1970

Vietnam War Timeline

The AC-47 ("Puff the Magic Dragon" ) was a United States Air Force C-47 Skytrain (the military version of the DC-3) that had been modified by mounting three 7.62 mm General Electric miniguns to fire through two rear window openings and the side cargo door, all on the left (pilot's) side of the aircraft. Other armament configurations could also be found on similar C-47 based aircraft around the world. The guns were actuated by a control on the pilot's yoke, where he could control the guns either individually or together, though gunners were also among the crew to assist with gun failures and similar issues. Its primary function was for close air support for ground troops, both U.S. Australian and South Vietnamese. Once called into action, it could loiter, orbiting the designated target, sometimes for hours, providing suppressing fire. Coverage given by a Spooky was over an elliptical area approximately 52 yards in diameter, placing a projectile within every 2.4 yards during a 3 second burst.

Operation ' Bluewater'
30 Dec 69 - 7 Jan 70

The New Zealand Soldier

Units Involved: Three Coys 6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) 9 Sqn RAAF, A Sqn 3 Cav Regt, 1 Fd Sqn.
Enemy Units: D445 LF Bn
Friendly Forces: No change
Mission: To locate and destroy D445 LF Bn in AO DRURY
Sources Used in Archive: 6 RAR Ops Instr 26/69

The New Zealand Soldier

Operation ' Atherton'
10/12/1969 10/1/1970

81mm Mortar

NZ Gunner - 161 Bty(NZ)

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Start Date End Date
10/12/1969 10/1/1970
Allied Units Involved: 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
Enemy Units Involved
Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA
Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA
Enemy WIA
Objective of Operation: reconnaissance and ambush operation
Descriptive Narrative of Operation:Operation Atherton, the Battalion's first operation in Vietnam, began with the deployment of the Battalion into AO Ashgrove. The AO was generally west of Route 2, extending from the Binh Ba rubber plantation in the south to the province boundary in the north and north west, with limited access east of the road in the vicinity of the De Courtenay rubber plantation.
On the 10th December C Company with one section of 161 Field Battery and one section of C Battery 2-35 (US) Artillery moved by road to establish a temporary Fire Support Base in the Duc Thanh military post, with a simultaneous deployment of D Company by Armoured Personnel Carriers of C Squadron 1 Cavalry Regiment into area Romeo.
A Company then deployed by air from Kapyong to secure the site of Fire Support Base Peggy and was followed shortly after by the deployment of the Fire Support Base. The following morning B Company deployed by air west of AO Tango and moved on foot into AO Quebec followed by the deployment of C Company to the same LZ.
Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill's concept of operations was to establish ambushes with D Company in the north of the AO, across known routes running north east to south west through the De Courtenay rubber and across Route 2 into the plantation area just south of the province boundary. B Company was to move within AO Quebec from west to east along the axes of the Song Ca and the Suoi Ca and C Company within AO Tango along the axis of the Suoi Soc. The purpose of both these companies was to drive enemy into the D Company ambushes to the east.
A Company was to conduct reconnaissance in force operations within AO Zulu, specifically to locate tracks and determine enemy movement patterns. 
Intelligence sources considered that elements of 3-274 Vietcong Regiment could be located astride the Phuoc Tuy Long Khanh Provincial Boundaries and it was well known that the traditional routes across Route 2 within the civilian access areas surrounding the De Courtenay rubber were in constant use. Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill considered that a concentration on these areas would be profitable and deployed accordingly.
The Battalion's first operational contact occurred at dusk on 12th December when 1 Platoon A Company contacted two enemy in AO Zulu. One was wounded but the second immediately fired an RPG which wounded six 1 Platoon soldiers. Four of the six were evacuated that evening and two the following morning.
From the period 12-20th December numerous contacts were made particularly in the D and B Company A0s, with the location of unoccupied bunker systems becoming almost a daily occurrence. D Company was particularly successful during this period killing numerous enemy from ambush positions. The pattern was broken on 20th December when 1 ATF intelligence, confirmed by B Company sightings, indicated a possible major enemy concentration just north of the Province boundary. The Commanding Officer decided to redeploy the Battalion to block the enemy location, to be followed by a drive through the area with B Company, once blocks were in position.
US and ARVN forces were to provide blocks in depth to the north and north west of the target area, with redeployment to take place on 22nd December. The concept depended on stealth for success, it was essential that enemy elements within the target area were not alerted until blocks were in position.
This did not occur, as on 21st December D Company while moving into its blocking position to the east of the target area contacted an enemy force of Platoon strength in bunkers at 390906. A fierce fire fight followed until last light, when D Company withdrew from the bunker system and formed a defensive perimeter.
During the night there was obvious enemy activity within the bunker system, however when D Company supported by tanks, moved back the following morn ing the bunkers were empty except for enemy dead.
Early on 22nd December blocks were positioned and from 22-24th December reconnaissance in force was conducted by B Company within the block positions. Some contact was made but over the next few days the companies returned to ambush and reconnaissance in force operations, with the Assault Pioneers following up and destroying all bunkers located.
Contacts were regular with small groups of enemy and numerous caches were found. This routine was broken by a patrol of trackers and mortarmen on a local patrol from Fire Support Base Peggy on the night of 8th January, which contacted a large number of enemy. The engagement continued through the night with the patrol being reinforced by the Assault Pioneer Platoon and a section of Armoured Personnel Carriers and supported by "Shadow aircraft". Results were indeterminate but drag marks were discovered in the area next morning.
 On 9-10th January the Battalion returned to Nui Dat.
The operation had been initially aimed at destroying enemy nstallations in AO Ashgrove and it was influenced by the intelligence assessment that 3-274 Regiment was attempting to re-establish itself in its old Song Ca base areas. Positive identifications of C21 and C24 identified 274 Regiment, probably 3-274.
Contact was made in the early stages of the operation with C6-D440 and documents captured on the Secretary of the Party Chapter of the Cau Su Unitindicated D6-MR7 Sapper Battalion were moving into the area. This was later substantiated by contact with a member of the Battalion.
The Battalion's operation to surround HQ 3-274 Regiment although it did not make contact with the HQ itself, did identify the Regimental Support Companies C20, C21 and C23, elements being killed in the blocking positions.
The traditional resupply routes roughly aligning the provincial boundary were found to be in constant use and the effectiveness of ambushing in these circumstances was well illustrated by the fact that forty three of the fifty two known enemy casualties were accounted for by firing from ambush positions.
Positive results of the operation were: Enemy Casualties, KIA 28 - WIA 24 - POW 1, Small Arms Weapons Captured 26, Mortars 1 , Small Arms Ammunition Captured 2120, Grenades 26 Explosive 24 Ibs. Detonators 41, Food Captured Rice 1067 Ibs. Salt 86 lbs. Misc. Food 349 lbs.
Own Casualties:KIA 1 - WIA 13
FSB Peggy - YS 43-83 On the N edge of the Cu Bi Rubber Plantation, 6 km NNW of Duc Tanh, 2 km W of Rte-2, 3 km SW of FSB Kylie and 16 km due N of Nui Dat. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s Bty 18Sep-6Sep70) firebase set here 11Dec69-10Jan70. Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps.

Operation 'Napier'
10 Jan - 28 Feb

Operation 'Matilda'
15 Jan 70 - 25 Jan 70

Operation 'Keperra'
26 Jan - 14 Feb 70

CTZ: III Corp
TAO. AO
Allied Units Involved: 8 RAR, 1/16 Mech Inf(US). In DS 161 Fd Bty, 1 Fd Sqn, 1 Div Unit, Psyops Unit, 1 Aust CA Unit,
Objective of Operation: To conduct from Nui Dat Base at Xuyen Moc. Nui Nohn and in Nui Dinh Hills.
Descriptive Narrative of Operation: Operation Keperra began on the 23rd January 1970 with the cordon and search of two villages in the south east of Phuoc Tuy Province, Xuyen Moc and Nui Nhon. Cordon hours 0030 at night . On the afternoon of 24th January the Battalion re-deployed by road to a lie up position west of Nui Nhon. The cordon was inserted on foot and was in position by 0300 hours. The following morning 237 people were screened. Practical results of the two cordons were, Xuyen Moc seven detainees on the police black list were held for subsequent checking and in Nui Nhon three were held, one of whom was a VC intelligence agent.The Battalion then returned to Nui Dat by road on the afternoon On the 25th January they prepare for deployment into the Nui Dinh Hills on 26th and 27^th January.
The Nui Dinhs lying some 5,000 to 6,000 metres south west of the Nui Dat base have often been used as a stronghold for operations by the VC and NVA against the populated areas in the south of Phuoc Tuy. At this time, approaching Tet it was considered by the commander 1 ATF Brigadier Weir, to be harbouring elements of D67 Engineer Battalion and D41 Chau Duc guerillas. He therefore ordered 8 RAR to carry out operations on the eastern side of the hill complex in conjunction with 1-16 US (Mech) Bn of 2 US Bde, 1 lnf Div, who were to take the western side.
The operations of both Battalions were designed to prevent any Vietcong offensive against Baria and surrounding districts during TET. Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill's concept was to locate B and D Companies in the north east and south west of the Battalion AO in ambush positions, whilst A and C Companies drove down from the top of the mountains towards them. The enemy were thus to be swept down into the ambush positions. On completion of the sweep the companies were to be flown back to the top to repeat the operation. 
The deployment began by D Company moving to its block position by tracks of B Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment and B Company to its position by truck, on 26th January. On 27th January the Assault Pioneers flew to an LZ on top of the hill complex after preliminary clearing by a light fire team of 9 Squadron RAAF. The Assault Pioneers then secured the LZ for the fly in of a section of mortars and A and C Companies. 
The first important incident occurred late on the afternoon of 28th January when three enemy contacted a D Company ambush in the south of the Battalion AO, resulting in one enemy killed and one wounded, who was captured. The PW after interrogation was identified as belonging to the Chau Duc guerillas rear services element, engaged in a forward resupply mission.
After two days of operation little contact had been made although much sign of enemy presence was seen including sixty unoccupied bunkers by A Company. Lieutenant Colonel O'Neill then decided to re-locate B Company from the foothills further to the north east to cover the valley of the Song Sui and the Song Chau Pha due west of the Task Force base, as this appeared to be the logical route between the Task Force base and the Nui Dinhs for VC movement to the provincial centres. No contact was made until 2nd February when one VC was killed and one wounded by B Company.
This was followed on 3^rd February by a further contact when two enemy were killed, and one wounded who was captured, again by B Company. The captured guerilla was identified as a Chau Duc and provided valuable information concerning the main Chau Duc base north west of the Nui Dinhs and locations of guerilla tunnels within Hoa Long village. Information on the Chau Duc base was followed up by 1-16 US Battalion.
On the 3rd February D Company and C Company returned to Nui Dat for ready reaction tasks. A Company continued to search the Nui Dinhs moving down the re-entrants to the south and north east of the complex with B Company remaining in location.
During the nights of 7th-9th, C Company was given local ambush tasks east of Hoa Long without contact and on the 10th was deployed to the western edge of the Long Hai Hills to protect an engineering quarrying party of 21 Construction Squadron and to ambush between the hills and the villages of'Long Dien and Dat Do. One further contact was made, resulting in 2 enemy killed,.and on 14th February A and B Companies returned to Nui Dat. 
FSB 'Charlie Deuce' YS 2567
The results of Operation Keperra were: Enemy Casualties KIA: 6 - WIA: 3 - PW: 1 Small Arms weapons captured: 3 - Small Arms ammunition captured: 100, Grenades: 2 - Explosives: 2 lb.Food Captured: 285 lb.Rice -  Salt 2 lb. - Miscellaneous: 1 00 lb.
Own Casualties KIA: 1 - WIA: 3
29-1-70 Wagstaff V.N. Pte 312756 8RAR RAINF 21 KIAFFF GSW. Mistaken for VC during ambush.

Operation 'Cutlass III'
27Jan 70 -

Operation ' Hammersley'
10 Feb - 9 Mar 69

8 RAR Unit Citation

"An excellent combat unit, always displaying high morale while co-operating and assisting the Vietnamese people in their struggle against Communism and to defend peace and freedom.  While operating in Military Region III, Republic of Vietnam from 28 November 1969 to the present, the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force participated in almost every military operation to search out and destroy the enemy in Phuoc Tuy province.  Though fighting under the most difficult conditions, the members of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force still fought bravely and determinedly and had many glorious victories.
Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills.  This area is known as 'Minh Dam Secret Zone', a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province.  This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces.  But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy's secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there. "
General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

Citation Presented 0n the 29 Oct 70
by Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commander of II Corps and Military Region 3
to the Commanding Officer 8 RAR Lt Col K. O'Neill

CHARLIE VALLEY:
8 RAR IN THE LONG HAI HILLS - 1970

After Action Report
(pdf file 23.86mb)

Operation 'Uhlan'
12/2/1970 -

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Start Date End Date
28/2/1970 10/3/1970
Allied Units Involved: A Coy/ 6th RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion, one Coy 18 ARVN Div, one Tp plus one AMC sect B Sqn 3 Cav Regt, one CET 1 Fdn, 1 sect 81mm mortars 6 RAR(NZ). one Tp A Sqn 1 Armd Regt
Enemy Units Involved
Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA
Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA
Enemy WIA
Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance in force operation in AO COSSACK
Descriptive Narrative of Operation
Sources Used in Archive
Preliminary Checklist Of United States Military Operations In Southeast Asia

Operation ' Epsom'
16 /2/1970 -

Operation ' Gisborne'
28/2/1970 -10 /3/1970

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Start Date End Date
28/2/1970 10/3/1970
Allied Units Involved: 6th RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion
Enemy Units Involved
Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA
Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA
Enemy WIA
Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance in force operation
Descriptive Narrative of Operation
Sources Used in Archive
Preliminary Checklist Of United States Military Operations In Southeast Asia
8-3-70 Duffy .K.A Pte 1735143 6RAR RAINF 21 KIA In contact. East of Nui Dat 2.
8-3-70 Power R.E. Cpl 2790170 6RAR RAINF 22 KIA In contact. East of Nui Dat 2.
8-3-70 Clarke R.D.. Pte 3794556 6RAR RAINF 21 KIA In contact. East of Nui Dat 2.

7.62mm SLR M16

Operation ' Semaphore'
28/2/1970 -

Operation ' Hamilton'
3/3/1970 - 24/3/1970

After Action Report
(pdf file 23.86mb)

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Units Involved: 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, D Coy 6 RAR and one Coy 7 RAR, Tp 3 Cav Regt, Tp 1 Armd Regt. 161 Fd Regt, 161(Indep) Recce Flt. Working in co-op RFCoy Xuyen Moc.
Objective of Operation: RIF Ops
Descriptive Narrative of Operation: Operation Hamilton was mounted to follow up the success of Operation Hammersley. On the night of 19th February 1970, when 8 RAR was withdrawn from the Long Hais for a B52 strike, the bulk of D445 moved into the Tan Ru area. No contact was made with them until A Company 6 RAR operating in the South East of their AO contacted a strong enemy bunker system east of Dat Do and just north of Route 23, on lst March.
After a lengthy fire fight in which 13 friendly wounded were sustained, the enemy was identified as elements of D 445. The identification was extremely valuable, as it was essential after the battering this Battalion had sustained in the Long Hais to keep up the pressure on it and if possible to destroy it. This was the first positive identification of D 445 since 8 RAR's major contact on 18th February. 
Although the enemy moved from the bunkers after the 6 RAR contact, the Commander 1 ATF Brigadier Weir, decided to deploy three companies of 8 RAR to AO Ascot with the Battalion Headquarters moving to an old Fire Support Base, Discovery, about five thousand metres west of Xuyen Moc Village. One company was to remain in the Long Hai Hills as a protection group for the quarrying operation, with the secondary roll of ambushing major exit routes from the Long Hais.
On the 3rd March 1970, Battalion Headquarters deployed by road from lsa to Discovery, and A Company flew into Discovery to begin operating west of the base. B Company deployed by road to its AO and D Company followed next day by air. The Battalions task was to locate D 445, particularly the headquarters element and if possible to encircle and destroy it.
With D 445's capacity to move rapidly and disperse quickly and also its proven ability to survive over the years, this was a formidable task. There were however some factors in 8 RAR's favour. The enemy was battered, with the usual assumption following that his morale was suffering. He was short of food and medical supplies. He had been forced from a location in the Long Hais where he had lived comfortably and in relative security for seven months and was on the run.
Lastly and perhaps most important of all, he had vacated his base adjacent to the Long Dien and Dat unable to carry out his propaganda and intimidation tactics in the most populous areas of the province. Despite this, the questions that faced Colonel O'Neill were these, first, the perennial "where is he" and second "once found how can destruction be assured?".
The answer to the first question came on 7^th March when a report was received to the effect that HQ D445 was located in the Battalion AO in an area approximately four thousand metres south west of Xuyen Moc. The Battalion was immediately given additional resources, as D Company 6 RAR and A Company 7 RAR were passed to under operational control of 8 RAR, with support being supplied by a troop of tanks and a troop of cavalry. The Battalion plus D Company 6 RAR was rapidly deployed to block the area, while A Company was given the task of reconnaissance in force within the block.
D Company 7 RAR simultaneously cordoned off Xom Trai Den four thousand metres west of the target, in order to catch any enemy who might be on liaison and reconnaissance tasks in the village. No contact was made that day and the following day A Company 7 RAR passed back to Task Force operational control. The reconnaissance in force continued on the 8th, D Company 6 RAR being given an additional task of checking an area south west of the original target. During a sweep of the new target, enemy firing from bunkers initiated contact, killing three members of the company and wounding five others. As the company applied pressure the enemy broke from the bunkers and withdrew south and south east. The subsequent search revealed nine freshly constructed bunkers containing some documents and ammunition.
During D Company 6 RAR's fire fight the companies of 8 RAR, the tanks and APC's were deployed immediately to surround the enemy location. Deployment took place rapidly but no contact was made and it was apparent that the enemy in the nine bunkers had made an extremely rapid withdrawal. D Company 6 RAR following up their search of the nine bunkers located an additional 20 bunkers approximately 300 metres further south. All were recently constructed, were located near water and had been occupied in the s apparent that the original intelligence report had been substantially correct, but the location given had been 2,000 - 3,000 metres north east of the actual enemy site. Once again the elusive D 445 had come close to destruction.
On the 10th March the companies deployed to separate A0s south east of Xuyen Moc in an attempt to locate D 445 elements which were thought to have moved generally east after the contact on 8th March. By the evening of 10th March the Battalion was in position and conducting reconnaissance and ambush tasks over a wide area from the coast to route 23 in the north. Quick results followed when B Company contacted a small enemy force that afternoon, killing one and capturing a weapon.
Two days later C Company was withdrawn from lsa and moved into AO Ascot to join the rest of the Battalion in reconnaissance and ambush. No further enemy contact was made until the 18th March, although sizeable bunker systems and caches were discovered by C, B and A Companies.
On the 18th March B Company which had moved to a new AO north east of Xuyen Moe made contact twice. On the first occasion two Vietcong were contacted returning to a small camp site that had beendiscovered by a platoon. One of the enemy was killed and he was later identified as a postman for the Xuyen Moc guerillas. The platoon remained in location and later in the day contacted two more enemy, one of whom was killed and the other wounded and captured. Identification was again of Xuyen Moc guerillas.
On 21st March C Company returned to Nui Dat for base patrol tasks and the other three companies continued to maintain ambushes within their AO's. No further contact was made until 23rd March when a platoon of B Company engaged between 6-8 enemy in a small jungle camp. The Vietcong withdrew rapidly and 6 Platoon B Company was airlifted from Fire Support Base Discovery to cut off the withdrawal route. As they landed they made fleeting contact with the escaping enemy, capturing a weapon and pack, but just failing to cut the escape route. On 24th March the two remaining companies and the Battalion Headquarters returned to Nui Dat.
The results of Operation Hamilton were inconclusive. D445 which was the primary target had been chased hard but always managed to stay one jump ahead of the Battalion in spite of some very rapid reaction. Undoubtedly the enemy had been pushed away from the villages temporarily, but it was equally certain that he would be back.
Results of the Operation were: Enemy: KIA 3 - WIA 1 - WIA Possible 1, Weapons Captured. 7, Ammo 7.62 400 rounds - Grenades 2 - Mines 2 - RPG Rounds 2 - Mor Rounds 62, 57mm Rounds 19 - Rice Captured: 1 200 lbs.
Own Casualties. KIA 2 - WIA 8 Attachments. KIA 3 - WIA 5 - Accidental WIA 1.
6-3-70 Bressington J Pte 218583 8RAR RAINF 23 KIA Mine. Triggered mine E.of Xuyen Moc.
6-3-70 O'Dal S.J. Pte39016 8RAR B/5 70.03.06 20RAINF DOW At 1FDHOSP V.T. from mine shrap wds that day
FSB Discovery - YS 60-68 On Rte 328, 18 km due E of Nui Dat, 5 km NNW of FSB Bond, 13 km NE of Dat Do, 5 km W of Xuyen Moc, and 14 km NE of FSB Horseshoe. Placed in a position to provide support for 8 RAR’s blockade of VC escape routes from the Long Hai Hills during operations there in 1970. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s Bty 18Sep69- 6Sep 70) firebase set here 3-22Mar70 (left section), 11-24Mar70 (right section). Prov, III Corps.

Operation ' Finschhafen'
9/3/1970 - 7/4/1970

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Start Date End Date
9/3/1970 7/4/1970
Allied Units Involved: 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. In DS 106 Fd Bty, one H13 161(indep) Recce Flt, emls plant 1 Fd Sqn plus 4 splinter teams one Tp B Sqn 3 Cav Reg. for deployment 9 Sqn RAAF.
Enemy Units Involved
Allied Operational Strength Enemy Operational Strength Allied KIA
Allied WIA Allied MIA Enemy KIA
Enemy WIA
Objective of Operation: To destroy elms of D445 bn and other en within AO KURRAJONG
Sources Used in Archive
Preliminary Checklist Of United States Military Operations In Southeast Asia
3-4-70 Smith R.K. Pte 2257880 7RAR RAINF 19 KIA GSW to chest by sniper in Long Khanh Prov.
FSB Anne YS5477 106Fd Bty in situ 10 March.
23 March. Six soldiers from 7 RAR Assualt Pioneer Pl are accidentally wounded by a mortatr round fired from FSB Anne.

Nui Dat, South Vietnam. March 1970. Adelaide Army sponsored concert party's finale at Luscombe Bowl. The entertainers on stage are, left to right: Tammy (of the brother and sister act, Ricky and Tammy), Bev Harrell, Ricky, the Wills Sisters, Ann and Sue. The show was rated tops by hundreds of off-duty troops who packed the bowl. Copyright AWM

Nui Dat, South Vietnam. January 1970. Vocalist Julie Lewis, on stage, sings to Australian troops at Luscombe Bowl at the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) Base. Julie was one of two female entertainers in the Army and Australian Forces Overseas Fund sponsored concert party which visited the war zone over Christmas and New year. The ABC Dance Band provided the music and the concert party played to capacity audiences wherever it went. Copyright AWM

Operation 'Raven'
25 - 29 March

Operation 'Townsville'
25 March +

Operation' Phoi Hop'
7 - 19 April 1970

Operation ' Concrete I'
Phase 1 of Op 'Nudgee'
19/4/1970 - 7/5/1970

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Units Involved: HQ 1 ATF, 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC), 7RAR, 8RAR, 4Fd Regt, ASqn 1 Armd Regt, BSqn 3 Cav Regt, 1Fd Sqn,161 lndep Recce Fit.
Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance and ambush operation
Descriptive Narrative of Operation
This was a Task Force operation involving all three battalions centred on the District of Xuyen Moc.The operation was mounted to destroy D445 Main Force Battalion, and its base areas. Task Force units involved in the operation were:
7 RAR's task in the operation was to reopen FSB "Discovery" on Route 328 four kilometres north of Route 23. The FSB provided artillery support for reconnaissance and ambush operations conducted by rifle companies in the VC base area known as the Tan Ru. One company was to hold the Horseshoe Hill north of Dot Do and train an ARVN company from the 18 ARVN Division.For the operation the battalion was allotted the following support:
In direct support 106 Fd Bty and one light helicopter. In support 3 Tp A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, a Section of B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 2 Tp 1 Fd Sqn. For a short period of time C Bty of 2/35 US Artillery,a 155 mm bty, was deployed in FSB "Discovery".
On 15th April, C Company was placed under operationcil control of HQ 1 ATF and moved by road to the Horseshoe. In addition to its training role, C Company was to conduct ambushes within Dot Do District. At 11.45 a.m. on 19th April, A and B Companies commenced to deploy from Nui Dot by foot. After reaching lie up positions they were to wait for darkness before completing their move. At 2.30 p.m. D Company moved by road to the Horseshoe from where it deployed during the night into the area north of Nui Nhon, about ten kilometres east of the Horseshoe. At first light on the morning of 20th April, all three rifle companies had reached their objectives and were ready to commence detailed searching within their respective Area of Operations.
Early on the morning of the 20th April the Support Company element of the FSB moved from Nui Dot by APC via Routes 2, 23, and 328 to "Discovery". Battalion Headquarters followed later in the morning. All deployment was completed by midday on 20th April.
At 1.45 p.m. on 20th April, 4 Platoon B Company made contact with six VC in an area four kilometres west of "Discovery". A particularly rapid and aggressive follow up by 4 Platoon resulted in 1 VC killed. This was the first contact of the operation.
On 22nd April at 1.15 p.m. B Company sighted another two enemy on the western bank of the Song Rai River about 1,500 metres south east of the original contact area. The follow up from this sighting resulted in a further contact being made with the enemy at 2.35 p.m. which developed into 7 RAR's first clash with D445 Battalion in a bunker system. The battle continued throughout the afternoon. Contact was broken at 4.20 p.m. to allow an airstrike on the enemy bunkers and permit evacuation of our wounded.
At 6.12 p.m. a troop of Centurion tanks linked up with 6 Platoon and started to move forward to the area of battle, however, darkness fell before the attack could be pressed home. During the night B Company patrols moved out to cut possible enemy withdrawal routes to the east. At first light the attack was pressed home and the bunkers taken.
Blood soaked bandages and blood trails in the area indicated that the enemy had taken a number of casualties. Documents captured showed that the position had been held by C3 Company of D445 Battalion and K6 Company of D440 Battalion.
Between the 22nd April and the 8th May all,companies except C continued a detailed search of the Tan Ru. This search disclosed a number of bunkers. From these, and documents captured in contacts, there was now proof fhcit all sub units of D445 Battalion were or had been, in the area.C Company remained under operational control of 1 ATF.
On the 25th April, a 12 man patrol from the company ambushed an enemy group of 50 to 60 guerilicis in the sand dunes outside the village of Long Phuoc Hai, south of Dot Do. The enemy was well armed and fought with machine guns, AK 47 assault rifles and RPG rockets to assist extraction of their dead and wounded before breaking contact. Skilled use by the patrol commander of artillery, air and the fire power of a troop of tanks prevented the enemy from assaulting the patrol's position. Documents taken from enemy dead identified them as being from the Long Dot District Concentrated and Phuoc Hai Guerilla units.
During "Concrete 1" 7 RAR had made contact with all major elements of the enemy who were to oppose the battalion for the remainder of the tour.
The statistical results of the operation were 19 VC killed in action, one Vc prisoner, three wounded VC and on Hoi Chanh.
Our own losses being two killed, nine wounded, one who died from wounds later and three minor wounded who remained on duty. Enemy material captured included 9 AK47 rifles, 3 m16 rifles, 1 RPD light machine gun, 1 RPG 2 and 1 K54 pistol. Large quantities ammunition. clothing and personal equipment was also captured.
20-4-70 Tognolini M.P. Tpr218453 B3CAV 19 RAAC DOW At 1FdHosp from wds earlier that day
21-4-70 Kavanagh G.R. Pte 4720992 7RAR2 B/6 21 RAIN F DOD Dehydration and high body temp.
22-4-70 Hughes R.E. Pte 44897 7RAR2 B 19 RAINF DOW At 24EVACHOSP after RPG shrap to head earlier that day.
FSB Bond - YS 62-64 At the intersection of Rte-23 and Rte 328, 4 km SSE of FSB Discovery, 20 km ESE of Nui Dat and 7 km N of the ocean. 161 Bty’s deployment here was part of Operation Concrete, the largest Australian Operation since WWII, involving all 3 RAR Inf Bns, 1ATF HQ, a Field Rgt and supporting arms, that were deployed to destroy the HQ of the D445 VC RGT. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s Bty 18Sep-6Sep70) firebase set here 20-26Apr70. Prov, III Corps.

Operation ' Nudgee'
("Concrete I & II")
20/4/1970 - 11/6/1970

CTZ: III Corp
TAO
Units Involved: HQ 1 ATF, 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC), 7RAR, 8RAR, 4Fd Regt, ASqn 1 Armd Regt, BSqn 3 Cav Regt, 1Fd Sqn,161 lndep Recce Fit.
Objective of Operation: Reconnaissance and ambush operation
Descriptive Narrative of Operation:Operation Nudgee can conveniently be divided into two phases, each of which had widely differing objectives and significantly different results.
Phase 1. The Battalion deployed on 20th April to an area generally to the south of Xuyen Moc on a Task Force operation named Concrete, involving the three Battalions of the Task Force and a great majority of the supporting arms. Operation Concrete was mounted to destroy the headquarters of D445 and any other elements of the Battalion that could be found in the Task Force area of operations.
The basic concept was for 6 RAR to drive from the north to south, east of Xuyen Moc into blocks formed by 8 RAR running from north to south below Route 23 and extending from Route 23 to the coast. 7 RAR was to establish blocking positions to the west of Xuyen Moc in the vicinity of the Song Rai.
8 RAR deployed by road on the morning of the 20th of April with A Company in armoured personnel carriers securing the area for Fire Support Base Bond, located at the intersection of Routes 23 and 328. This Fire Support Base was named after Brigadier General Bond the former commander 199 US Light Infantry Brigade who had been killed a week before. 8 RAR had co-operated closely with 2-3 Infantry Regiment US of 199 Brigade during the Battalion's first operation. B Company followed A Company, taking over their carriers at Bond and proceeding south along the axis of Route 328.
Some three kilometres south, the third carrier in the column struck a 40 lb mine wounding nine 8 RAR soldiers and one engineer and trapping the driver in the wreckage. The Commanding Officer immediately flew to the Battalion Headquarters road convoy and sent the Regimental Medical Officer, C. Josephsen to the scene of the mine incident where he performed invaluable first aid and by surgery freed the driver from the carrier. C and D Companies deployed by road, and on foot to their positions.
By midday the whole Task Force was deployed with Task Force Headquarters located adjacent to Fire Support Base Bond. Two contacts only occurred in the 8 RAR AO. The first on the night of the 20th when 8 Platoon A Company moving into its night ambush position contacted seven to ten enemy in open paddy fields south west of Fire Support Base Bond. After a brisk fire fight the enemy withdrew leaving drag marks and bullet riddled packs.
The second occurred on the night of the 24th when 9 Platoon C Company contacted two enemy moving obliquely across their front, there were no casualties.
6 RAR also struck barren ground and was withdrawn from the operation on 23rd to return to Nui Dat.
7 RAR had moderate contact in its AO but no significant results were achieved by any of the Battalions.
The operation was marred by two further mine incidents, one in the 6 RAR AO and one involving C Company 8 RAR, producing casualties in both cases.
Reliable information had been received by Task Force that an attack would be mounted against Dat Do on the night of the 25th with the objective of assassinating a group of village chiefs who were to hold a conference there on that night. C and D Companies were moved to Dat Do as a preventative measure and laid ambushes that night to the east and south east of the town. The attack did not eventuate, but on the 26th A and B Companies were also withdrawn from AO Rainworth to resume ambushes in the Hoa Long area. 8 RAR had thus returned to its village barrier concept, with A Company contacting 3 enemy on the night of the 26th, killing one.
On the 27th, Fire Support Base Bond was vacated and the first phase of Operation Nudgee had finished.
Phase 11. B, C and D Companies were now required for a combined operation with the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Division (US) who were targeted onto an area north west of the Binh Ba rubber, where a concentration of D440 was reported. B and C companies deployed by air on the 28th to establish ambushes in depth to the south of the 2nd Brigade Operation. Thus B Company found itself back in its old stamping ground just west of Ap Suoi Nghe, with C Company generally to their west. D Company deployed by air to block to the north east of the American objective.
All three companies were now in a good position to interdict movement into and out from the populated areas north of the Task Force Base, while A Company continued its activities around Hoa Long, which were later extended to include Dat Do.
On the night of the 30th, 9 Platoon C Company again became involved in a major contact. In ambush on the banks of the Xoai, about eighteen to twenty enemy were seen moving from north to south on the opposite bank about 100 metres from 9 Platoons location. The platoon opened fire and rapidly became engaged in a heavy fire fight. Although the enemy appeared to be attempting their characteristic outflanking movement they did not try to cross the river and eventually withdrew taking their dead and wounded with them.
The sweep the next morning failed to produce any bodies although it was apparent that considerable damage had been caused, the Vietcong ability to remove dead and wounded from the battlefield under fire, being again demonstrated.
The following day B Company in its area west of the Binh Ba rubber sighted fifteen enemy moving from south to north. They were engaged by artillery and as they withdrew to the south were engaged by small arms with two being killed- A further three enemy also withdrawing south were engaged soon after by 4 Platoon with one other being killed. One of the dead, a female, was identified as the Part Chapter Secretary of Binh Ba and the driving force behind the Binh Ba guerillas.
Later in the day one further Vietcong was killed by 4 Platoon. Two days later two Binh Ba gueriii'as rallied to Duc Thanh district. Authorities. They reported that of the party of 16 guerillas, 10 had been killed by B Company ambushes. Thus in a short action B Company had decimated the very active group of Bing Ba querillas; only four remained as one local source remarked "they are at least temporarily disillusioned with the Vietcong cause".
A Company by this time had altered its stance slightly to include the southern approaches to Dat Do as well as Hoa Long. This immediately produced results as at 1930 hours on lst May a force of 30-40 Vietcong moving north from the Long Hais struck 3 Platoon A Company, just as they were getting set in their night ambush position south west of Dat Do. A brisk fire fight followed with the enemy again showing their skill at clearing the battlefield. The following morning one body was located although reports received from Dat Do suggested that at least six more were killed.
A short while later that evening 1 Platoon A Company contacted approximately seven to ten Vietcong south west of Hoa Long, resulting in 3 dead enemy and two blood trails.
The A Company ambush south west of Dat Do, again proved its worth at 2200 hours on 3rd May. It was in the vicinity of the contact two days before and occurred at approximately the same time. Some sixty enemy approached from the direction of the Long Hais and on contact probed the 3 Platoon ambush on three sides. The fire fight lasted for an hour and a half, with APCs reacting from the Horseshoe to assist.
During the contact a number of the enemy were seen to break to the south east and south west of the ambush location, however others attacked aggressively across the rice fields and in some cases came within grenade throwing distance of the 3 Platoon position. Contact was broken at about 2130 hours after the platoon had sustained six wounded.
The following morning's sweep produced only three bodies although undoubtedly many more had been killed in the contact. An unsubstantiated report revealed later that 50 Vietcong had been killed and wounded in the two A Company contacts on the 1st and 3rd. 
On the 7th May the Battalion Headquarters and the anti tank platoon deployed to Fire Support Base Le Loi the old Fire Support Base of the 4th Battalion of the 9th US Infantry Regiment. Minor contacts followed in the next few days in the C Company and A Company areas, until 3 Platoon A Company on the 9th May contacted six enemy, of whom three were killed. The contact area on Route 2 to the south west of Hoa Long was again proving to be a continuously useful location.
Five days later on 14th May approximately 12 enemy approached another 3 Platoon ambush situated four hundred metres south east of where the 9th May contact occurred. 3 Platoon initiated contact killing seven of the enemy, all later identified as Chau Duc guerillas. The Hoa Long "circuit" again proving to be one of the most active in the province.
On the 13th May A and D Companies supported by some 40 sappers of 1 Field Squadron conducted a lightning serach of a sector of Ap Bac Hamlet in Hoa Long Village without prior warning, finding large quantities of money, assessed as money to buy rice for the Vietcong.
D Company was the subject of an interesting experiment on the 18th May, the company being at this stage located generally on the western edge of the Binh Ba rubber. The plan was to send a bullock cart with Vietnamese Regional Force drivers from Duc Thanh along the fire trail south of the Binh Ba rubber then north west past 10 Platoon's ambush location.
The platoon was to keep the cart under surveillance in the hope that its unexpected presence in Vietcong territory might attract the enemy to it. This imaginative experiment did not produce results on this occasion but it was to be tried again at a later stage.
Another interesting method of deployment was tried by B Company on the 20th and again on the 26^th May. On each of these occasions a platoon of the company was deployed in Construction Troop scrapers to the area of Cam My north of Le Loi. The platoons, in each case, moved along Route 2 from Le Loi standing six to a scraper scoop and completely hidden from view. In both cases the impression created was one of an engineer plant moving on normal road construction activities. Outside the range oflocal observation the troops dismounted and moved to their ambush locations through the rubber on foot.
By the 25th May a calm had settled over the southern area of Phuoc.Tuy, attributable largely to the tight 8 RAR and 7 RAR control of the Vietcong access routes to the population centres. Even D445, which intelligence estimates located to the north east of Dat Do with some elements still in the Long Hais, seemed unusually quiet. It was obvious that the local Vietcong from the Chau Duc and the Binh Ba guerillas who had also suffered badly over the last few weeks were in no condition to even carry out normal liaison and propaganda tasks. The reduction of Vietcong influence in Binh Ba and Duc My was apparent in increased friendliness of the people and their willingness to give information.
On the night of 29th May a section of the Assault Pioneers ambushing some 1 000 metres south of Night Defensive Position ISA contacted an enemy force estimated at approximately thirty strong. After a brisk fire fight the enemy withdrew east into the Long Hais leaving two bodies behind. This contact was of special interest as the enemy force had that same night ambushed a PF group in the village of Lo Voi about 1200 metres south west of ISA where they had lain up for twenty four hours previously. The enemy having completed their task and killed four PF soldiers moved out of Lo Voi across the road and directly into the Assault Pioneer ambush. Although neither body had any identification it was fairly certain that they were an element of D445 and were apparently returning to the area of the Minh Dam Secret Zone.
A few dayslater 1 2 Platoon D Company ambushing by day on the north eastern tip of the Long Hais killed one Vietcong who was identified as a member of C3 D445, giving further weight to the assessment that elements of D445 were back in the Minh Dam Secret Zone.
On the 30th May both A and C Companies were moved to the north of AO Kipper whose boundary in the north ran along the Phuoc Tuy - Long Khan border. A SAS patrol had earlier made fleeting contact with a small enemy force in the area and because of the general lack of contact it seemed to Colonel O'Neill too good an opportunity to miss. C Company accordingly moved from its block position north east of the Nui Dinhs and A Company from its location north west of Le Loi. A few days later C Company headquarters made contact with two enemy one of whom was killed and identified as belonging to 274 Regiment.
On the 5th June A Company deployed by air to the south to attempt to pick up sign of activities of D440 who possibly at this time had moved back to an area north west of Le Loi. C Company also deployed by air on the 6th from the north of AO Kipper to Le Loi where they conducted local ambush patrols on both sides of Route 2 in the vicinity of the Binh Ba rubber and Duc Trung hamlet. On the 10^th A Company returned to Nui Dat and Operation Nudgee ended.
Phase ii of Operation Nudgee consolidated the evidence gained on Phoi Hop that concentration on the centres of population would produce good results and increase the basic security of the province considerably. It was apparent during the last three weeks of the operation that emphasis on the population had forced the Vietcong to scale down their activities and that the casualties inflicted on them had made them incapable of offensive action.
Tangible results of the operation were:Enemy Casualties: KIA 26 - WIA 35 (12 KIA possible), Does not include intelligence estimates of killed and wounded. Weapons Captured: Small Arms 17 - M79 1 - RPG 2 1 - 6OMM Mortar 1,Ammunition Captured: 6588 assorted rounds. Bangalore Torpedoes 2,Claymores 7 - Mines 5 ,Food Capturered: Rice 292 Ibs - Salt 10 Ibs - Miscellaneous 9 ibs
Own Casualties. KIA 4 - WIA 25
22-4-70 Garland B.A. Lt. 235324 101Bty RAA 231 .KIA Mine. FO att. to 6RAR2
26-4-70 Pothof R.C. Lt. 235324 7RAR RAINF 21 .KIA APC c/s 11 hit mine near Phuoc Hai.
29-4-70 Hurst H.W. Spr. 2791326 1FDSQN RAE 21 .KIA Landrover hit mine.
30-4-70 Stanczyk H.J. Pte. 44679 7RAR RAINF 21 .KIA VC AK47 round struck M26 grenade and adapter on L1A1
FSB Bond - YS 62-64 At the intersection of Rte-23 and Rte 328, 4 km SSE of FSB Discovery, 20 km ESE of Nui Dat and 7 km N of the ocean. 161 Bty’s deployment here was part of Operation Concrete, the largest Australian Operation since WWII, involving all 3 RAR Inf Bns, 1ATF HQ, a Field Rgt and supporting arms, that were deployed to destroy the HQ of the D445 VC RGT. 161 Bty, RNZA (Andrew’s Bty 18Sep-6Sep70) firebase set here 20-26Apr70. Prov, III Corps.
.FSB Le Loi - YS 45-76 Called FSB Le Loi. On Rte-2, 7 km N of Nui Dat, 4 km S of Duc Tanh, and 3 km SW of Ngai Giao. 161 Bty, RNZA, Andrew’s Bty set here 27-30Apr70, 7May-7Jun70, 6-29Jun70 and 1-14Jul70 (left section), 14-20Jun70 (right section); Master's Bty, 22Oct70, 3- 9Dec70. US 1st/8th Field Arty also here until Apr/May70, when it moved to support the Cambodian Invasion. While at Le Loi in 70, 8 RAR developed and unusual ambush tactic in which squads would hide in the upraised scoopers of "earth scrapers" (earth moving vehicles) that then dropped them off at ambush positions along Rte 2 without the local VC operatives observing them leaving the compound. During Jun70 (after 14Jun), 161 Bty fired its biggest shoot of the war, during which 184 "serials" pounded the area around FSB Dampier. Phuoc Tuy Prov, III Corps.

Operation ' Concrete II'
Phase 2 of Op 'Nudgee'
8/5/69 - 11/6/69

Operation ' Ashfield'
15/5/69 - 25/5/69

Operation Name
'Capricorn'