.Y OPERATIONAL FOOTING OVER THE XMAS/NEW YEAR PERIOD(.)
FOR 1 ATF UNIT/DET COMS AND STAFF BRANCH HEADS (.) YOU ARE TO ENSURE THAT FESTIVE SEASON ACTIVITIES IN NO WAY LIMIT 1 ATF OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY (.)ACK EBONY 25
PAGE
1 OF1 PAGES - RESTRICTED
15-12-70 Knight P.R. LAC A318937 1OSU 46 RAA F DOI Vehicle accident in Vung Tau.
16 December. A coy 7 RAR returns to Nui Dat for stand down.
25 December. 2 RAR/NZ still on Ops.
25-12-70 Moss A.B. T/Sgt 4410968 52SUP 22 RAASC M/AUST Murder by GSW by Pte P.R. Ferriday in TFMA Sgt's Mess.
25-12-70 Galvin W.J. Sgt 214101 26COY 32 RAASC M/AUST Murder by GSW by Pte P.R. Ferriday in TFMA Sgt's Mess
28-12-70 Nichols R.K. WO1 1797 106 F DWKSP 39 RAEME DOD Heart attack in unit lines.
30-12-70 Lloyd A.L. Pte 3797086 7RAR2 B/6 20 RAINF DOW At 1FDHOSP V.T. from GSW that day.
The change in the nature of the allied war effort reflected the rapid but measured
withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. naval forces. NAVFORV strength dropped from a peak
of 38,083 personnel in September 1968 to 16,757 at the end of 1970. As Admiral Zumwalt
transferred resources to the Vietnamese Navy, he disestablished U.S. naval commands and
airlifted personnel home. With the redeployment of the Army's 9th Infantry Division and
the turnover of 64 riverine assault craft in June 1969, the joint Mobile Riverine Force
halted operations. When the Riverine Assault Force (Task Force 117) stood down on 25
August 1969, it became the first major naval command deactivated in Vietnam. By December
1970, COMNAVFORV had transferred to Vietnam the remaining river combatant craft in his
command, which included 293 PBRs and 224 riverine assault craft. That month, the River
Patrol Force was disestablished and the Task Force 116 designator reassigned to Commander
Delta Naval Forces, a new headquarters controlling SEAL and naval aircraft units still
in-country.
31 December 0400 hrs. A group of en (approx 20) approach an ambush position 5 km SE of Xuyen Moc. The ambush consists of APC's 3 Cav Regt and B Coy 7 RAR.
|
Navy Task Force 77 - Tells the Story of Navy Operations off the coast of Vietnam in 1970 Carriers, fighters, helicopters, cruisers are all part of task force 77 in the Gulf of Tonkin during Vietnam. Shows a life aboard carriers, russian spy ships, man falls overboard and is rescued. Great overview film of Navy life off the coast of Vietnam. Runtime 27.mins in two parts |
 |
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