The Vietnam War was a conflict in which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, or North Vietnam) and its allies fought against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, or South Vietnam) and its allies. South Vietnam's allies included the United States, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. US combat troops were involved from 1965 until their official withdrawal in 1973. Australian and New Zealand troops were involved from 1962 to 1973. The war ended on 30 April 1975 with the defeat and capitulation of South Vietnam and its allies.
Australia as an ally of the United States, with obligations under the SEATO and ANZUS Pacts sent ground troops to Vietnam and contributed material to the war effort. As a result, in late 1964 the Australian government controversially re-introduced conscription for compulsory military service by eligible males aged 18-25.
After assisting in the Malayan Emergency, Australian and New Zealand military forces had gained valuable experience in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency. According to historian Paul Ham, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk “freely admitted to the ANZUS meeting in Canberra in May 1962, that the US armed forces knew little about jungle warfare”.
During 1961 and 1962, Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam, requested assistance from the US and its allies to improve South Vietnam's security. At the same time, the USA initiated the Many Flags program, hoping to counter the communist propaganda that Republic of Vietnam was merely a US puppet state and intending to involve as many nations as possible. The Australian government’s response was to send 30 military advisers, dispatched as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV), also known as "the Team". The Australian military assistance was to be in jungle warfare training, and the Team comprised highly qualified and experienced officers and NCOs, , many with previous experience from the Malayan Emergency. heir arrival in South Vietnam during July and August 1962 was the beginning of Australia's involvement in the war in Vietnam.The final commitment ceased on 2 December 1962 when the Australian Army Assistance Group (AAAG) departs Vietnam, on the last two RAAF C130 flights in support of Australian troops. This  now  leaves a small Australian Embassy Guard as the last of the Australian troops in Vietnam. The was the longest war Australia was ever involved in. Australia's peak commitment at any one time was 7672 combat troops and New Zealand's, 552, in 1969.

The Commitment

In April 1965, Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies announced the government had received from South Vietnam a request for further military assistance. “We have decided…in close consultation with the Government of the United States "to provide an infantry battalion for service in Vietnam.” He argued that a communist victory in South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia. “It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans” he added.
In late 1965 and early 1966 the full effects of President Johnson's decision in July to conduct a full-scale war in Vietnam gradually became obvious as the number of American forces committed to Vietnam rose from around 200 000 towards its eventual maximum of half a million, placing enormous strains on the economy and society of South Vietnam. The instability of political leadership in Saigon at least seemed to have been resolved after the removal of the last civilian leaders in June. The leading generals installed one of their numbers, Nguyen Van Thieu, as chief of state and the head of the RVN air force, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, as Prime Minister. Thieu was to prove the more successful and durable politician, but initially more attention was focused on the flamboyant and immature Ky, together with his glamorous young wife. Both Thieu and Ky unreservedly supported and assisted the enormous influx of men and resources from the United States and its allies, without any of the hesitations that, for example, Ky's predecessor Dr Quat had displayed in early 1965. President Johnson, after meeting both men at a hastily convened conference in Honolulu in February 1966, came away impressed especially by Ky's rhetoric about the need for economic, social and political reform alongside military success in Vietnam. These goals were then encapsulated in a joint American-Vietnamese statement known as the Declaration of Honolulu. The noble ideals of this statement reflected Johnson's genuine commitment to reform abroad as well as at home, but had rather less substance on the Vietnamese side. Ky's American advisers had tutored him in the use of rhetoric reminiscent of Franklin Roosevelt and Johnson himself. During this period of rapid and massive escalation Thieu and Ky suited American purposes admirably. The extent of their support within South Vietnam itself was another matter.
The scale and speed of the American build-up led inevitably to press speculation that Australia would be expected to increase its commitment.
Indeed there were several indications in diplomatic and military discussions that both Washington and Saigon hoped for additional Australian assistance. Pentagon officials referred to their hopes for small engineering, medical, naval and other units. More significantly, Robert McNamara told the Australian Ambassador in Saigon, David Anderson, on 29 November that Australia could expect a request for a second infantry battalion. McNamara was confident of a positive Australian response.25 During Hasluck's visit to Saigon in December the deputy to the American military commander indicated that the American forces wanted, in order of preference, either two additional battalions, to make up an independent brigade; or one further battalion, to make up a two-battalion task force; or various smaller units including artillery, engineers, field hospitals, and transport aircraft. At this time Ky made what Hasluck called 'almost a request', saying that additional army or air force assistance 'would be a big help'.26 Diplomatic exchanges between Washington, Canberra and Saigon ensured that any request would be seen to come from the RVN rather than the United States, and that it would only be presented when Australia was prepared to accept it.
Although well aware of these American and Vietnamese pressures, Australian ministers did not yet want to receive any such request. After one press report that Australia had already agreed to an American request for more combat troops, the FAD Committee noted that no such request had come from either Washington or Saigon. The committee added that 'any decision on a request would need to be made in relation to possible commitments arising from the British defence review'.
Britain's future policy in Southeast Asia was indeed the principal concern for Australian policy-makers at this time. After the talks in London in September, discussed in the previous chapter, Australians remained concerned by evidence that the British Government expected soon to be forced out of its bases in Malaysia and especially Singapore by local political pressures. The Australians thought that London was needlessly pessimistic, for the newly independent Singapore wanted the British to remain as a source of employment as much as security, but the Wilson Labour Government seemed swayed by the public statements of those in Malaysia and Singapore who denounced the bases as relics of colonialism. Furthermore, the British seemed to think that a withdrawal from Singapore might be linked to a negotiated end to Confrontation, on terms that Australia would have regarded as a virtual defeat for the Commonwealth nations. The British were also indicating that if removed from Singapore they would want to establish bases in Australia and that they would look to their allies, especially Australia, to help with the capital costs of these installations. The Australians did not relish this prospect, for strategic as much as financial reasons. Ministers and their advisers believed that bases in Australia would be poor substitutes, both politically and militarily, for those in Singapore and Malaysia. Moreover, public suggestions that the British were even contemplating withdrawal from Singapore or concessions to Indonesia would constitute a major setback for the Western allies in the region, undermining the position in Vietnam.

Australian counter-insurgency tactics

Historian Albert Palazzo comments that when the Australians entered the Vietnam war, it was with their own “well considered …concept of war”, and this was often contradictory or in conflict with US concepts.The 1ATF light infantry tactics such as patrolling, searching villages without destroying them (with a view to eventually converting them), and ambush and counter ambush drew criticism from some US commanders. General William Restore is reported to have complained to Major General Tim Vincent that 1ATF was “not being aggressive enough”.By comparison, US forces sought to flush out the enemy and achieve rapid and decisive victory through “brazen scrub bashing” and the use of “massive firepower.”Australians acknowledged they had much to learn from the US forces about heliborne assault and joint armour and infantry assaults. Yet the US measure of success -the body count – was apparently held in contempt by many 1ATF and battalion commanders.
In 1966 journalist Gerald Stone described tactics then being used by Australian soldiers newly arrived in Vietnam:

Looking back on ten years of reporting the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, journalist Neil Davis said in 1983; "I was very proud of the Australian troops. They were very professional, very well trained and they fought the people they were sent to fight – the Viet Cong. They tried not to involve civilians and generally there were fewer casualties inflicted by the Australians." Another perspective on Australian operations was provided by David Hackworth, Vietnam’s most decorated US soldier. "The Aussies used squads to make contact… and brought in reinforcements to do the killing; they planned in the belief that a platoon on the battlefield could do anything."

For some Viet Cong leaders there was no doubt the Australian jungle warfare approach was effective. One former Viet Cong leader is quoted as saying; "Worse than the Americans were the Australians. The Americans style was to hit us, then call for planes and artillery. Our response was to break contact and disappear if we could…The Australians were more patient than the Americans, better guerilla fighters, better at ambushes. They liked to stay with us instead of calling in the planes. We were more afraid of their style "However, as a junior partner, Australians had little opportunity to influence US strategy in the war. "The American concept [of how the war should be fought] remained unchallenged and it prevailed almost by default."
Overall, the tactics used by the Australian Army in Vietnam were not successful. Like the Americans, Australian tactics were focused on seeking to engage the Communist forces in battle and ultimately failed as the Communists were generally able to evade Australian forces when conditions were not favorable. Moreover, the Australians did not devote sufficient resources to disrupting the logistical infrastructure which supported the Communist forces in Phuoc Tuy province and popular support for the Communists remained strong. After 1ATF was withdrawn in 1971 the insurgency in Phuoc Tuy province rapidly expanded.

The Withdrawal

The Australian withdrawal can be seen as effectively commencing in November 1970, the first time an Australian unit was sent home without replacement . Australian combat forces were reduced during 1971. On 18 August 1971, Australia and New Zealand decided to withdraw their troops from Vietnam . Australian advisors of "the Team" continued to train Vietnamese troops however, until the announcement by the newly elected Australian Labor Government of Gough Whitlam that the remaining Advisors would be withdrawn by 18 December 1972. It was only on 11 January 1973 that the Governor-General of Australia, Paul Hasluck, announced the cessation of combat operations against the Vietnamese. However, Australian troops remained in Saigon guarding the Australian embassy until 1 July 1973.The withdrawal from Vietnam meant that 1973 was the first time since the beginning of World War II in 1939 that Australia's armed forces were not involved in a conflict somewhere in the world.

Elements of the Australian military returned to South Vietnam in 1975. In March 1975 the Australian Government decided to dispatch RAAF transport aircraft to the country to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees fleeing the North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh Campaign. The first Australian C-130 Hercules arrived at Tan Son Nhat Airport on 30 March and the force, which was designated 'Detachment S' reached a strength of eight Hercules by the second week of April. Detachment S's aircraft transported refugees from cities near the front line and evacuated Australians and several hundred Vietnamese orphans from Saigon to Malaysia. In addition, they regularly flew supplies to a large refugee camp at An Thoi on the island of Phú Quốc. The deteriorating security situation forced the Australian aircraft to be withdrawn to Bangkok in mid-April from where they continued to fly into South Vietnam each day. The last three RAAF flights into Saigon took place on 25 April when the Australian embassy was evacuated. While all Australians were evacuated, 130 Vietnamese who had worked at the embassy and had been promised evacuation were left behind.

Social attitudes and treatment of veterans

Service in the war was unpopular and opposition to it generated negative views of veterans in some quarters. In the years following the war, some Vietnam veterans experienced social exclusion and problems readjusting to society.As the tour of duty of each soldier during the Vietnam War was limited to one year (although some soldiers chose to sign up for a second or even a third tour of duty), the number of soldiers suffering from combat stress was probably more limited than it might otherwise have been.

Some World War II veterans held negative views and attitudes toward the Vietnam War veterans and as a result many Australian Vietnam veterans were excluded from joining the Returned Servicemen's League during the 1960s and 1970s on the grounds that the Vietnam War veterans did not fight a "real war". Further, many Vietnam veterans were excluded from marching in the ANZAC Day parades during the 1970s because the soldiers of earlier wars saw the Vietnam veterans as unworthy heirs to the ANZAC title and tradition, a view which hurt many Vietnam veterans. Eventually, however, on 3 October 1987, Australian Vietnam veterans were honoured at a "Welcome Home" parade in Sydney and it was there that a campaign for a Vietnam memorial began.

The Vietnam Forces National Memorial located on ANZAC Parade in Canberra, was dedicated on 3 October 1992.